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Abstract 
Since launching policies of economic reform in the 1980s, China has emerged from 
several decades of economic and urban stagnation to become more integrated into the 
regional and global economy. Cities have been integral to the growth machine of 
economic development.  China has experienced rapid development of industrialization 
and urbanization in the context of national institutional arrangements favouring 
decentralisation towards regions and cities, and reform towards a market-oriented 
economy. This political and economic transition has led to rapid changes in the urban 
landscape, including the construction of mega urban projects in peri-urban areas in the 
context of competitive and entrepreneurial urbanism.  
The main body of this thesis describes the planning and development processes of the 
Hongqiao project, the project‟s relationship to urban development and spatial 
restructuring in Shanghai, as well as the nature of urban change. This thesis empirically 
investigates the construction of a mega urban project, its governance mechanism and its 
impact on relocated people and neighbouring districts. It includes an intensive case 
study of the Hongqiao project in Shanghai based on empirical data derived from 
questionnaires, interviews and secondary data. 
The implementation of the project has involved the participation of government at various 
levels, state-owned companies, estate developers, banks, relocated people, all of them 
involved in numerous activities of flexible competition, cooperation, and negotiation. It is 
argued here that a land-based urban growth coalition was formed which became the 
driving force behind the Hongqiao project. The thesis argues that this coalition, led by 
the local state, has played a crucial role in the construction of the Hongqiao project in the 
context of competitive urbanism. The participants have maximized their own interests, 
particularly entrepreneurial government, which benefits most from lucrative land revenue 
place-making. The thesis argues further that competitive urbanism reveals a process of 
accumulation by dispossession, whereby the interests and voices of relocated people 
were ignored by powerful participants. The livelihoods of local residents of the Hongqiao 
project were impacted and compensation was limited, resulting in a paradoxical state of 
affairs that can be summarised as, “better living condition but worse life.” 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction: Hongiqao and urban theory 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Since market-oriented economic reforms were launched in 1978, growth has 
become the main theme in China, not only in terms of the economy, but also in 
terms of China‟s cities. The Chinese economy has grown at an annual rate of more 
than 10 per cent in the past three decades, and in 2012, China became the second 
largest economy in the world. Meanwhile, the Chinese urban landscape has also 
experienced a huge transformation in the past three decades, with the rate of 
urbanization rising from 22% to 33% between 1983 and 1999. By 2009, it increased 
to 49.6%; in 2012, it  exceeded 50%. The level of urbanization is expected to reach 
75% in the 2050s (Cheng and Masser 2003; Liu, Yin and Ma 2011). Cities of 
various sizes have experienced wave after wave of urban projects, resulting in 
urban growth. Shanghai was, and remains, the largest city in China, but despite its 
size, it can be seen as representative of Chinese cities in the process of rapid 
urbanization. The city‟s image and its landscape have been shaped by a series of 
urban regeneration projects in the city centre (Yang and Chang, 2007; He and Wu, 
2005), the development of Pudong New District (Wei and Leung, 2005) and a 
number of suburban developments (Tao, 2010). With the completion of various 
urban projects in the city centre and in Pudong on the east bank of the Huangpu 
River, the city‟s urban edge has attracted the attention of entrepreneurial local 
governments that see mega urban projects as the driving force of place promotion 
and economic growth. A number of recent studies have commented on projects on 
Shanghai‟s urban edge, including Shen and Wu‟s (2012a) work on an ersatz 
English town in Songjiang district, a new university town (Shen 2011) and 
competition with Kunshan (Chien 2013), a neighbouring city locked in fierce 
competition with Shanghai (discussed in Chapter 3).   
 
However, systematic studies of mega urban projects in China are lacking. In this 
thesis, I attempt to shed light on a number of questions: why was the Hongqiao 
project constructed? How has the project been constructed in such a short time? 
What is the impact of the project on West Shanghai and local residents? By 
drawing on the findings of a case study of the Hongqiao project in West Shanghai, 
this research explores the context of entrepreneurial urbanism; the dynamics of the 
land-based urban growth coalition formed to see the Hongqiao project through the 
planning and construction process; and the impact of the project on local people 
who have been displaced and relocated as a result of the project. The results of the 
fieldwork will be fully discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 following a review of 
urbanization in China, Shanghai‟s transformation and the regional background of 
competitive urbanism in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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1.2 Why study the Hongqiao project? 
 
The Hongqiao project has two components. The first is a transport hub, including a 
new terminus station for high-speed trains linking to the existing airport, which itself 
has been expanded. The second is a business zone. Altogether, the project covers 
some 26 square kilometres. The Hongqiao project was expected to promote 
economic and urbanization growth west of Shanghai through the construction of the 
commercial and trade centre of Shanghai in Hongqiao. Much more effort was put 
into the Hongqiao project by the Shanghai Municipal Government to realize its 
dream of a global city; against this background, the Hongqiao project became a 
super mega urban project in China, which has attracted considerable concern from 
the society, the media and academia. 
  
Since the start of the Hongqiao project in 2006, the transport hub was completed in 
2010 after five years of intense construction work. Since then, Shanghai Municipal 
Government‟s focus has been on the core area of the Hongqiao project, the 4.7 
square kilometres which include three parts of the first phase of the project. West 
Shanghai has become a new developmental hotspot. The Hongqiao high-speed 
railway line fuelled expectations among neighbouring districts governments. To take 
advantage of potential opportunities, those governments were commissioning 
consultation papers on the likely impact of Hongqiao‟s high- speed railway on 
regional economic development. Minhang District Government, which was 
responsible for overseeing the relocation of local residents to make way for the 
project, was actively involved in soliciting research on the potential for industrial 
upgrading presented by the project. As a graduate student, I was involved in the 
research in 2007, 2008 and 2009. At the time, I remember being shocked and 
fascinated by the tremendous scale of the Hongqiao project while conducting the 
fieldwork to evaluate its impact on Minhang district. The other face of this project 
was the rapid and large-scale land expropriation and relocation of local residents 
who lived in the area designated for the project. I was interested in the issues of the 
planning and construction of the new Hongqiao, as well as the relocation of 
residents, which had been ignored in earlier research. Local government had only 
paid attention to the economic opportunities brought by the high-speed rail station.  
 
I wondered why the largest project to be undertaken in Shanghai, and indeed in the 
whole of the country after Pudong, could be expedited in such a short time while 
having to overcome a series of difficulties. I wanted to know how the Hongqiao 
project would be organised and coordinated among so many participants, what the 
governance mechanism was, and what impact the Hongqiao high-speed railway 
would have on regional development on West Shanghai and beyond it, in the 
Yangtze River Delta (YRD). As my doctoral research progressed, my research 
crystallised around the following four questions. Firstly, what are the principal 
modes of urban development in Shanghai and how are they changing? Here, I will 
look at infrastructure-led urban development and the strengthening of Shanghai‟s 
role as a service centre. The bulk of the material relating to this question will be 
addressed through written documents. Secondly, how is a mega urban project like 
Hongqiao undertaken (envisaged, planned and constructed) and what is its 
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relationship to surrounding areas? Thirdly, how have the governance structures for 
the Hongqiao project been developed and what are the issues and problems 
involved? Finally, how are local people affected by the construction of the Hongqiao 
hub? 
 
1.3 Research aims and objectives  
 
This dissertation is a detailed examination of the planning and construction of 
Hongqiao and its impact on local residents. In brief, the broad aim of my research is 
to investigate the process of the planning and development of Hongqiao transport 
and business zone; to examine its relationship with urban development and spatial 
restructuring in Shanghai; and to thereby comment on and critique the nature of 
urban change in contemporary China, which will be characterised as property-led 
and infrastructure-led. I break this aim down into three objectives.   
 
The first objective is to obtain a full understanding of the nature of competitive 
urbanism in Shanghai and its region and, thereby, to shed light on the main 
features of entrepreneurial urbanism in contemporary China. Existing research on 
competitive urbanism has tended to concentrate on cooperation between cities from 
the perspective of city regions. For instance, Luo and Shen (2008) examine city 
region planning in the YRD to argue the role of state-led metropolitan governance, 
while Ye (2014) stresses the role of central government in promoting the formation 
of city regions in the Pearl River Delta. However, the nature of competitive 
urbanism in shaping urban structure has been much less examined. Therefore, this 
study will empirically assess the nature of entrepreneurial urbanism in Shanghai 
and its region. This objective will be covered primarily in Chapters 3 and 6. 
 
The second objective is to investigate the main features of the land-based urban 
growth coalition formed in Hongqiao through a representation of the detailed picture 
of the Hongqiao project. I stop short of referring to the organisations that drove 
forwards the Hongqiao project as an urban regime as the concept of urban regime 
is mainly relevant to the U.S. context and is of limited utility here (see the following 
section). Nevertheless, the concept of coalition is relevant and helpful in 
understanding urban change in China. I argue here in this thesis that growth 
coalitions in China are evolving into land-based urban coalitions. My research 
attempts to explore the mechanism behind land-based urban growth coalitions in 
China. Chapters 5 and 6 provide material to support this argument, and Chapter 8 
will link the findings back to my overall argument. 
 
The last objective is to investigate the consequences of the Hongqiao project on 
local residents in terms of its impact on livelihoods and to discuss this in terms of 
accumulation by dispossession. The existing research on residential relocation has 
tended to focus on “urban villages” in and around Guangzhou and Shenzhen in the 
south and Beijing in the north, sidestepping Shanghai (see, for example, Hao et al., 
2011). For Shanghai, most of the academic research has concentrated on urban 
restructuring in the inner city and consequent displacement of residents. (One 
among many examples is He and Wu 2007.) However, the urban periphery of 
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Shanghai and its urban villages are very different from those outside China‟s other 
large cities. This research aims to investigate the consequences of the Hongqiao 
project on local people who live in urban villages in Shanghai‟s peri-urban area and 
to place this in the context of accumulation by dispossession (see Chapter 7).  
 
1.4 Theoretical issues 
 
In this section, I will place my thesis within wider theoretical debates, laying the 
groundwork and setting a context for the detailed field case study that is discussed 
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. My aim here is to show how a close reading of the process 
of execution of the Hongqiao project can tell us much about Chinese urban 
development and restructuring, more broadly, and about how urban change in 
China may or may not relate to theory-building that largely emanates from 
universities in “the West.” Each of the subsections, below, relates to one of the 
three empirical chapters. In the first subsection, the literature on entrepreneurial 
cities and neoliberal urbanism is briefly introduced, followed by an introductory 
discussion of how some writers on China have drawn on the concept to interpret 
the Chinese urban political economy. Attention is drawn specifically to the planning 
and construction of mega urban projects such as Hongqiao, which, I argue, are one 
of the mainstays of competitive urbanism. These themes are developed, as they 
relate to Hongqiao, in Chapter 5.  
 
In subsection 1.4.2, I discuss briefly the development of the concept of 
accumulation by dispossession in the recent geographical literature, looking at how 
David Harvey‟s adaptation of Marx‟s original insight has been further developed by 
scholars and writers, with attention to how the concept has been adapted to the 
Chinese context. It is within the conceptual framework of accumulation by 
dispossession that the evidence presented in Chapter 7 drawn from my fieldwork is 
given broader theoretical purchase. It is hoped that the principal contribution of this 
thesis will be in its articulation of the concept of land-based urban growth coalitions. 
In order to set this in context, two key theoretical constructs – growth machine 
theory and urban regime theory – are introduced in subsection 1.4.3. More 
specifically, my interest here is on the portability of these concepts, especially in the 
Chinese context. In line with other writers, I argue that neither can be translated in 
full into the Chinese urban scene and that it is more useful to think in terms of 
coalitions rather than regimes. However, the centrality of land to the Chinese urban 
political economy and the unquestioned imperative of growth make growth machine 
theory in particular quite an attractive explanatory mechanism in the Chinese 
context.  
 
I should stress that in the subsections that follow, lack of space severely limits the 
extent and breadth of the discussion.  
 
1.4.1 Entrepreneurial urbanism and mega urban projects from London 
Docklands to Hongqiao in Shanghai  
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In this subsection, I will provide a brief overview of what Kevin Ward (2003, 116) 
refers to as the “entrepreneurial-turn literatures.” It should be noted that these 
“literatures” use a range of different terms to express this new urbanism, the 
principal ones being entrepreneurial, competitive and neoliberal. While each 
indicates a difference of emphasis, they can be considered to represent a 
commonality of interpretation. In a seminal account, David Harvey (1989) mapped 
out the passage from managerial to entrepreneurial governance. While Harvey was 
writing in the context of Baltimore and the U.S., he was conscious of the fact that 
his comments had much wider relevance. Quilley (2000) gave his interpretation a 
specifically British twist. He described a move from municipal socialism to the 
entrepreneurial city, examining this shift in the cities of northern England, and 
especially Manchester, and seeing the break as less abrupt than sometimes 
considered.  
 
Central to this understanding of change towards entrepreneurial urban governance 
is the notion of a more withdrawn role for the state counter-balanced by an 
increasing faith in the effectiveness of the market, bringing about an end to a whole 
range of conditions, approaches and actions normally associated with modernist 
urbanism and Fordist production. However, many writers qualify and even 
contradict this position. Over the last three decades, there has been a “slow erosion 
of key institutions enshrined in the welfare state and a major crisis in the legitimacy 
of modernist-inspired urban planning” (MacLeod et al., 2003, p. 1655). As Hall and 
Hubbard (1996, p. 155) argue, “It is difficult to assess whether the shift to 
entrepreneurial modes of governance is supplanting or merely supplementing 
traditional „managerial‟ approaches.” Peck and Tickell (2002) delineate a period of 
“roll out” neoliberalism, following the “roll back” neoliberalism of the 1980s. In other 
words, they see the state as reasserting its authority, albeit in new ways and 
different guises. We will see echoes of these debates in the context of Shanghai 
and Chinese urbanism. A further discussion that also has a bearing on China, with 
its dynamic fiscal and regulatory relationship between central and local government, 
is that of scale. Brenner (1999) is among a number of writers who have signalled a 
sense of shifting scales of governance, shifts that have brought on a fluid situation 
without easy resolution. Of particular relevance to the context of urban East Asia is 
Jessop and Sum‟s definition of an entrepreneurial city, which they apply to Hong 
Kong. For them, it has three defining features. It “pursues innovative strategies 
intended to maintain or enhance its economic competitiveness vis-à-vis other cities 
and economic spaces” (2000, 2289); it actively pursues these strategies; and it 
backs them up with the full panoply of entrepreneurial, market-oriented and 
marketing discourse.  
 
In recent years, debates about the shift to entrepreneurial urban governance have 
sought to come to grips with the neoliberal underpinnings of the changed world of 
urban governance in which it is generally agreed we live today. In doing this, there 
have been occasional criticisms, especially from those who do not espouse a 
Marxian approach of monolithic theory-making. This has been countered in various 
ways, but primarily through articulations of a more fine-grained and variegated 
neoliberal urbanism. Brenner and colleagues see neoliberalism as variegated in its 
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discourses, uneven in its spatial distribution and inconsistent in its temporal 
penetrations (Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010). Larner (2003) and Perreault and 
Martin (2005) are among writers who move away from a view of neoliberalism that 
is centred in the North Atlantic towards an understanding of a much more protean 
force with a topography that is anything but hierarchical. Larner (2003), referring to 
Latin America and New Zealand, reminds us that neoliberalism has been as much, 
if not more, a product of the global periphery as it has been of the centre. Perreault 
and Martin (2005), in support of this contention, point out that it was first in Chile, 
and then in other Latin American countries, that neoliberal policies were applied.  
 
This call for a more modulated appreciation of neoliberalism and its expression on 
the urban terrain in the form of entrepreneurial and competitive urbanism has 
provoked the interest of scholars working on East Asia, and especially China. One 
constant in discussions about the (neoliberal) economy of East Asian cities is the 
prominent, if not actually dominant, role of the state, a factor whose importance 
becomes clear in discussing the case of Hongqiao in Shanghai. This represents, as 
Hill and Kim (2000) convincingly argue, an important contrast to the market-centred 
regime characteristic of leading Western cities. This understanding has 
subsequently been reinforced in numerous works (see for example Bae 2012) and 
is seen as a leading characteristic in China (He and Wu 2009). Prominent among 
scholars writing on these issues is Wu Fulong, who has intervened in debates both 
about the nature of Chinese neoliberalism and the distinctive qualities of the 
Chinese entrepreneurial city. He and Wu, in their study (2009) of the relevance of 
neoliberalism to China and Chinese cities, are insistent on the importance of the 
role of the state, not only at the central level, but also the local state, which they see 
as giving a particular coloration to neoliberalism in China. Another distinctive 
feature of Chinese-style neoliberalism, they argue, are the contradictions that 
emerge between central and local governments and “between emergent neoliberal 
practices and social resistance” (2009, 291). Some of these contradictions are 
evident in the Hongqiao project, as will become clear, especially in Chapter 7. In an 
earlier paper, Wu stresses the path dependence of development patterns in (post-) 
socialist cities (Wu 2003). In the context of Shanghai, he delineates three periods in 
the city‟s history according to the metaphors used to encapsulate Shanghai‟s role in 
the national economy: first, as China‟s bridgehead in the Nationalist period; then, as 
locomotive under state socialism; and finally, as dragon head in the contemporary 
era of so-called market socialism. Referring extensively to Jessop and Sum‟s (2000) 
definition of the entrepreneurial city, he notes how deals were cut with central 
government that favoured, in fiscal and other terms, Shanghai‟s emergence as a 
global city, how a discourse of entrepreneurial globalism was fashioned especially 
in city publicity, and in particular, how entrepreneurial spaces were created starting 
in 1983 with the Minhang–Hongqiao Development Corporation and development 
zone (see Chapter 5) and culminating in the decision to create a mammoth city 
district, Pudong, on the east bank of the river with its several special economic 
zones and especially the Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone (see Chapter 2). 
However, he stops short of seeing Shanghai as a fully-fledged “entrepreneurial city” 
as defined by Jessop and Sum, and this on account of the role of the state as agent 
creating a “territorially based entrepreneurialism” (Wu 2003, 1694).  
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At the centre of this thesis is the Hongqiao project in the west of Shanghai, the 
second largest urban redevelopment project ever to have been undertaken in 
Shanghai and in China, after Pudong. It is a mega urban project on a scale with few 
parallels, and one that invites reflection on the nature of entrepreneurial urbanism in 
the Chinese context. It becomes the most recent example of the competitive rush to 
build mega urban projects in China‟s largest cities, which has seen the proliferation 
of new financial districts in Beijing and Guangzhou (Gaubatz 2005). Of equal 
importance has been the impact of the three mega events to have been held in 
recent years in China‟s main cities: the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, the 2010 
World Expo held in Shanghai and the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games. These have 
provided the occasion for large urban restructuring programmes involving the 
displacement of hundreds and thousands of people, especially in Beijing 
(Broudehoux 2007), as well as in the football World Cup venue cities of South 
Africa and Brazil. They have also contributed to the creation of a planning 
environment conducive to the creation of exceptional zones outside the normal 
regulatory sphere.  
 
Mega urban projects are arguably the symbol par excellence of entrepreneurial 
urbanism, and it is not a coincidence that they have become a familiar part of the 
urban scene throughout the world, not least in East Asia (Orueta and Fainstein 
2008). They can be seen as the consequence of and a response to the 
deindustrialization of leading cities, first, in North America and Europe, and then, in 
East Asia as economies converted to a globalized neoliberal condition. Many, but 
not all, European mega urban projects are at waterside locations, London 
Docklands being the preeminent example (and Paris La Défense the preeminent 
exception). They are all part of urban restructuring consequent on the „capture of 
the city‟ by consumption capital.  
 
Mega urban projects in East Asia are as likely to use space on the urban edge as 
they are to use land along waterways or the coast. The outskirts of cities lend 
themselves to these developments because land there is plentiful and relatively 
cheap. Satellite cities of varying sizes have been built around the leading urban 
centres of Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as China, developments that 
are often facilitated by loose regulation and strong (often regional) capital. The 
construction of satellite cities on the periphery of South East Asian cities such as 
Jakarta and Phnom Penh has created a lively, if sporadic debate about 
globalisation and the role of regional capital. In what became a much-quoted 
intervention, Dick and Rimmer (1998) argue that the use of common technologies 
and global capital lent Jakarta‟s satellite cities strong commonalities with those of 
California. More recently, Percival and Waley (2012) have argued that the role of 
regional (predominantly Korean and Indonesian) capital and technology plays a 
predominant role in the development and construction of satellite cities around 
Phnom Penh. 
 
Academic discussion of peri-urban development around Chinese cities has followed 
a different trajectory, concentrating on the process in terms of the distinctive nature 
- Chapter 1 - 
8 
 
of the Chinese dual land regime and the role of the state in the appropriating rural 
land, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.4. Nevertheless, as Pereira (2002) 
and Chua Beng Huat (2011) among others have argued, Singaporean capital has 
been instrumental in the urbanization process in a number of contexts, most notably 
that of Suzhou and its joint Sino-Singaporean industrial park. As will be argued 
throughout this work, as a mega urban project on the urban periphery, Hongqiao 
needs to be understood in the context of a competitive approach to urbanization 
engendered by a political economy that is characterized by a Chinese version of 
entrepreneurial, neoliberal urbanism. This theme is reflected in and reinforced by 
the empirical account of the development of the Hongqiao project laid out in 
Chapter 5.  
 
1.4.2 Accumulation by dispossession and its relevance to Hongqiao  
 
A notable feature of the increasingly entrepreneurial, neoliberalized city is the 
extent to which economic growth is sought through the expropriation of land and a 
whole range of other factors by the commanding institutions of capital and the state. 
The classic definition of this process in the context of the contemporary world is, by 
now, that of David Harvey (2003), who in re-pitching Marx‟s concept of primitive 
accumulation advanced the concept of accumulation by dispossession. A very brief 
introduction to the concept will be provided here in order to provide a broader 
theoretical context for the empirical material advanced in Chapter 7.  
 
Harvey‟s reinterpretation of Marx was not designed to reject, but rather to update 
Marx‟s theory-making, linking it to insights that had been provided by Rosa 
Luxemburg (2003 [1913]). Arguing that Marx‟s primitive accumulation had 
contemporary relevance and should not be seen solely as a feature of the historical 
phase of feudalism, As Harvey wrote, “All the features of primitive accumulation that 
Marx mentions have remained powerfully present within capitalism‟s historical 
geography up until now” (Harvey 2003, 145). Of particular relevance to this study is 
Harvey‟s belief that “the monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land” 
(2003, 145) remains a leading means by which capital extracts value. Harvey 
himself has given greater definition and clarity to the term accumulation by 
dispossession, linking it to a process of privatization and corporatization that 
includes the extraction of resources and exploitation of the commons and the 
depletion of civic and public goods (2003, 148). 
 
In the last few years, a number of writers have extended the range and signification 
of the term. Some writers have emphasised the role of international organizations 
such as the IMF and set accumulation by dispossession within the context of 
structural adjustment programmes and the pauperization of the Global South (see, 
for example, Bush 2007). Others have argued that accumulation by dispossession 
can be seen as a process by which not only people‟s livelihoods, but also their 
social identities are commandeered by the cultures of the Washington Consensus 
(Gillespie 2013; Elyachar 2005). Saskia Sassen (2010) delineates two processes in 
the operation of accumulation by dispossession -- extraction and expulsion -- and 
this is of particular relevance to the Chinese situation. She argues that for each type 
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of value extraction that occurs, there is an act of expulsion that sees people 
removed from their homes and displaced from their livelihoods. That can certainly 
be considered the case in China, where the urbanisation process has become a 
matter of high politics and apparent economic necessity and where, as a 
consequence, millions of people have been uprooted from their homes and 
relocated, often to distant urban suburbs.  
 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.4, there are predominantly two 
different locations in which registered urban residents (urban hukou holders -- see 
Chapter 2.2) are displaced and relocated in actions that can be considered as 
accumulation by dispossession. Many hundreds of thousands of residents have 
been moved out of inner city areas of Beijing and Shanghai, as well as other 
Chinese cities, in state-promoted gentrification drives, described in more detail in 
Chapter 2.8 (Broudehoux, 2007; He and Wu, 2007). Hyun Bang Shin (2014) has 
interpreted this urban restructuring in terms of accumulation by dispossession, 
which he compares with developments in South Korea in the 1970s. Equally a 
longstanding process of accumulation by dispossession has been occurring on the 
peripheries of China‟s large cities, with Hongqiao being a particularly egregious 
example. When the state appropriates collective rural land, villagers are displaced, 
their houses destroyed and they are relocated. This process has been widely 
commented on, with a number of writers stressing the lack of transparency in the 
process, the uncertainty experienced by villagers as to the actual amount of 
compensation they receive and the loss not only of housing, but also of income and 
livelihood (Ong 2014; Chen 2013). We are reminded too that it is often the case that 
as many migrants are affected as hukou-holding residents, as is the case in 
Hongqiao.  
 
Harvey‟s re-formulation of Marx‟s concept of primitive accumulation has met with a 
number of criticisms, especially among autonomous Marxists. De Angelis (2007), 
for one, has argued that Harvey underestimates, or fails to take into account, the 
oppositional potential of “commoning” acts. In the Chinese context, one might point 
to the huge number of acts of protest and resistance to the forced relocation of 
residents by the state (Cai 2008). Many of these appear to go unreported; most, but 
not all, are suppressed. However, as I argue in Chapter 7, the picture is a complex 
one. A majority of residents were satisfied with the quality of their new housing, but 
what a much larger majority decried was the loss of livelihood, in terms of income 
from renting out housing, as well as small-scale farming and employment in local 
factories. Others have pointed out that while most villagers lose out substantially, a 
few manage to gain from the process (Wu et al., 2013). These disparities in 
outcome will become clear through discussion of the findings of the fieldwork, 
detailed in Chapter 7.  
 
1.4.3 The Chinese urban growth coalition and Hongqiao  
 
Economic growth through the exploitation and development of land lies at the heart 
of the Chinese economic model and of the concerns of this thesis. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that scholars writing on China have turned to growth machine 
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theory and urban regime theory in order to make sense of what has been 
happening in Chinese cities and to relate this to trends elsewhere. This is an 
important strategy in order to avoid what Choon-Piew Pow (2012) refers to as 
“China exceptionalism.” As Pow reminds us, “As a theoretical rejoinder to dominant 
„Western‟ urban theories and discourses, scholars working in the context of the 
global south have often underscored the local uniqueness and particularities of their 
respective cities as a way to „speak back‟ to Western theorization” (2012, 47). The 
references to these theories that grow out of U.S. soil are not without their 
difficulties and problems. We will examine some of these in the paragraphs that 
follow.  
 
In the first place, several writers have questioned whether growth machine theory 
and urban regime theory really are theories at all. Mossberger and Stoker (2001, 
811), for example, citing Dowding et al. (1999), argue that it is more appropriate to 
see urban regime theory as a concept rather than a theory as “it has limited ability 
to explain or predict variation in regime formation, maintenance, or change.” 
Dowding (2001) is careful to cast his analysis in terms of “regime analysis” in 
discussing regime theory. Further, it is unclear when a coalition becomes a regime; 
urban regime theory is largely silent on this point (Lauria 1999). It does indeed 
seem axiomatic that a theory should be open to transposition through time and 
space. Many of the critiques of both growth machine and urban regime theories  
argue that they do not travel well away from their original U.S. context. In addition, 
growth machine theory in particular is seen as less relevant outside of the temporal 
context of Fordist accumulation regimes and the immediate aftermath of their 
demise (Pierre, 2014).  
 
Growth machine theory builds its basic premise from the coming together of local 
political, economic, landholding, media and other elites around the creation of profit 
through local expansionary development and construction projects. It reflects a 
specifically U.S. array of forces, including locally based banks and media, as well 
as a strong local business elite. For Harvey Molotch (1976), originator of growth 
machine theory, place had become a market commodity. Coalitions of local 
business elites marketed place to expand their city and make profits thereby (from 
increased tax revenue, in the case of local government). Molotch saw growth as the 
inevitable imperative of localities. Local government‟s role was to promote place for 
the benefit of business. Many commentators, however, have argued that the theory 
has only limited purchase in Europe (Harding 1994; Wood 2004). They point to the 
greater degree of leadership shown by local government, to the more pronounced 
role of central government and to the wider array of institutional players, including 
civil society organisations. The preference in the European context has been for 
interpretations that emphasise the entrepreneurial nature of urban governance 
(Harvey 1989) and the centrality of public-private partnerships as tools for the 
advancement of projects. Furthermore, growth machine theory has been criticised 
for a tendency towards being too localist, failing to take into account the interplay 
between different scales of government (Wood 2005), and too voluntarist, affording 
too much theoretical weight to individual actors (Jessop et al. 1999). Growth 
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machine theory fails to take into account, Jessop et al. (1999) argue, the constraints 
stemming from the discursive space within which city elites move and act. 
 
In general, urban regime theory tends to be seen as more relevant to wider 
contexts, and a number of writers have expanded its compass through extended 
definition (Dowding et al. 1999). Nevertheless, in order to qualify as regimes rather 
than mere coalitions, urban regimes need to meet certain criteria. They need to 
have “(1) a distinctive policy agenda, which is (2) relatively long-lived, and (3) 
sustained by coalitions of interest or personnel [and] (4) [cross] sectoral and 
institutional boundaries.” They should also “survive personnel and leadership 
changes” and would normally involve electoral politics and more than one party 
(Dowding 2001, 14). These conditions circumscribe the interpretative meaning of 
urban regime theory, but without them, the theory (or perhaps I should say concept) 
loses all explanatory force.   
 
It is easy to see why both these theories have appeal to scholars writing on China. 
Equally, it soon becomes clear why there are limits to their applicability. Growth 
machine theory hinges on the use of land for profit and the expansion of local 
government‟s tax revenues as a lubricant in the wheels of the growth machine. Both 
these premises are met fully in China (Shen and Wu 2012). Local governments 
throughout China have used projects involving the conversion of land, either 
through urban restructuring or through urbanization of land on the urban periphery, 
to make money out of the sale of land use rights, which are de facto treated as land 
sales. Under the terms of the tax-sharing system introduced in 1994, proceeds from 
land sales are not subject to division with central government, and thus are of 
considerable importance to local government as the central state implemented the 
new system in order to wrest back revenue control from local government. 
Furthermore, the Chinese state, particularly at local level, is nothing if not growth 
oriented (Zhu 1999), with central government regularly having to pull it back. Urban 
regime theory also appears to offer much in trying to interpret and make sense of 
urban change in China. It is clear that urban projects are generally undertaken by 
coalitions of actors who include business and private interests, including foreign 
companies (Yang and Chang 2007). Zhu Jieming (1999, 546) has argued that 
“informal local urban regimes” characterize the development of Chinese cities along 
the country‟s more prosperous east coast. 
  
However, on several counts, it would be hard to see pro-growth coalitions in 
Chinese cities conforming to the criteria that Dowding (2001, 14) has lain out for 
urban regimes. There is generally no “distinctive policy agenda”; multi-party 
representative government is lacking; and projects are undertaken on a case-by-
case basis and tend to be driven by specific individual government office holders 
such as local party leaders and city mayors who are keen to promote their own 
political careers (Zhang 2002; Wang 2011; Chien 2013). Most writers, then, fall shy 
of using the term regime, even when they make explicit reference to theories or 
concepts in the broader literature. The preference tends to be to use the term 
coalition, or occasionally alliance, to refer to the groupings of interest who support 
and drive through urban restructuring projects. Above all, it is argued by a 
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preponderance of commentators on urban China that the state plays a much more 
prominent, indeed leading, role in urban restructuring and land conversion projects 
in Chinese cities (Liu et al. 2012; Shen and Wu 2012; Zhang 2014). 
  
Some writers engage more explicitly with urban regime theory. Zhang Tingwei 
(2002) argues that in the post-reform era, urban coalitions have been central to 
urban change in China, as in the U.S., and that urban regime theory is applicable, 
but with certain caveats. These include the stronger public sector in China and the 
variation between the north, central and south of the country, urban regime theory 
working better in the south than in the north. Zhang further separates out the 
economic from the political dimension of coalition building, arguing that only the 
economic dimension provides material for a comparison with the U.S. Yang and 
Chang (2007) argue that Zhu‟s (1999) informal urban regime concept is too 
descriptive and fails to come to grips with the concept of power, which is central to 
urban regime theory. They propose an alternative analytical model, which they call 
the “rent gap seeking regime,” and highlight the role of district government in driving 
the capital accumulation process, seeing it as a beneficiary of rent gaps.  
 
Indeed, it is hard to argue other than that urban regime theory cannot be properly 
applied in  the Chinese case, as to do so involves stretching the concept to the 
point where it loses its analytical purchase (Mossberger and Stoker 2001).  
However, while the use of the less theoretically loaded term coalition might appear 
more appropriate, there is nevertheless a distinct lack of definition around 
discussions of coalitions in the Chinese urban context, and it is a lacuna that is 
specifically addressed here in this thesis. In particular, there is a failure in the 
literature to analyse the nature of developers, many of them public-owned (Zhang 
2002, 489) and other actors, their origins, their relationship with each other and the 
state, and a failure to theorise their role. In this work, I propose the concept of a 
“land-based urban growth coalition” to give broader meaning to the alliance of 
interests and entities that have driven forwards the Hongqiao project, believing it to 
be relevant to a broader context of urban restructuring and land conversion in China. 
The concept includes the three key components of China‟s unprecedented period of 
urbanization: land, growth and coalition. There are various ways of attaining urban 
growth, but in China, land has been and remains pivotal. Both literally and 
figuratively, everything is built on land. Equally, despite occasional attempts at 
control from central government, urban growth is an unchallenged mantra of the 
local state not least because of its relationship with revenue raising and the 
promotion of political careers. Coalitions are the binding agents that make land-
based urban growth possible.  
 
The concept will be developed in more detail at various points in the thesis, but 
especially in Chapter 6 (sections 6.4 and 6.5). It will be examined again and 
conclusions drawn in the thesis‟ final chapter. While it is hoped that this represents 
the thesis‟ most important contribution to wider conceptual and theoretical 
discussions, it sits alongside the discussions on competitive urbanism and 
accumulation by dispossession and the relevance of these theoretical constructs to 
the Chinese context. As well as the introductory discussions here, there will be 
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further engagement with these ideas in Chapters 3, 5 and 7, with concluding 
reflections in Chapter 8.  
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1.5 Thesis outline 
  
 
Figure 1.1 Research objectives and thesis content 
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A brief outline of this thesis is presented in Figure 1.1. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the 
basis and context from which the thesis can expand and develop. Chapter 2 deals 
with urbanisation policy, the process and consequences of urbanisation, 
government‟s role in urban change and Shanghai‟s transformation based 
predominantly on the English-language literature. This chapter examines the 
stagnation and fluctuations of Chinese urbanization in the period from 1949 to 1978. 
When the central government initiated the period of economic reform, Shanghai 
became the driving force of national economic development. Urbanization suddenly 
took off, and the whole of China has experienced a significant growth in 
urbanization and industrialization in the past three decades, to the point where the 
urban population according to the official census conducted in 2010 overtook the 
rural population in 2011. A series of urban projects has brought huge urban change 
to China, particularly to the east coast cities of Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. 
Both central and local government promoted urbanisation, allowing the market to 
draw millions of rural dwellers into the city to work in industry and construction and 
in the service sector. Shanghai also experienced significant change as a result of 
urban regeneration projects in the city centre and inner city and the development of 
Pudong district, leading to an urban sprawl. The Hongqiao mega urban project in 
peri-urban Shanghai has ushered in a new wave of urban change in Shanghai.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the geographical setting -- Shanghai and Hongqiao in the 
Yangtze River Delta -- providing a regional background for the construction of the 
Hongqiao transport hub and business district. The review of the hierarchical 
regional administrative structure in the YRD shows how new city-region alliances 
emerged in YRD and explains why their impact has been minimal and their success 
short-lived. The failure to create a more robust regional architecture is attributed to 
urban competition leading to a reluctance to cooperate on a regional basis in the 
YRD. Particularly in the field of industrial development, cities at different tiers have 
been competing to attract inward investment, which is generally seen to be a core 
interest of local government. This chapter also highlights Hongqiao within the wider 
context of the western peripheries of Shanghai, placing Hongqiao within its regional 
context. Hongqiao faces fierce competition from the neighbouring city of Kunshan, 
as well as other neighbouring districts in the west of Shanghai. Among the projects 
that have contributed to the intensely competitive urban environment in which 
Hongqiao has developed is the One City Nine Towns project in western Shanghai, 
which is discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
Chapter 4 presents the research methodology and data resources used in this 
thesis. In order to obtain first-hand empirical data and secondary data, fieldwork 
was conducted during two periods: from 2011 to 2012, and again, in 2012. A 
quantitative survey and qualitative interviews were undertaken. Desk research was 
conducted before the first field trip to collect detailed information of the Hongqiao 
project and its detailed planning. This was followed by a pilot survey in Shanghai 
from November 2011 to February 2012. Extensive interviews were undertaken in 
both my field visits. Based on the preliminary findings of the pilot fieldwork, my 
research methods and questions for semi-structured and in-depth interviews and 
questionnaire were refined and redesigned. The second field trip was conducted in 
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June, July and August 2012. During that visit, extensive semi-structured and in-
depth interviews, as well as a questionnaire were conducted. This was followed up 
by interviews with relocated villagers. Leading officials who are responsible for the 
Hongqiao project were interviewed in both periods of fieldwork, and published and 
unpublished policy documents were obtained. Other interviewees are planners, 
academics, real estate developers, the owners of relocated businesses and villager 
leaders, as well as other village relocatees. 
 
A general picture of Hongqiao – the vision, planning and design of the project – is 
presented in Chapter 5, which is the first of three chapters drawing specifically on 
primary case study material. The chapter introduces the reader to the planning and 
layout of the Hongqiao project, focusing on its aims, main elements, planning 
process and land preparation. The chapter argues that the importance of the project 
can be attributed to the need to accelerate the pace of development in west 
Shanghai and to bring about industrial and spatial transformation in the context of 
place competition from within and outside Shanghai. The Hongqiao project, 
alongside a series of other urban projects in the west of Shanghai, aims to kick-start 
development by providing a new economic growth pole through the development of 
service industries, to integrate Shanghai with the Yangtze River Delta through the 
construction of a transportation hub and to create a poly-centred city by means of 
the development of a business district. When reviewing the scale and layout, 
planning and construction of the Hongqiao project, it is clear that Hongqiao is a 
grand urban project of a scale and importance almost equivalent to the Pudong 
project and out-rivalling similar CBD projects in Beijing and Guangzhou. The 
Shanghai Municipal Government has played a leading role in the case of the 
Hongqiao project in terms of establishing, planning and siting of the project and 
preparing of land in the process of project development. Through the joint efforts of 
government at different levels and after 6 years of intensive construction in 
Hongqiao, the Hongqiao transportation hub – a new landmark in Shanghai – is 
complete and the Hongqiao business zone is currently being built, soon to become 
a new city centre for Shanghai.  
 
Chapter 6 provides an insight into the governance mechanisms behind the land-
based urban growth coalition formed to carry out the Hongqiao project, seeing this 
in terms of a Chinese-style growth coalition. The chapter begins by reviewing the 
construction of the Hongqiao transport hub and business zone, then goes on to look 
at the role and responsibility of the main players. It, then, introduces the 
governance mechanism of the land-based urban growth coalition and its application 
of an urban growth alliance strategy in the Hongqiao project. It concludes by 
stressing that powerful and entrepreneurial local government has been the main 
driving force behind the project.  
 
Chapter 7 begins with an introduction to the lives of villagers before the Hongqiao 
project. The evidence from the fieldwork suggests that the former farmers had a 
prosperous life, but lived in overcrowded conditions in Hongqiao. They were 
generally reluctant to move and were in a vulnerable position when it came to 
facing compulsory relocation. This chapter explores the displacement process; it 
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shows how the local Minhang District Government played a significant role in 
convincing farmers to accept the relocation and negotiated compensation and 
relocation between the state and residents. This chapter also reveals diverse views 
and expectations of the relocation process, providing an insight into the process 
and decisions on relocation and showing that many of them were conflict-ridden 
with different state actors involved in the project having different views and with 
local residents holding different expectations. The primary expectation of villagers, 
therefore, was to get compensation before relocation in the hope of being able to 
tide them over. This chapter also examines the compensation mechanism and 
villagers‟ concerns about their future. A lower compensation standard was applied 
when compared to those living in urban areas, which resulted in compensation 
negotiations and questions of fairness. Several important issues are raised 
concerning what local farmers got and lost and what the issues that most 
concerned them were. The biggest changes can be summarised as more 
convenient transportation and an improved living environment, but also a reduced 
income and fewer job opportunities for relocated villagers. Building on these 
insights, the lessons appear to be that local government as core participant in the 
urban growth coalition plays the leading role in the relocation process, while the 
voice and interest of relocated villagers are almost totally ignored.  
 
Chapter 8 presents the main findings and conclusions of this research and places 
them within a wider context of entrepreneurial urbanism. These are framed by the 
concept of land-based urban growth coalitions working on a mega urban project. As 
well as summarising the empirical findings of previous chapters, the last chapter 
conceptualises the role of a land-based urban growth coalition in a government-led 
mega urban project. Suggestions for further research on urban change and growth 
in China are provided at the end.  
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Chapter 2  
Shanghai in the context of urban change in the PRC 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A vast body of literature has sought to interpret and explain Chinese urbanization – 
both urban regeneration in the city centre and urban growth on the edges of the city 
over the past three decades. Urban growth has become a popular topic for 
research on China, with writers pointing to its rapid growth and distinctive patterns, 
which provides an important case for studying urban change in China. The aim of 
this chapter is to provide a general overview of the relevant literature on Chinese 
urbanization. The chapter describes two periods in the story of urban change since 
1949. The first period is one of strong central control severely limiting the growth of 
cities and takes us up to the onset of the period of “opening-up and reform,” in the 
late 1970s and early 80s. The second period, up to the present day, covers years of 
vertiginous transformations, as Chinese cities sucked in migrants from the 
countryside and were transformed from low-lying urban settlements into the myriad 
of high-rise buildings we see today. The chapter will focus on Shanghai, the city 
above all others that encapsulates this metamorphosis. In particular, it will examine 
the process behind the planning and construction of Pudong New District, a 
process that has had a significant influence on the way that the Hongqiao project 
has been shaped and executed. This chapter lays out some of the background and 
context against which the story of Hongqiao can be better understood.  
 
The chapter unfolds in the following way. In the next section, the stagnation and 
fluctuations in Chinese urbanization in the period from 1949 to 1978 is discussed in 
the context of the  government‟s role in urbanization, followed by an examination of 
the subsequent period, with its land-centred development model and property-led 
projects. An overview of housing, social segregation, migrants  and the role of the 
hukou system and its effect on urbanization, urban villages and urban sprawl will be 
provided in sections 2.3 and 2.4. The chapter, then, goes on to look at the history of 
Shanghai‟s development, and then more specifically at the development of Lujiazui 
and Pudong in sections 2.5 and 2.6. Sections 2.7 and 2.8 review the World Expo 
and the restructuring of Shanghai‟s city centre and inner city. The debate over 
gentrification in Shanghai will be discussed in section 2.9, with a focus on Xintiandi 
and similar projects. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn in the last section. 
Throughout the chapter, Shanghai can be seen as a paradigm for urban China, not 
just reflecting processes and trends in other big cities, but also showing them to us 
as if through a magnifying lens.  
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2.2 Urban policy before the reform period  
2.2.1 Stagnation and fluctuations in the pattern of Chinese urbanization, 1949 
to 1978 
Cities have played a leading role in China‟s economic development in the pre-
reform period as well as more recently. Before China‟s transition from a planned 
economy to a socialist market economy, which began in 1978, urban development 
and growth were influenced by a series of factors such as changing policies, politics 
and economic planning (Hsu, 1994). In particular, changing policies directly affected 
the pace and process of urban growth.  
 
It has often been said that urbanization lagged behind industrialization in the 
decades after 1949. Urbanization was shaped by Marxist socialist ideology and 
Mao‟s plans. Central government adopted regional development policies that 
attempted to promote a balance between rural and urban areas and encourage 
growth in agricultural productivity. This kind of urbanization has been called a plan-
controlled mode (Ma, 2002). Others have seen this as a period of anti-urbanism, 
driven by Maoist ideological and political motives as the government adopted 
various steps to curb the pace and growth of urbanization (Kwok, 1987). 
Urbanization, indeed, was treated as a manifestation of capitalism by the Chinese 
government and, based on Communist ideology, the city was treated as a 
production centre rather than a consumption centre; stringent policies curbing 
migration from rural to urban areas were adopted in order to limit urban growth. In 
particular, China adopted de-urbanization policies in the period between 1960 and 
1978 (Wei, 1994). Moreover, during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), large 
numbers of urban residents, particularly urban youth, were sent to rural areas to 
accept re-education from poor peasants (xiaxiang) as government could not supply 
enough jobs and food to urban residents. The pace and pattern of urbanization in 
China have been shaped by changing ideologies and national policies. The 
following paragraphs will examine this process in more detail, outlining and 
reviewing three periods of urbanization since 1949. The three periods can be 
classified as the construction period, from 1949 to 1961; the period of urban 
stagnation, from 1962 to 1977; and the period of fluctuating urban growth, from 
1978 to the present. Each period will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
During the years from 1953 to 1957, the construction of a new socialist China 
became the top priority, and the Chinese Communist Party introduced the Soviet 
model as a prototype. Based on Marxist theory and the Soviet model, the policy of 
developing heavy industry was chosen as the first priority in an attempt to build a 
national industrial base in China (Ma, 2002). The Chinese government implemented 
its First Five-Year Plan in 1953. All important cities were divided into four categories 
according to their degree of industrial development and the number of industrial 
projects, as shown in Table 2.1. These cities were assigned to one of four 
categories: (1) top priority for new development; (2) reconstruction for major 
development; (3) modest development; and (4) other (essential maintenance of the 
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status quo). These categories had a direct impact on the development of Chinese 
cities (Hsu, 1993, 1994).  
  
Table 2.1 Categorization of cities, China, 1952 
Category 1  Category 2  Category 3   Category 4  
to be developed as  
heavy industrial bases 
to be developed as 
major industrial cities 
to be developed as  
industrial bases 
 to remain as  
they were  
           
Beijing   Jilin   Tianjin   All other 
cities 
 
Baotou   Anshan   Dalian      
Xi‟an   Fushun   Tangshan      
Datong   Benxi   Changchun     
Qiqihaer   Shenyang  Jiamusi      
Daye   Ha‟erbin   Shanghai      
Lanzhou   Taiyuan   Qingdao      
Chengdu   Wuhan   Nanjing      
   Shijiazhuang  Hangzhou      
   Handan   Jinan      
   Zhenzhou  Zhongqing     
   Luoyang   Kunming      
   Kanlang   Neijiang      
   Wulumuqi  Guiyang      
      Guangzhou     
      Xiangtan      
Source: (Hsu, 1993, 1994). 
 
156 major industrial projects supported by the Soviet Union were mostly located in 
these four categories of cities alongside a new wave of industrial investment in the 
chosen cities that promoted economic and urban development, as well as in newly 
built industrial and mining cities and old-city centres (Hsu, 1994). According to a 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) report from the central government in 1953, 
“factories are well constructed based on plan, but cities are not; factories are 
managed well, but cities are not” (Cu, 1953, 102). Even with an urban policy that 
made “constraining” the growth of large cities and “developing small cities” its 
slogan (Kwok, 1987), China still experienced fast urban development in some larger 
industry-led cities.  
 
The trend of urban growth lasted into the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962), but 
was curtailed by the Great Leap Forward in 1958, which was an attempt to achieve 
Mao‟s ambitious goal of ganying chaomei (translated as “to catch up with Britain 
and surpass the United States”) through rapid economic development. However, 
the blind pursuit of development speed through policies such as nationwide 
production of iron and steel resulted in chaos and a collapse in economic 
development with mass famine and starvation in rural areas caused by failed 
harvests and severe problems in cities through a lack of job opportunities and 
consumer goods in cities. In these circumstances, cities were ordered to control 
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urban population by having work units reduce the number of their workers (Cao and 
Chu, 1990). As a result, urbanization tailed off in China. Factories in Shanghai laid 
off large numbers of workers to their original place of residence, which for many 
was in the surrounding Jiangsu province. 
  
There followed a period of urban stagnation from 1962 to 1977. Slow economic and 
urban development was the main feature of this era. Having undergone the drastic 
consequences of the Great Leap Forward, China was shaken by the Cultural 
Revolution (variously considered to have lasted from 1966 to 1969, 1971 or 1976) 
until adjustment and recovery began in 1978 (Hsu, 1994). It is well known that the 
Cultural Revolution devastated economic and urban development. With “slower 
urban development” as one of its important slogans, there were limited funds 
available for industrial and urban development. Serious consequences stemmed 
too from the “third-front” (san xian) policy, launched in 1964. The essence of this 
policy was to develop military and heavy industries in interior provinces such as 
Sichuan. As a result of this policy, many plants were relocated from coastal areas to 
less accessible parts of central China in an attempt to safeguard industry in case of 
an invasion from the Soviet Union and to promote economic balance between 
central and coastal areas. The relocation not only wasted limited and valuable 
resources, but also resulted in the formation of inefficient new plants in isolated 
mountain areas and a decline in urban growth (Hsu, 1994).  
 
It can be seen from Table 2.2 that the urban population increased from 39.49 
million in 1949 to 101.30 million in 1961, and then declined. In 1961 and 1962, the 
urban population experienced a decline of 4.9 million. Meanwhile, cities were even 
downgraded into towns (Ma, 1994). The total number of cities, which had increased 
from 132 in 1949 to 208 in 1961 declined to 167 in 1964 (see Table 2.2), a decline 
that stemmed from centrally controlled urban policies (Hsu, 1994). 
 
It can be seen that urban growth in China experienced significant fluctuations 
before 1978, with the proportion of the population living in urban areas growing from 
about 13% to 19.6% in the three decades beginning in 1949 (Hsu, 1994). In this 
period, China's urbanization had two main characteristics. Firstly, the central 
government was the driver of the mechanisms controlling urbanization prior to 
reform. A series of economic and urban policies implemented by government had a 
direct effect on the pace and process of urban growth. What is more, the 
geographical distribution of urbanization was governed by a highly centralized 
planning system and, as Hsu (1994) observed, the government‟s urban policies 
frequently led to a change in definitions of urban boundaries, reinforcing 
government control over urban development and growth during the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s. Secondly, urbanization was most pronounced around centres of 
industry, and many of these were sited near the location of the natural resources 
needed for industrial development, as for instance, with the mining cities of 
Panzhihua and Daqing. 
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Table 2.2 Cities and populations, 1949-1978 
Year  
Number 
of cities 
Total city 
population 
(in thous.) 
Non-
agricultural 
population 
(in thous.) 
Total town 
population 
 
Number 
of town 
Total 
population 
(in mil.) 
1949 132 39,491 27,406   541.67 
1952 153 47,880 34,910   574.82 
1953 163   3372  587.96 
1954 165    5400 602.66 
1957 176 70,773 54,127 3047 3596 646.65 
1958 184 92,187 60,667   659.94 
1961 208 101,325 69,063   658.59 
1962 194 94,611 64,152   672.95 
1963 177 90,474 64,921  2877 691.72 
1964 167 89,782 66,031   704.99 
1965 168 88,576 66,906 3793  725.38 
1969 176 93,241 66,449   806.71 
1970 177   4576  829.92 
1975 185 105,357 74,018   924.90 
1978 193 116,571 79,867 5316 2850 962.59 
Blanks indicate no data 
Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau), 1990, Statistical Yearbook of Chinese Cities. Beijing: 
China Statistical Press. 
 
2.2.2 The government‟s role in urbanization 
 
Clearly, there are major differences between political regimes in China and the 
West and the role that government plays in urban development. In discussing the 
mode of Chinese urban development and associated policies, academic research 
has revolved around two themes: talks about the mode of urbanization and the 
drivers of urbanization (Wu et al., 2011). Many scholars have focused their 
discussions on the mode of urban development. For instance, Rondinelli (1991) is 
one among a number of writers who focuses on Chinese central government‟s 
attempts to limit the expansion of large cities, controlling rural–urban emigration and 
trying to keep a balanced pattern of urbanization between cities of the East Coast 
and Central and Western China in the pre-reform period. At that time, rates of 
urbanization were low or, at times, flat. While China's urbanization mode in the pre-
reform period was one that could best be characterized as central government-led 
top-down industrialization cum urbanization, the mode of urbanization experienced 
a sharp change of direction with the launch of reforms in 1978, since when it has 
interacted and been influenced by many factors at different levels, including 
markets, FDI and globalization. It can be argued that urbanization in some coastal 
cities has been driven through processes that originate in the lower echelons of 
government.  
 
The second major theme of scholarly discussion revolves around the driving force 
behind urbanization. While in the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, the state no longer plays a leading role in the urban process, the picture in 
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China is completely different. Liu et al. (2011) have argued that in the European 
context, the state only plays a limited role in urban development. For instance, in 
the fields of city planning, construction and transport projects and the provision of 
social services, local government is normally but one of several actors. However, 
the situation is quite different in China. Government at various levels plays a 
leading and omnipresent role in the process of urbanization, not only in decision-
making, but also in the operation of policies (Liu et al., 2011). In this context, it is 
necessary to examine what the governance arrangements are between central and 
local (municipal and district) governments and what the roles of various 
administrative levels are in the process of urbanization. Liu et al. (2011) see the 
mode of state-oriented urbanization in China as administrative urbanization, in 
which a different role is played by central and local governments in the process of 
urbanization. In particular, the roles that central and local governments played in 
pre- and post-reform periods are different. 
 
Most scholars hold the view that centrally planned policy was the major driving 
force for China‟s urbanization (Wu et al., 2011; Wu, 1998a; Wu, 1998b; Han, 2000; 
Wu, 2002a). Central government controlled the growth of the urban population and 
the distribution of cities through the institution of hukou registration in the centrally 
controlled and planned economy (Kirkby, 1985; Xie and Costa, 1991; Chan, 1994; 
Zhang and Zhao, 2003). In addition, industrial production and distribution were 
planned and controlled by central government. Even the number of products was 
controlled by central government through its party-controlled machinery (Cui and 
Ma, 1999; Ning, 1998). In these conditions, government at provincial level just 
involved control over the production and distribution of goods under orders from the 
central government. To all intents and purposes, local government had no rights in 
the era of the centrally planned economy. In particular, powerful work units directly 
participated in the planned economy and held many of the responsibilities later 
undertaken by local government. 
 
Since 1978, China has gradually conducted a policy of market creation and 
decentralization. Economic development has become the major goal of government 
at different levels. It came to be recognized that urbanization is an inevitable 
process associated with industrialization and modernization. National policies for 
guiding urban development were adopted in China (Wei, 1994), and certain non-
state actors such as some township enterprises and foreign investors gradually 
became the driving force in transforming cities and lower-order urban settlements 
(Zhang, 2008). Above all else, a market-oriented approach has become the major 
driver for the urban development process in China (Davis, 1995; Gaubatz, 1999; 
Logan, 2002), and controls on rural–urban migration have been gradually loosened 
resulting  in urban sprawl, in particular with the development of industrial parks on 
the urban fringe. While the market has played an increasingly important role in 
urban development, this does not mean that government has lost its commanding 
role in urban development. On the contrary, various levels of government are still 
leading actors in controlling the shape and direction of urbanization (Ma, 2002, Lin 
and Wei, 2002), but with the tendency for local government to be gradually playing 
the more prominent role, as was argued in Chapter 1 (Liu et al., 2011). At the same 
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time, as Yeh and Wu (1999) found, urban planners have been gradually facing 
greater challenges as a result of the transformation of the urban planning system 
from centrally driven to market-oriented. The major duty of central government – to 
set the general directions, policies and guidelines for urban growth – has been 
passed on to local government through the bureaucratic hierarchy. Municipal and 
(in Shanghai) district governments have gradually taken over the specific role of 
promoting urban development in China and are the dominant player in decision-
making and the implementation of urban projects. 
 
2.2.3 Urbanization of local government through the land-centred development 
model and property-led projects 
 
Since the 1980s, local government has actively promoted the development of cities. 
Cities have become the driver for the development of China‟s economy. Through 
attracting business to construct industrial parks and high-technology parks, local 
government has actively conducted a pro-urban policy. City governments 
throughout China try their best to attract investors and find useful economic 
resources to promote the development of their local economy (Liu et al., 2011). 
They compete to attract investment and FDI in order primarily to get more financial 
revenue through leasing land to developers. Therefore, local governments are keen 
to realize urban renewal in the city centre and urban expansion on the urban fringe. 
The additional resources garnered through the sale of land leases enable them to 
promote the construction of modern urban projects and eye-catching buildings that 
will change the image of their city (Shen and Wu, 2012). This, at the same time, 
helps to enhance the performance of local officials, who can show off their 
achievements and press their case for promotion (Chien, 2013). This is why local 
government is the most prominent force behind projects of property-led 
redevelopment and the construction of industrial parks and housing estates in the 
inner city and on the urban fringe.  
 
The process of urbanization in China is dual as a result of the difference between 
China‟s urban and rural administration setup. Land is separated into two categories: 
urban category (over which the state has ownership) and rural land (over which 
rural collectives have ownership). Rural areas of China are organized into villages 
and townships. Villages come under the jurisdiction of counties; however, urban 
areas come under the jurisdiction of districts, which are part of a separate 
administration system (Zhang and Wu, 2006). Villages become “urbanized” in a 
number of ways (Smith, 2014). Often, the county government will undertake a 
regional strategic development plan, in which it will stake out land for economic and 
industrial parks. The local government will compulsorily purchase the land from 
villagers, who will be moved out and relocated elsewhere. Then, local government 
will change the status of the land from rural to urban. The government will, then, 
based on the plan, start development projects, in particular high-profile ones (for 
instance, high-tech parks, special economic parks, university cities and, indeed, 
whole new cities). The local state oversees the construction of the physical 
structure of the new settlement and all the infrastructure by setting up a special 
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organization to undertake the projects. When they are finished, the control over the 
project will revert to the local state (Hsing, 2010). In some cases, if the settlement is 
reclassified as urban, the villagers will be granted an urban hukou and be provided 
with housing compensation and jobs available in the new industrial parks (Ong, 
2014). As I will explore in more detail in Chapter 7, even in and around a big city 
like Shanghai, this is a fraught process with villagers often very unhappy about its 
prosecution and the consequences for their future lives.  
 
With state tenure of land in China, local government not only regulates land use 
and transactions, but also owns the land and profits directly from land rents. In the 
past, government would not have had the right to undertake land transactions, but 
this situation changed with the launch of economic reforms starting in the 1980s 
when  a series of institutional arrangements were put in place by central 
government, which resulted in a process of rescaling of fiscal and other powers. 
These institutional reforms were introduced in the context of a new ideology -- the 
concept of the socialist market economy, proposed in 1987. Against this 
background, rescaling has occurred in two directions: top-down institutional 
rescaling and horizontal market reforms (Wu, 1995).  
 
From the perspective of institutional arrangements, China has gradually 
transformed itself from a centrally planned into a transitional economy, and the 
power of intervention in the economy has gradually transferred to the lower levels of 
provincial, and even district, government. Central government has gradually 
decentralized its powers to local government in the field of local economic 
development (Wu and Yeh, 1997). Meanwhile, a series of policies were introduced, 
such as reform of land policies; land-use rights were separated from land ownership. 
This represented an attempt to avoid unconstitutional restrictions on the trading of 
market, which today forms the basis of the prosperity of the land auction market. In 
the process of decentralization, local government have an important role to play in 
economic development rather than merely as coordinators, as they were prior to 
political decentralization.  
 
From the perspective of horizontal market reforms, market forces began to play a 
role in the process of economic development. In particular, the influx of foreign 
capital started to play a crucial role in economic development (Smart and Hsu, 
2004). Investment from the public sector and from private domestic and 
multinational companies has led to a faster speed of urbanization and 
industrialization. 
 
With the deepening of reforms in the 1990s, more institutional arrangements were 
adopted by central government. In particular, a tax-sharing system was established 
in 1994; central government took for itself most of the revenue from value-added 
tax (75%), while 25% was left for local government. Meanwhile, social welfare and 
other costly responsibilities were  transferred to local government from central 
government (Qing, 2010). Thus, local government had to carry the burden for costly 
local affairs, but without the revenue sources. In the 1990s, local government was 
actively attracting investment, particularly foreign investment, for industrial parks 
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and similar ventures. Some preferential policies were adopted by local governments 
to attract investment. For instance, some chose to reduce land premiums and 
management fees, expecting to benefit from tax revenues rather than land 
premiums. There were further institutional reforms in the field of housing. 
Government and state-owned enterprises have no longer been providing welfare 
housing since 1999, and this has contributed to a burgeoning housing market. 
Increasing demand for housing prompted a boom for the housing market. 
Meanwhile, the urban land market became overheated with land auctions, 
becoming the only source of land supply. The booming of markets for housing and 
land have led local governments to see „land sales‟ as a crucial source of revenue. 
 
When local government decides to transfer land-use rights to property companies, 
the money they gain by leasing land-use rights goes into their coffers. Land rent 
has, thus, become a major source of local government revenue and capital for 
urban exploitation, and local government leaders have a keen interest in promoting 
and boosting property prices with the consequent effect of boosting the price of 
land-use rights. In addition, property prices are used to gauge the success of a 
city‟s development (Hsing 2010). Local leaders are regularly promoted if their urban 
development projects are successful, so local government leaders not only benefit 
from the extra funds, but also from promotion. There are lots of advantages, 
therefore, for local leaders to use urban strategic development plans to change the 
city‟s image and boost property prices. 
 
Urban land is owned by the state, and the state in this context is generally taken in 
practice to mean municipal and district government. The state leases land in theory 
(and generally in practice, too) through public auction, although the process can be 
less than transparent. However, before 2000, it was common for land to be leased 
through negotiation (Tian, 2008; Xu et al., 2010). The whole gamut of processes 
around the development of land gives rise to the concept of property-led 
redevelopment, as discussed in Chapter 1 (He and Wu, 2007). Property-led 
redevelopment has changed the built environment and the social neighbourhood. 
 
2.3 Urban conditions today 1: Housing, social segregation, migrants  
 
In line with the process of China‟s industrialization and urbanization, China has 
experienced many changes in terms of housing provision and, along with it, social 
segregation.  
 
2.3.1 Housing  
 
In the late 1980s, the policy of open door and reform was extended to the sphere of 
land and housing, with crucial implications on urban development in China (Wang 
2005; Wu 2002b; Yeung and Howes 2006). Housing reform changed the system of 
housing provision. In the pre-reform era, housing had been provided by the work 
unit and government for urban residents. In 1988, the government changed the old 
welfare system of housing provision and introduced a system of commodified 
housing (Li and Wu 2006). From then, an increasing number of urban residents 
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have had to buy property on the market, thereby breaking the link between the work 
unit and residence (Li and Wu 2008; Wu and Ma 2006). Housing reform has 
created great demand for commodity housing, and all new built housing has been 
sold by means of the market (He, 2007). In particular, since the turn of the century, 
housing has become a financial product on the market, with the wealthy and middle 
classes trying to buy more houses to keep safe the value of their money. This has 
pushed up the price of housing in Chinese cities. Furthermore, as we have seen, 
local government benefits from land leasing, so local governments have a motive in 
promoting the development of real estate. The developers also have an incentive to 
build more houses as they benefit from the speculator-driven market and higher 
house prices. Today, even for the middle class, not to mention those on low 
incomes and new rural-urban migrants, it is not easy to afford a new property in 
cities. Due to the fact that both government and developers can benefit from 
property development, more and more high-profile property has been built in and 
around cities, and this has had a huge impact on social segregation, as we will see 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
2.3.2 Social segregation 
 
Much attention has been focused on socio-spatial segregation in Eastern Europe 
Africa, and Asia (Madrazo and van Kempen, 2011). Terms such as dual cities, 
polarized cities, fragmented cities and partitioned cities have been used by 
researchers to refer to social segregation (Mollenkopf, 1992; Marcuse, 1989; 
Marcuse and Kempen, 2002). In Madrazo and van Kempen‟s research (2012), the 
terms divided cities, segregation and social division have been used 
interchangeably with those words seen as indicating the same issues of spatial 
division in cities. Living together in a group is thought by many to make for easier 
access to economic resources and life chances. Living in isolated circumstances, 
on the other hand, is seen as being likely to gradually exacerbate social exclusion 
and concentrations of poverty in the cities (Friedrichs, 1998; Wacquant, 2008). 
Economic restructuring and social polarization are seen as the mechanisms 
causing spatial divisions (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000).  
 
China has gradually experienced social segregation in the cities ever since the start 
of the opening-up period. Chinese cities have been transformed from spaces with 
no social and spatial division into spaces characterised by segregation and social 
divisions. Social segregation has been intensified by the direct foreign investment 
and rural-urban migration, which have accompanied reform and opening (Madrazo 
and van Kempen, 2011; Li and Wu, 2006). Nevertheless, it is government policy 
that has probably been the most important cause of socially segregated living 
patterns (Huang and Jiang, 2009; He et al., 2010). For instance, the policy of 
closing the many state-owned enterprises (SOE), which led to millions of workers 
being laid off, caused many urban workers who lived in company and factory 
complexes to become the new urban poor. In addition, the hukou system of 
household registration has been considered one of the most important elements in 
the restructuring of the socio-spatial patterns of Chinese cities (Madrazo and van 
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Kempen, 2011). More recently, government profit-driven entrepreneurial activities 
have had a significant impact on the spatial structure of cities. 
 
2.3.3 Migrants  
 
Massive numbers of rural migrants have been moving to urban areas in the years 
since the 1980s. Zhong (2000) and Jiao (2002) estimated that there was a „floating 
population‟ of 30 million in the early 1980s and 70 to 80 million in the early and mid-
1990s. This number increased to 100 to 140 million after 2000. By the time the 
2005 population sample survey was conducted (NBS 2006), the floating population 
had increased to 147.35 million. Liang and Ma (2004) and Fan (2005a) confirm that 
the mobility of the floating population had significantly increased from 1985 to 1990 
and from 1995 to 2000. Inter-county migration increased from 22.62 million to 78.5 
million between 1990 and 2000, which clearly shows a growing rate of increase. 
Not only has mobility increased, but the distances moved by the migrants have also 
increased from the 1980s (Du 2004; Fan 2005b). The main direction of migration is 
to the three most developed and highly industrialized regions: the Pearl River Delta 
(Guangdong province), Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai, Jiangsu province and 
Zhejiang province) and Huangbohai regions (Beijing and Tianjin) (Chan, 2009; Fan, 
2002 and 2008; Goodkind and West, 2002; Gu and Shen, 2003). The issues that 
migration in China raises – the scale of the migration and its social and economic 
impact – have resulted in more attention from researchers; these issues have given 
rise to controversy amongst researchers, observers and the general public. 
Goodkind and West (2002) look at the connection between migration and hukou 
policy and argue for the reform of hukou policy. Population censuses in 1990 and 
2000 allowed for nine major reasons for migrants‟ move to cities: job transfer, job 
assignment, industry/business, study/training, friends/ relatives, retirement, joining 
family, marriage, housing change, and other. While this is the formal view, it is 
widely accepted that economic objectives such as increasing income and diversity 
of income sources are the major reason why migrants move to urban areas (Liang 
and Ma, 2004; Croll and Huang, 1997; Fan, 2002).  
 
The hukou system was introduced in 1958. It was designed as a means to control 
population movements and mobility between rural and urban areas, and also as a 
central institutional mechanism defining the relationship between city and 
countryside. Changes from rural to urban hukou status need to be approved by 
government (Chan, 1996; Goodkind and West, 2002; Wang, 2004). Hukou 
registration not only provides the principal basis for establishing identity, citizenship 
and proof of official status, but is also essential for every aspect of life. Without it, 
people neither can get food, clothing or shelter through official avenues, nor obtain 
a job, go to school or marry. Although there is more research focusing on the 
impact of rural-urban migration and urbanization, less attention has been devoted to 
the effects of hukou in controlling population. Chan and Zhang (1999) point out that 
the hukou system played a significant role in formally controlling migration from 
rural to urban areas. As a result of the hukou system, many people who did not 
have jobs were sent back to the countryside. There was only a relatively small 
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increase in the urban population during the period from the inception of the policy in 
1958 to the early 1980s, due to the strict hukou policy (Wang and Wu, 2010).  
 
There are two hukou classifications: urban and rural. For the most part, both 
classifications are inherited from the parents. Agricultural hukou provides access to 
farm land, while the nonagricultural hukou gives citizens access to jobs, housing, 
food and state-sponsored benefits and rights (Fan, 2008). Hukou symbolises status 
in China. During the economic reforms of the past three decades, the hukou system 
has been loosened by the government to allow (if not to encourage) rural migrants 
to stay in cities and find temporary jobs (Wang, Wang and Wu, 2010). Although 
hukou policy is ultimately controlled by the central government, local governments 
have some room for manoeuvre in terms of adapting policy to local circumstances. 
China has transformed from an immobile to a relatively mobile society, even though 
the rate of Chinese population flow is relatively low when compared with western 
countries (Fan 2008). 
 
Zhong (2000) argues that when the State Council approved reforms to the hukou 
policy in 1984 and peasants were permitted to work in cities and towns, it was 
thought that they would be self-sufficient in food grain supplies, symbolizing the 
liberalization of relationships between city and rural areas. Yu (2002) argues that 
the People‟s National Congress approved the use the citizen‟s identity card as a 
way for a migrant to prove identification. In addition, Fan (2008) also argues that the 
introduction of a liberal market for food, housing and other daily goods means that it 
often is easier for peasants to live and work in the cities and towns, even without an 
urban hukou. 
 
Reform of the hukou system has become one of the major debates within the 
higher echelons of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as among municipal 
leaders of the country‟s largest cities. A number of cities introduced experimental 
reforms in the early years of this century, repealing restrictive regulations on non-
urban hukou holders‟ access to housing, education and social welfare. However, 
the burden of cost of these reforms led to their being repealed (Wang 2010). At the 
same time, some of China‟s largest and wealthiest cities, Shanghai leading 
amongst them, initiated a system of charges for an urban hukou. This became 
known as the Blue Hukou, which has been stopped in the largest cities. In April 
2014, Tianjin is the last one to stop the policy of Blue Hukou to control rapid growth 
population in the largest cities.   
 
Particularly since 2001, there have been various attempts to reform the hukou 
system led by the State Council in an attempt to loosen internal migration between 
rural and urban areas (Wang, 2010). In 2001, the State Council approved a pilot 
policy. The urban hukou was granted to rural migrants with a stable income and 
stable housing in selected towns or small cities for more than two years. The policy 
was then expanded in 2002, with the promulgation of a directive affirming the rights 
of rural migrants to work in cities. Stable housing and income have become the 
major criteria for rural migrants who want to get an urban hukou in towns and small 
cities. The further step of “grand and deep hukou reform” was taken by the State 
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Council in an attempt to create a uniform national hukou system to reduce the 
income gap between rural and urban areas through a relaxation in controls on 
internal migration. This policy has been pursued in a number of medium and large 
cities. For instance, Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan province, attempted to realize 
an ambitious urbanization plan, with more than 250,000 rural migrants becoming 
urban hukou-holders; this resulted in a series of social problems including a lack of 
educational resources and job opportunities. Zhengzhou-style urbanization was 
subsequently criticised as Henan‟s Great Leap Forward in urbanization (Wang, 
2010). Hukou reform faced widespread resistance from local government and 
special interests groups of local urban residents. Official media referred to hukou 
reform as being “stuck in deep water.” Central government attempted to use a 
uniform hukou system to replace urban and rural hukou in 11 provinces and 
encountered difficulties and local resistance (Wang, 2010). Hukou reform has 
become an intractable problem, which has received much more attention from 
scholars and government. 
 
More recently, the issue of urbanization and hukou reform was at the centre of 
attention at the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the CCP held 
in Beijing in November 2013. The subsequent communiqué outlined plans, albeit 
still vague, that would allow for an accelerated process of conversion from rural to 
urban hukou (Chan, 2014). However, in all discussion of hukou, it is important to 
bear in mind that, based on the report of the Third Plenum, hukou reform was seen 
as one of the key reform hotspots by 2020. Cities are classified into four categories: 
small cities, medium cities, large cities and mega cities. Reforms of policy on the 
hukou is different according to the category of city. Large and mega super cities are 
more likely to tighten up hukou policy (ANU, 2014), making it harder for outsiders to 
become hukou holders of cities such as Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. When it 
comes to small cities, hukou policy is becoming more open to in-migrants, while 
medium cities are moving towards applying an “orderly” open door policy. Small 
cities and counties will become the focus of urbanization according to the “new type” 
urbanization plans of Premier Li Keqiang (Chan 2014).  
 
Based on the new urbanization plan announced in 2013, energy will be directed 
towards the urbanization of counties (chengzhenhua) rather than the urbanization 
of cities (chengshihua) and will focus on growth in incomes rather than growth in 
infrastructure. People‟s hukou status will depend on workplace rather than 
birthplace, but the hukou system will still act to control internal migration. The 
reforms are being criticized on a number of fronts, for example, for taking away the 
attraction of a small-city urban hukou, while making the most attractive large cities 
hukou even harder to obtain. The issue of greatest concern is that the reform 
merely reinforces the “three nos” of urban migrants – no land, no job opportunities 
and no welfare protection (Wang, 2010). Large-scale urbanization in small cities 
and counties will result in a large number of rural people obtaining urban hukou, 
which will require much investment in education and housing as well as welfare 
protection. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that a small number of highly 
successful rural migrants can satisfy the stringent criteria of most cities through 
educational attainments and/or party connections. Cindy Fan (2002), indeed, refers 
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to three of elite, urban and rural not two categories rural and urban. This is an 
important, but often neglected, addendum to the discussion of migration and the 
hukou system in China. 
 
2.4 Urban conditions today 2: Urbanization, urban villages and urban sprawl  
 
When launching its policies of opening and reform, the State Council issued 
institutional arrangements for the reform in two different, but ultimately related fields: 
rural policy and foreign investment. The whole reform process started with the 
introduction of rural land contracts and the loosening of hukou policy, meaning that 
farmers had land contracted out to them in return for a stipulated proportion of their 
harvest. This released many people from the need to work the land, allowing them 
to move to urban areas. At the same time, substantial FDI investment poured into 
the coastal cities, which became the driving force of economic development and the 
intersection between capital and the floating population, giving rise to massive 
urban growth and urban sprawl – trends that will be discussed in the following 
section. 
 
2.4.1 Urbanization 
 
China‟s unprecedented urbanization has caused massive urban sprawl, which 
intensified the loss of farmland in China‟s urban periphery (Lee, 1991; Heilig, 1997; 
Marton, 1999; Zhang, 2000; Hubacek and Sun, 2001; Xu et al., 2000). In the 
paragraphs that follow, we will review the process of urbanization and urban sprawl. 
 
In the last three decades, there have been huge changes in terms of urbanization 
levels, both in terms of level of urbanization and number of cities. The rate of 
urbanization rose from 22% to 33% between 1983 and 1999; it increased to 49.6% 
by 2009. The level of urbanization is expected to reach 75% in the 2050s (Cheng 
and Masser 2003; Liu, Yin and Ma 2011). With respect to the number of cities, 
between 1978 and 2006, there had been a three-fold increase; from 1978 to 2007, 
the number of mega cities (with a population of over 1 million) increased from 13 to 
56 (Wu, Zhang and Shen 2011). This rapid rate of urbanization has been the focus 
of much scholarly attention (Ma and Wu, 2005; McGee, 2007; Wu, Xu and Yeh, 
2007). One of the principal distinctive hallmarks of the urbanization process is that it 
was prefaced by a period of rural industrialization, especially in that part of Jiangsu 
Province south of the Yangtze, lying more or less between the cities of Shanghai 
and Nanjing. This densely populated area later developed into a highly 
industrialized and urbanized landscape, but in the 1980s, it was here that rural 
industry in the form of factories owned and run by township governments, gave a 
kick-start to large-scale Chinese industrialization with the blessing of central 
government.  
 
 
 
2.4.2 Urban villages 
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The process of city-based and land-centred urbanization is not only bringing with it 
the image and reality of state-of the-art architecture and skyscrapers and landmarks 
in cities, but also the phenomenon of the „village-in-the-city‟ (chengzhongcun), 
otherwise known also as „urban village‟ in  Western literature. Urban villages have 
become widespread in many Chinese cities, providing affordable and accessible 
shelter for rural migrants (Hao et al., 2012). Ho (2001) and Tian (2008) think that 
the widespread existence of urban villages in many large cities is due to institutional 
constraints such as government controls of public access to urban land. Urban 
villages dominate the low-cost housing market taking shape in many cities (Hao et 
al., 2012). The presence of urban villages is, therefore, not only widespread, but 
also distinctive and important within the overall picture of urban change in China.  
 
Urban villages arise when municipal governments requisition rural land from rural 
collectives and convert it to urban land for urban development; rural villages are 
surrounded and captured by the newly built-up area. In order to avoid costly and 
time-consuming compensation resulting from relocating villagers, municipal 
governments only expropriate village farmland, leaving untouched villagers‟ housing. 
This, then, becomes enclosed spatially by new built-up areas creating urban 
villages. This is a particularly common phenomenon in southern cities like 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen (Hao et al. 2012; He et al. 2010). The urban villages are 
surrounded by built-up areas in which there are many factories. Therefore, these 
urban developments create a huge demand for jobs, giving rise to massive rural to 
urban migrations and a huge demand for affordable and accessible housing units 
near the urban area. The villagers build housing units without planning permission 
from government to rent out to satisfy the demand from workers, who gradually 
form a low-income housing market in these new urban area (Zhang et al., 2003; 
Tian, 2008; Wang et al., 2009).  
 
Urban villages emerged in those cities with rapid urban growth, particularly in 
Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Beijing. Urban villages have become the 
focus of much research. They are formed by rapid urban growth,  surrounded by 
newly built plants and industrial parks, and contain affordable and convenient 
temporary housing for rural to urban migrants (Wang et al., 2009, Shen et al., 2002, 
Wu and Wang, 2002). However, these urban villages have different characteristics 
in different cities depending on their location. Much of the focus has been on 
Shenzhen. As Wang et al. (2009) state, as a former fishing village on the border 
with Hong Kong, Shenzhen experienced extraordinary urbanization driven by 
processing plants, workshops and factories, which resulted in rural land being 
seriously encroached.  Due to the huge transformation of Shenzhen, large numbers 
of urban villages were absorbed within the rapidly growing city. Urban villages in 
Shenzhen are  numerous and large and are scattered around the whole of 
Shenzhen city, with 91 located inside the SEZ and 150 outside the zone (Wang et 
al., 2009). When it comes to Shanghai and Beijing, because of the long history of 
these two cities, there are almost no urban villages in city centre or inner city areas.  
 
Scholars have provided contrasting definitions of urban villages (Tian, 2008; Zhang 
et al., 2003). Some have emphasized the emergence of unusual forms of housing 
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settlement due to the institutional context. He et al. (2010) argue that a mixture of 
land, hukou, housing provision and village governance have resulted in the 
formation of urban villages. A number of writers have come up with detailed 
documentation in terms of physical setting, land and living conditions in urban 
village (Wei, 2000; Zhou and Gao, 2001). Others have looked in particular at the 
land-use patterns and ownership systems of urban villages, among them Jing 
(1999), Xie (2003). Yet other scholars have concentrated on the change in social 
structure (Lan 2001; Li 2002).  
 
Urban villages have attracted researchers‟ attention from four perspectives – the 
perspectives of rural migrants, planners, government officials and indigenous 
villagers. For the rural migrant, urban villages play a vital role in providing affordable 
and accessible housing for low-income workers, who are shunned in the urban 
housing market due to the high cost of renting housing in urban areas (Zhang, 
2005;Song et al., 2008). Therefore, urban villages are important shelters for rural 
migrants and low-income workers. For indigenous villagers who have lost their 
farmland in the process of urban expansion and so have lost their means of making 
a living, renting their housing to low-income workers has become the primary, and 
often the only, source of livelihood (Zhang et al., 2003) as we shall see for 
Hongqiao in Chapter 7. Chen and Jim (2010) point to the important role of urban 
villages in the low-income housing market and efforts that have made towards 
formalization. Nevertheless, as they point out, municipal governments retain a 
negative attitude, holding the view that the existence of urban villages is a physical 
and social problem, which suppresses the value of land around the urban village 
and in neighbouring areas and harms the image of the city. Migrants who lived in 
urban villages encountered institutional discrimination and the impact of market 
imperatives (Chen and Hoy, 2011). Policymakers and planners focus on land in the 
urban village; they hope for wholesale demolition and redevelopment of the area as 
a solution to the „urban village problem‟. Planners such as Zhen Jing use the term 
„isolated island‟ (gudao) to describe urban villages, clearly indicating thereby that 
they wish to change the situation of these islands. However, indigenous villagers 
have been resisting urban redevelopment programmes.  
 
While villagers have resisted redevelopment, many researchers have also criticized 
urban redevelopment schemes, arguing that the wholesale demolition of urban 
villages will exacerbate the housing crisis for the migrant population and the 
landless (Zhang, 2005; Song et al., 2008; Tian, 2008). The tendency has been on 
all sides to think of urban redevelopment schemes in terms of win-win solutions. 
One of the aims of this thesis is to understand the process of urban village 
development and the requirements of stakeholders in order to provide some 
findings and implications to help the government develop better policies towards 
urban villages (see Chapters 7 and 8). 
 
 
2.4.3 Urban sprawl  
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Urbanization has a significant impact on urban sprawl in terms of land use. The 
population in China‟s largest cities has been surging and has reached more than 20 
million in both Shanghai and Beijing. Large expanses of rural land have been 
expropriated and converted into ‟construction land„ (jianshe yongdi) to 
accommodate new waves of urban growth of construction of industrial parks and 
new towns (Liu et al., 2005). In line with the fast speed of urbanization in China in 
recent decades, urban sprawl has become widespread in many cities, even around 
some small and medium-sized cities. These cities have an incentive to promote 
urban sprawl through the building of new industrial zones and new towns, and this 
applies all the more so to big cities in developed areas of China, in particular in the 
eastern part of China, such as the Yangtze River and Pearl River Deltas, which has 
gradually led to the formation of urban megalopolises.  
 
In examining the issue of whether urban sprawl in China is excessive and inefficient, 
scholars have argued that urban development has two contradictory phenomena, 
which are development zones and semi-urbanized villages in the process of urban 
sprawl (Deng and Huang 2004). Deng and Huang (2004) hold the view that 
traditional theories of excessive urbanization and normal suburbanization could not 
explain both types of urban expansion in China, where various levels of government 
have set up numerous industrial development zones, which are discontinuous and 
far away from city centres. They outline certain inefficient patterns of urban 
expansion that have been described using the term urban sprawl. There is, 
however, no consensus on the exact meaning of urban sprawl in the Chinese 
context. Most Chinese scholars have been treating urban growth as urban sprawl 
(Fung, 1981; Wei and Zhao, 2009; Wu and Yeh, 1999; Lin, 2001). Deng and Huang 
(2004) conclude that the definition of urban sprawl should, firstly, refer to inefficient 
or excessive urban structure, and, secondly, have the characteristics of leap-frog or 
low-density urban structure. They also conclude that sprawl does not equal 
suburbanization. 
 
Wei and Zhao (2009) state that urban sprawl around China‟s megacities should be 
seen as having a different pattern to that which is found around Western cities. The 
pattern they describe is of many high-density developments along with plenty of 
open space – a pattern that is the result of joint action by local authorities and 
property developers at the urban fringe. Meanwhile, when it comes to the levels of 
township and village, a different land-use pattern of low density and less open 
space is revealed, mainly associated with local developments. Taken together, we 
see a pattern of urban over-spill and local urban sprawl. This amoeba-like pattern 
contrasts with the classic picture for cities in global south countries of development 
around the urban fringe of existing cities or along traffic arteries of highways and rail 
tracks (Torren and Alberti, 2000; Barnes et al., 2001; Hurd et al., 2001).  
 
One simple measure of urban sprawl is the sum of the built-up area (Sudhira et al., 
2004). In terms of built-up area, there was a huge increase to 1.38 million hectares 
in 1996, more than doubling that in 1949 (Lin and Ho, 2003). The dazzling speed of 
urban growth has been a prominent feature of the Pearl River Delta, where the 
urban area increased by 300 percent in eight years from 1988 (Seto et al., 2002), 
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with a further acceleration since 2001. In that year, China joined the World Trade 
Organization, and global capital poured into the country. Urban development and 
consequent sprawl was promoted by various intertwined forces of state policies 
(both central and local government), foreign investment, urban planning and 
changing governance (Cheng and Masser, 2003). 
  
The creation of Special Economic Zones early in the reform period in the Pearl 
River Delta accelerated the trend of urban sprawl. More recently, in 1998 and 2008, 
central government took measures to speed economic growth when the regional 
and global economies were in difficulty. On both occasions, central government 
introduced credit and other policies to stimulate land- and construction-based 
growth. The result was a boom in the construction of industrial parks at the urban 
fringe of the east coast, a boom that was subsequently transferred to areas of 
central, and even western, parts of China. Not least as a result of these policies, the 
real estate industry has become the driving force behind China's economy in the 
past ten to twenty years, and local government has actively initiated a policy of 
property-led development. As a consequence, the areas around China‟s cities have 
been completely transformed and now include large numbers of gated communities 
and villas built on the urban fringe catering for the rich and middle class (Phelps 
and Wu, 2008). Large numbers of new cities and towns have also sprung up like 
bamboo shoots after spring rain. Among examples are Binjiang New District in 
Hangzhou, Songjiang New City in outer Shanghai and Hexin New District in Nanjing.  
 
A further type of urban sprawl results from the proliferation of university campuses 
around Chinese cities. With the launching of reform of the higher education system 
in 1999, a wave of construction of new science and university towns on the city 
outskirts took place. Many universities planned and constructed new campuses on 
the urban edge, working with local government to build new urban areas to promote 
economic and urban growth. For instance, Shanghai Municipal Government 
established Songjiang University City, covering an area of more than 10 square 
kilometres (see Chapter 3). Nanjing local government has planned Xianning 
University Town, and Beijing and other cities have undertaken similar plans.  
 
By now, China has experienced wave after wave of government-led urbanization 
projects. The rapid growth of urban sprawl has significantly transformed the urban 
spatial structure and pattern of large cities such as the eastern cities of Guangzhou, 
Shanghai and Nanjing, as well as Beijing and other small- and medium-sized cities. 
Rapid urban growth has brought the opportunity of urban development and 
benefitted local government. However, urban growth has also resulted in serious 
loss of arable land; China‟s cultivated land per capita had been reduced by 677 
square metres from 1949 to 1995 (Cheng and Masser, 2003). This problem of the 
reduction in the amount of arable land has been getting worse due to urban sprawl. 
By 1998, it had become so bad that the State Council in Beijing, in its First National 
Land Use Master Plan, set a minimum national cultivated land area (Chen 2013, 
107). In an attempt to protect farm land, it issued quotas for the conversion of land 
from agricultural to urban use. Central government strictly adheres to a line that 
agricultural land remain at the level of 1.8 billion mu. This has, however, led to 
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various schemes to circumvent the quotas. Thus, in some places, a trade in 
conversion rights has developed, with Kunshan (see Chapter 3) being involved in 
this (Chien 2013). At the same time, the construction of „concentrated villages‟ has 
become popular, where attempts are made to use land more efficiently by uprooting 
villagers and relocate them into newly built high-rise housing (Ong, 2014).  
 
The above examples show that it is necessary to understand urban expansion and 
sprawl in the Chinese urban context. Urbanization in the Yangtze River Delta will 
soon be all but complete. At the centre of this region stands Shanghai, and it is to 
an examination of urban development patterns in China‟s largest city that we now 
turn. 
 
2.5 The history of Shanghai‟s development  
 
Once a smallish trading town located near the mouth of the Yangtze River, 
Shanghai quickly grew to become the biggest city and economic centre in China. 
Even at the time of the economic stagnation brought on by the Cultural Revolution, 
Shanghai was the major revenue contributor for central government. With a 
population of about 23 million on a land area of 6341 square kilometres, Shanghai 
is recognised as the „dragon head‟ (long tou) of the Yangtze River Delta. Due to its 
strategic geographical location near the sea, Shanghai has become the hub of 
China‟s industry and trading. Shanghai is also an important port city that links the 
inland of China with the rest of the world. The city, indeed, lives up to its name, 
which means “above the sea,” being not only the largest city in the country, but also 
its financial, shipping, trading and economic centre. Shanghai‟s municipal politics 
are cast in terms of catching up with and overtaking Hong Kong and Singapore as a 
global city. Since the start of the 1990s, Shanghai has experienced two decades of 
fast development at unprecedented speed, involving a huge scale of urban 
rebuilding (Chen, 2009). In the history of Shanghai‟s modern development, four 
periods can be identified: pre-1949, 1949 to 1978, 1978 to 1990 and 1990 to the 
present. These periods are delimited by remarkable changes in policy. 
 
2.5.1 Shanghai before 1949 
 
When China lost the Opium War in 1842, the Qing government was forced to sign 
the treaty of Nanjing. As an outcome of the treaty, Shanghai became one of five 
cities chosen to become an open city – open to Western trade and residence. 
Shanghai became a connection to the Western world and an important port city. 
Thanks to Shanghai‟s location midway up the country‟s coast, it became the crucial 
link between port cities in northern and southern China as well as the principal link 
to port cities in Korea, Japan and Western countries (Feitelson, 1993, Chen, 2009). 
In addition, Shanghai‟s port linked the city to other major cities along the Yangtze 
River. 
This central location meant that Shanghai soon became the base for foreigners 
doing business in China and, before long, the city became the centre of comprador 
capitalism in China and in the wider East Asia. Shanghai, thus, became a sort of 
semi-colony, with foreign settlers and Chinese residents having separate 
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jurisdictions. By 1930, Shanghai had been transformed from a small town into the 
seventh largest city in the world, a thriving and cosmopolitan settlement often 
referred to as the Paris of the Orient, a centre of fashion centre whose inhabitants 
enjoyed a vanguard cosmopolitan life (Chen, 2009). During the city‟s heyday, in the 
1920s and 1930s, East Nanjing Road was recognized as the „Ten miles foreign 
market‟ (shili yangchang), complete with pubs, clubs and leisure palaces that 
helped Shanghai live up to its billing. Shanghai had gradually become the first and 
leading industrial centre in China. The principal industry was textiles, with factories 
involved in spinning, finishing and fashion, using silk and cotton from the fertile 
flatlands of the Yangtze River Delta.  
 
Many of Shanghai‟s new residents came from the southern part of Jiangsu Province, 
many of them driven into the city by the frequent floods that inundated that part of 
China. Others, especially factory workers and rickshaw pullers, came from those 
parts of Jiangsu Province north of the Yangtze known as Subei. Other more 
prosperous migrants came from the old trading port of Ningbo to the southeast of 
Shanghai. Shanghai became a staging ground for a variety of forces wrestling for 
control of China. During the Nationalist period, the China Communist Party 
established its first branch in Shanghai and gradually built a trade union movement 
and convened the first congress. Nevertheless, the city never became a Communist 
stronghold, and Communist activity in the city was crushed with relative ease.  
 
2.5.2 Shanghai and its history since 1949 
 
When the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 with the 
China Communist Party‟s ascent to power, Shanghai‟s situation was totally 
changed. Scholars have divided Shanghai‟s history under the rule of the CCP into 
three phases – from 1953 to 1978; from 1979 to 1989; and from 1990 onward, with 
the development of Pudong (Feitelson, 1993,  Song and Yeung, 1996). The 
different characteristics of these development stages will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
In the first era from 1953 to 1978, Shanghai experienced economic stagnation. In 
particular, the government in Beijing adopted a policy of even national development 
and, in 1958, promotion of industry in inland parts of the country to protect it from 
foreign attack. As part of this policy, many key elements of economic development 
such as factories, skilled workers, technicians, goods and machines were relocated 
to previously neglected areas in central and western parts of China (Pye, 1995). 
Shanghai was seen as the epitome of evil Western capitalism by Mao Zedong and 
the Communist leadership in China, causing strained relations between the 
Shanghai and central governments. Shanghai had not only to support development 
in the rest of China in terms of economic development, but also in terms of revenue. 
As Lynn T. White (1987) writes, Shanghai was forced to remit a larger share of its 
revenues than it should have remitted on the basis of what the political system 
required of other places. Between 1949 and 1983, Shanghai remitted as much as 
87% of its revenue (about RMB 350 billion) to Beijing. Only 13% of its revenue was 
left for its own development, in obvious contrast to Tianjin, with an average of 30% 
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of its revenue spent on local development (Song and Yeung, 1996). With less 
revenue resource to support economic development, urban development in 
Shanghai stagnated, and dilapidated buildings proliferated in inner Shanghai. In the 
early 1990s, the Shanghai government initiated a policy of urban renewal in the 
inner city (jiucheng gaizao), which involved the demolition of dilapidated buildings 
and started the process of displacement of residents. 
 
In the second phase from 1979 to 1990, China carried out its policy of reform and 
opening-up, but in this early period, the policy was centred on a number of southern 
cities such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai, which were designated as Special Economic 
Zones. Throughout the 1980s, Shanghai remained reliant on manufacturing (Lu and 
Wei, 2007). Shanghai lost out in the initial phase of economic reform, even though it 
was chosen as one of fourteen open cities in 1984. Its annual economic growth 
speed of 7.5% was below the national average, even as it contributed one sixth of 
central government‟s revenues (Song and Yeung, 1996). This is why Shanghai was 
described as a “golden cash cow” (White, 1989). Shanghai lost status, and the 
reputation of its manufactured products, which had held high even during the 
Cultural Revolution, fell.   
 
The third phase refers to the rapid economic growth since the start of development 
of Pudong in the early 1990s. Since then, Shanghai has experienced a new wave of 
economic growth, with Pudong becoming the new platform for Shanghai‟s 
development. Shanghai‟s gross domestic product had reached RMB 197.2 billion in 
1994, while in 1978, it was only RMB 27.3 billion ( Song and Yeung, 1996) 55). 
Shanghai‟s GDP has enjoyed a growth rate of more than 10% per year for 17 years. 
It was only in 2008 that the economic growth rate dropped below 10% as the global 
financial crisis caused a decline in exports and in the real estate sector, which had 
been  the driving force behind economic growth in Shanghai as elsewhere in China 
(Chen, 2009). 
 
2.6 The development of Lujiazui and Pudong  
 
2.6.1 Behind the development of Pudong 
 
When Shanghai was chosen as one of fourteen open cities in 1984, Hongqiao 
Economic and Technological Development Zone (ETDZ), Minhang ETDZ and 
Caohejing High-Tech Park were created in order to attract foreign investment. 
However, these zones were located in the far western suburbs of Shanghai and 
were too small to effect scalar change (Wu and Barnes 2008, 367). Development 
thus avoided the city centre, where there was less room for further development, 
given high densities of building and population. Even after Shanghai had adopted 
reform policies, its speed of development lagged behind that of cities in southern 
China, and even more so that of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) (Yeh, 
1996:290). Shanghai did not have room to attract foreign investment. Shanghai‟s 
leaders decided, therefore, to develop Pudong (east of the Huangpu river), seeing it 
as receptive terrain for development (Huang, 1992). Development of Pudong had 
been restricted previously because of the lack of bridges across the river, and the 
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area had remained largely agricultural with a few factories despite its proximity to 
the city centre.  
 
Pudong was given SEZ status in 1990, with special features (outlined below) and 
with backing from the State Council in Beijing (Wu and Barnes 2008, 367). The 
development of Pudong was actively supported by former mayor of Shanghai and 
then State Council Premier Zhu Rongji. The city government formed a leading 
group in order to develop Pudong in 1988. The State Council approved the plan to 
develop Pudong New District on April 18, 1990. With the establishment of Pudong 
and its designation as a „new district‟, Pudong was able to enjoy more preferential 
policies similar to those applied to Shenzhen and other SEZs (Yeh, 1996:290). An 
administrative commission was set up to run Pudong New District with a 
development corporation for each of the four special zones that were also set up. In 
2000, a special administration, the Pudong District Government, was established 
with a high status directly under the Shanghai Municipal Government (McGee et al., 
2007, 223). 
 
Pudong was able to incorporate many of the lessons learned and development 
experiences of Shenzhen and other SEZs in the field of urban planning and 
attracting foreign investment, the most successful of which were preferential 
policies and infrastructure development (Yeh 1996:290). The central government 
approved ten preferential policies in an effort to attract investment to Pudong and, 
in particular, foreign investment as shown in Table 2.3. 
 
These preferential policies relating to the financial sector were only applied in the 
newly established Pudong New District as part of an attempt to make Shanghai into 
an international economic centre. Even Shenzhen and the other SEZs were not 
allowed to apply these preferential policies. The Pudong project gained strong 
support from the central leadership. The development of Pudong New District 
became a national strategy when Premier Li Peng announced that the State 
Council had agreed to the development of Pudong New District on April 18, 1990. 
Based on a directive from the central leadership, the Shanghai municipal 
government proposed a 16-character slogan to articulate the principles behind the 
development of Pudong: Fazhan Pudong, zhenxing Shanghai, fuwu quanguo, 
mianxiang shijie (translated as “Develop Pudong, revitalize Shanghai, serve the 
entire country and face the world”). Meanwhile, Li Peng proposed that planning, 
infrastructure and finance and trade should be top priorities in the development of 
Pudong. With the support and encouragement from central government, the 
development of Pudong was divided into three phases by Shanghai Municipal 
Government. The first phase covered the Eighth Five-Year Plan period (1991-1995). 
The state focused initially on preparations and planning, environmental remediation 
and the solution of traffic problems. The second phase covered the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan period (1996-2000), which focused on the development stage and continuing 
to build the backbone of the roads and municipal infrastructure. The third phase, in 
the years since 2000, is the stage of comprehensive development. In order to drive 
the development of Pudong, the Shanghai Municipal Government established a 
leading group, with the then mayor as its head. Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone, 
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Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone and Jinqiao Export Processing Zone were 
established in September 1990, pushing Pudong into a substantive start-up phase. 
 
Table 2.3 Preferential policies issued by the State Council to support the 
development of Pudong New District 
 Preferenti
al policies  
Content  
for local government 
1 Fiscal 
waivers 
 To speed up the construction of the Pudong New District, providing 
development, investment in the necessary infrastructure. Additional 
revenue was to be used to further the Pudong New District. There was no 
need to remit revenue to central government from the newly established 
Pudong District Government. 
2 Establishm
ent of free 
trade area 
Pudong was allowed to build a free trade area in Waigao qiao. 
For foreign investors: loosening conditions for  FDI 
3 Export 
trade 
Allowed foreign institutions to engage in export trade and provided 
convenient visa services for management personnel. 
4 Infrastruct
ure 
projects  
Foreigners could invest in infrastructure projects including airports, 
railways, ports, roads and power plants. For the first five years, 
investments are exempt from corporation tax; tax is halved in the second 
five years. 
5 Tertiary 
sector 
 Foreigners could invest in the financial and retail sectors. 
6 Bank 
branch
es 
 Foreign banks could open branches in Shanghai, as well in Pudong New 
District. Tax rates for foreign banks reduced. 
7 Land 
leasing 
rights 
Foreign investors can sign contracts with government for land leasing for 
50-70 years for development and investment. 
8 Customs 
duties and 
tax 
exemption  
Customs duties were waived for imports of machinery, equipment, vehicles 
and materials needed for construction in Pudong New District, and 
exemptions were applied from consolidated industrial and commercial tax.   
9 Export-
oriented 
products 
sales in 
China 
Export-oriented products can be sold in China, on condition that they are 
approved by the competent authorities and customs duties and the 
business tax are paid. 
For Domestic enterprises  
1
o 
Relief from 
Corporatio
n Tax 
Businesses are exempt from corporation for the first two years of operation, 
and their tax rate is halved in the third year. 
Source: (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2000). 
 
In line with the State Council‟s declaration, in 1990, the Shanghai Municipal 
Government approved nine sets of regulations and guidelines for promoting the 
development of Pudong New Area as shown in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4 Preferential policies issued by Shanghai Municipal Government for the 
development of Pudong New District 
N0 Preferential policies issued by Shanghai Municipal Government for the development of  
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- Pudong New District 
1 Regulation of administration of financial institutions    
2 Regulations on reduction and exemption of enterprise income tax   
3 Customs regulations concerning the control of goods entering and leaving the Waigaoqiao free 
trade zone 
4 Regulations to encourage of foreign investment     
5 Measures affecting the management of Waigaoqiao free trade zone    
6  Land administration in Pudong New District     
7  Provisions of administration of planning and construction in Pudong   
8  Approval measures for foreign-invested enterprises    
9  Guidelines for industries and investment in Pudong New District   
Source:  Shanghai Pudong New Area: Investment Environment and Development prospect. 
China Construction Bank, Shanghai branch, 1991. 
These preferential policies and guidelines, which were approved by the State 
Council and the Shanghai Municipal Government, are part of an effort to promote 
the fast development of Pudong New District. The Shanghai Municipal 
Governmentfocused its energy on the development of Waigaoqiao Free Trade 
Zone, Jinqiao Export-Processing Zone, Zhangjiang High-Tech Park and Lujiazui 
Financial and Trade Zone. This latter zone was planned to become the CBD of 
Pudong and the whole of Shanghai, earmarked as China‟s Manhattan (Yeh, 
1996:290). Shanghai Municipal Government issued preferential policies and 
guidelines related to finance in an effort to build up Lujiazui as Shanghai‟s new CBD 
and financial centre.  
 
2.6.2 Lujiazui financial centre and suburban industrial zones 
 
Of Pudong‟s four special zones, Lujiazui was the nearest to the old city centre and 
was designed as a centre for global higher-order service companies, especially 
finance companies. The competition to design Lujiazui became something of a 
cause célèbre and has been well described by Kris Olds (2001). Lujiazui is located 
opposite the old economic core of Shanghai. It was designed to be a fitting CBD for 
Shanghai as the dragon head of Yangtze River Delta (Yeh, 1996:290). In this sense, 
it has been successful in attracting a wide variety of modern service industries such 
as branch offices of international banks and consultancy companies. As a result, 
Pudong has been transformed in the last 20 years from agricultural land to CBD 
and financial and trade centre with much state-of-the-art architecture. 
 
Apart from Lujiazui Business District, three other industrial parks were planned in 
an attempt to promote the development of Shanghai. Jinqiao Export Processing 
Zone was designed to attract FDI and relocated manufacturing from Shanghai city 
centre. Waigaiqiao Free Trade Zone is mandated to coordinate development of the 
Jinqiao Export Processing Zone in Pudong. Modern port facilities were built at 
Waigaiqiao. In this zone, sino-foreign joint ventures and foreign-funded corporations 
were invited to locate, in particular, corporations who could bring advanced skills 
and technologies. Public service agencies related to the free-trade zone established 
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offices in order to facilitate the trade of imports and exports. Zhangjiang High-Tech 
Park is located in the eastern part of Pudong; its function is to develop the science 
and education sectors. Among companies to move to the park have been firms 
producing precision medical equipment and computer software. Most FDI, however, 
has gone to Jinqiao Export Processing Zone while, more broadly, there has been a 
move from investment by predominantly joint-venture companies to foreign-owned 
companies. The development corporations have tended to use two development 
systems, known colourfully in Chinese as zhuchao yinfeng and yinfeng zhuchao or 
„fix the nest then attract the phoenix, and attract the phoenix then fix the nest‟. In 
other words, the first refers to the construction of infrastructure and buildings prior 
to attracting investing companies, while the second involves first obtaining interest 
from investors who then develop and make profits from the sale of property. In 
Lujiazui, the development corporation has tended to construct buildings and 
infrastructure, and then find buyers rather than vice versa. Elsewhere in Pudong, 
where foreign-owned companies are involved, they have tended to lease land first 
(Wu and Barnes 2008, 371). Much of the actual construction, however, especially 
outside Lujiazui, has been unrelated to the plans of the district government and the 
development corporations. 
 
2.6.3 The construction of new infrastructure 
 
Pudong learned many lessons from Shenzhen SEZ, which is widely considered to 
be the most successful SEZ in China (Yeh, 1985). It was clear from Shenzhen that, 
apart from the preferential policies, infrastructure development plays a significant 
role in attracting foreign investment and economic growth (Yeh, 1996:290). Thus, 
Shanghai Municipal Government paid considerable attention to the development of 
infrastructure in Pudong. Shanghai government spent a total of RMB 25 billion 
(US$ 3 billion) to finish ten major projects (Wu, 2009: 137) from  1990 to 1995 (see 
Table 2.5).  
 
From 1995 to 2000, the Shanghai government spent about RMB 100 billion to finish 
the second round of infrastructure construction in Pudong, including Pudong 
International Airport, Metro Line 2, the Outer Ring Road and Pudong Information 
Port (Table 2.6). Large-scale investment on infrastructure development has 
significantly improved the urban environment. From 2000 to 2005, a new round of 
infrastructure construction was started in Pudong; this involved the second phase of 
construction on Pudong Airport, the construction of the Yangshan Deep Water 
Container Port and the construction of the Maglev line (Wu 2009: 137).  To this 
series of projects must be added the construction of facilities for the World Expo, 
held in 2010. This became a source of competition for Shanghai with Beijing, which 
only two years earlier had hosted the Olympics. 
 
Table 2.5 Ten major infrastructure projects launched between 1990 and 1995 
1990-1995 Ten infrastructure projects  
Linkage projects across the Huangpu River between Pudong and Puxi 
 
 
Nanpu Bridge 
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Yangpu Bridge 
 
Pudong section of the Inner Ring Road 
 
Sewage Treatment Project 
Projects focused on Pudong 
 
 
Pudong Gas Plant Phase II 
 
Yang Gao Road widening  
 
Waigaoqiao New Harbor first phase 
 
Waigaoqiao Power Plant 
  
 
Pudong New District Communications Centre 
 
Liaoqiao Water Plant  
Source: Shanghai Pudong New Area: Investment Environment and Development prospect. 
China Construction Bank, Shanghai branch, 1991. 
 
Table 2.6 Second round of ten major construction projects launched from 1995 to 
2000 
1995-2000   Ten infrastructure projects    
1    Pudong International Airport   
2    Waigaoqiao Port Area Phase II   
3    Pudong International Information Port  
4    No 2 underground phase I   
5    Pudong New District light rail   
6    Waigaoqiao Power Plant Phase II  
7    Pudong section of the Outer Ring Road  
8    Sewage Treatment Project Phase II  
9    The Bund Sightseeing Tunnel   
10    East China Sea oil and gas supply project 
Source: Development Report of Shanghai Municipal Government from 1995 to 2000. 
 
2.7 Shanghai and the World Expo 
 
As we have seen, central government policies first worked to hold Shanghai back 
and then, from around 1990, preferential policies and support from central 
government made a major contribution to the city‟s fast development, especially 
with central government‟s approval of the plan for Pudong when Shanghai was 
chosen as the first city to allow foreign capital to invest in finance and banking. 
 
As capital of China, Beijing enjoys the biggest advantage in applying for preferential 
policies. Indeed, Beijing has been cooperating with nearby Tianjin, China‟s third 
largest city, to form an economic and industrial centre to perform similar functions 
for the north of the country as Shanghai does for the centre. Once Beijing won the 
nomination to hold the Olympic Games in 2008, many factories moved to Hebei 
province and Tianjin in order to alleviate the problem of pollution in Beijing. For 
instance, Beijing Capital Steel Mining moved to Hebei Province. In the context of 
hosting the Olympic Games, Beijing has been building up its position as economic 
and financial centre for the northern part of China. Indeed, the city orientation is 
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similar to that of Shanghai, so it is inevitable that the two cities would find 
themselves competing for the title of economic and financial centre of China. 
Beijing‟s biggest advantage over Shanghai is the proximity of the offices of central 
government. Beijing is also home to the headquarters of central banking and 
financial institutions such as the People‟s Bank of China (China‟s central bank), the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission and the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the headquarters of 
the four major state-owned banks, two major investment banks and domestic 
futures companies, regulators and other decision-making bodies, as well as China's 
top-level financial groups. Shanghai had been hoping that central government 
would move the headquarters of those banks and regulatory commissions to 
Shanghai, but up until now, only the central bank has established a second 
headquarters in Shanghai – such has been the strength of Beijing‟s competition 
with Shanghai as China‟s financial centre.  
 
Shanghai has an advantage when it comes to the number of listed companies with 
head offices in the city. The level of economic development in Shanghai is higher 
than in Beijing, both in terms of GDP and the rate of increase of GDP according to 
Chinese Statistical Yearbook in 2013. In addition, Shanghai has a much higher 
number of multinational companies with offices in the city, and the first stock 
exchange in China was established in Shanghai. Finally, Shanghai is better located 
in terms of its economic hinterland than is Beijing, as the Yangtze River Delta is the 
largest economic and industrial base in China. In sum, while Shanghai has the 
advantage of economic development, Beijing has political and policies advantages.  
 
The competition between Shanghai and Beijing goes beyond the economic 
perspective and has been extended to other issues such as the hosting of large-
scale events. In the process of preparing to host the Olympic Games, Beijing 
municipal government spent RMB 280 billion on infrastructure, RMB 13 billion on 
the construction of sports venues and RMB 2.3 billion on the operation of Olympic 
Game (New Beijing News, 2008). In terms of infrastructure, Beijing built three 
underground lines to alleviate traffic congestion and its fifth and sixth inner ring 
roads (China.com, 2002). Beijing has expended much effort on urban renewal; in 
particular, much old and dilapidated alley (hutong) housing was demolished (with 
small quantities being upgraded and preserved). Large-scale infrastructure 
investment became the driving force for Beijing‟s development.  
 
At more or less the same time, the Shanghai Municipal Government was actively 
bidding to host the World Expo in 2010. In the process of preparing for the Expo, 
Shanghai spent RMB 310 billion on infrastructure, including RMB 18 billion on the 
construction of the Expo pavilions. The rest of the money was used to build public 
conveyance systems. Of the 9 underground lines built in Shanghai in the decade 
leading up to the World Expo, Lines 10 and 7 were specially built for the Expo (Sun, 
2010). Importantly, in terms of this thesis, the Hongqiao transport hub was finished 
and began operations before May 2010, when the Expo opened. In addition, large-
scale urban renewal projects were undertaken in the city centre. Indeed, the whole 
of the city was given something of a face-lift. Hosting the Expo became an 
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important driving force for Shanghai‟s economic development and brought in huge 
investment in infrastructure. 
 
2.8 New projects and the restructuring of Shanghai‟s city centre and inner 
city  
 
The market-oriented reforms that China has adopted since the 1980s, including 
administrative and fiscal decentralization, land and housing reform and real estate 
development, have led to a transformation of the inner-city areas of Shanghai and 
other large Chinese cities (Leaf, 1995). Property development has driven urban 
redevelopment, with real estate providing much of the funding. Shanghai, as the 
largest city in China, is at the leading edge of urban restructuring.  
Given that China‟s urban redevelopment largely relies on the realisation of value on 
property, a strategy of property-led redevelopment has been adopted by many 
Chinese cities with a huge impact on urban space and restructuring (He and Wu, 
2007). Shanghai has played the role of pilot city initiating land and housing reform 
in China (He and Wu, 2007), but urban redevelopment has lagged behind economic 
development because Shanghai has remitted a large part of its revenue to central 
government. Shanghai has been facing the problem of a dilapidated built 
environment since the 1990s. In 1990, there were 6.6 square metres per capita of 
residential living space in 1990, while in 1976 there had been 4.4 square metres  
(Shih, 2010).  
 
Throughout Shanghai‟s central districts were numerous backstreet alleys, lilong, 
with red-brick terrace housing built by landlords to house rural migrants to the city in 
the first half of the twentieth century. By the 1980s and 90s, this form of housing 
was deemed to be of a quality no longer acceptable. Schemes were designed to 
improve housing conditions by eliminating lilong and other „sub-standard‟ housing 
from central and inner areas, notably the so-called 365 Plan (see below) and post-
2002 Facilitation Plan (Shih 2010; He and Wu 2007). These development projects 
are seen to have been largely successful.  
 
The process of conversion of Shanghai into China‟s leading centre for the service 
sector – with a vastly enlarged city centre built and decked out for international 
companies and the transnational and Chinese elites that work in them – has been 
driven in a fairly ruthless fashion with the profit motive as paramount in the 
redevelopment of central urban areas (Li and Wu 2008, 407). Various conflicts 
arose around relocation, resulting from the precedence given to developers and 
their priorities and from ambiguities in the legislation (Shih 2010). In 2002, an 
attempt was made to bring all the developers under one roof, with the formation 
jointly by the municipal government and the Communist Party of Shanghai Real 
Estate Group Company, but, if anything, corruption intensified as a result (Hsing 
2010, 49). 
 
In this way, property-led redevelopment became the preferred route to capital 
accumulation (He and Wu, 2007). The demolition of old slums and dilapidated 
urban areas came to be seen as Shanghai Municipal Government‟s major task. The 
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government set off a wave of urban transformation activities with the goal of 
demolishing 15 million square metres of slum housing in deteriorated areas. The 
scheme aimed to redevelop 3.65 million square metres of structurally unsound 
lilong housing by 2000, as part of its 365 Plan (He and Wu, 2007). After 2002, a 
new round of urban redevelopment was launched by the Shanghai government, 
providing a series of preferential policies to developers, for instance, by exempting 
land leasing costs and administrative fees. By 2005, lilong had decreased to 23.8 
million square metres; by now, there is little left (Shih, 2010). Today, Shanghai 
looks like a different city, with more than one million residential relocations since the 
adoption of the city renewal policy in 1991 (Shih, 2010). 
 
This process of the transformation of central and inner Shanghai is symbolised by 
Xintiandi, a project that has become a classic example of slum clearance and 
gentrification. Here, in one of the most fashionable parts of the city, a handful of 
lilong have been preserved and gentrified while their erstwhile occupants have 
been relocated elsewhere in the city (He and Wu 2005). Other projects have 
involved the demolition of sub-standard housing in inner-city areas and its 
replacement with up-market condominiums as, for example, at Liangwancheng in a 
process of state-led gentrification (He 2007). The reconstruction of Xintiandi is the 
classic example of a Shanghai-government implemented project of urban renewal. 
Xintiandi is the name of a place (meaning “new heaven and earth”), located in 
Huangpu district; before the urban redevelopment, it consisted of lilong with houses, 
in which about 6 or 7 families shared two or three-storey housing. It was 
transformed into a high-quality commercial and recreational district to cater to elitist 
consumption demands as a major tourist destination (He and Wu, 2007). 
 
These urban redevelopment projects in the inner city and urban expansion projects 
on the urban fringe have resulted in a large scale of displacement and residential 
relocation.  According to Li‟s calculations (2004: 66), 72,728 households were 
relocated in 2001, of which 97% were relocated to the urban fringe, differing 
radically from the original neighbourhood of the relocates. This resulted in large-
scale conflicts between relocated households and local government over relocation 
and compensation issues (Shih, 2010).  
 
In line with Shanghai‟s goal of fostering four development poles – shipping, finance, 
economy and trading – Shanghai has changed its master plan by transforming its 
development axis from north-south to east-west. The main factories had once been 
distributed from north to south. Baosteel was located in Baoshan district in the north 
of the city, while a number of companies in the oil refining and chemical industry 
were located in the south of Shanghai. In recent years, Shanghai has been aiming 
to develop its service industry from east to west and, as a consequence, 
Shanghai‟s focus of development has gradually shifted to an east-west axis (Zhang, 
2009: 178). Central to this reorientation of the city are Pudong in the east, designed 
as Shanghai and China‟s financial and economic centre, and Hongqiao in the west, 
the new commercial, service and transport hub that forms the focus of this thesis. 
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2.9 The debate over gentrification in Shanghai, with a focus on Xintiandi and 
similar projects  
 
With so much attention focused on the issues of urban redevelopment and 
expansion in China, many scholars have written of urban restructuring in the city in 
terms of gentrification (He, 2007, Shih, 2010, Wu et al., 2007, He and Wu, 2007). 
Wu Fulong (2009: 137) has provided some important data on the role played by the 
Asian Development Bank. Zhang Tingwei (2009) has examined the changing 
fortunes of the three central wards of Huangpu, Luwan and Yangpu and how this 
has related to economic and spatial restructuring in Shanghai. Lu et al. (2009) look 
at how globalization impacts at the local level in Shanghai, examining FDI, foreign 
communities and gated communities. Neighbourhoods, they argue, become more 
differentiated in the process of urban renewal. He and Wu (2007) study the socio-
spatial impacts of property-led redevelopment on China‟s urban neighbourhoods, 
focusing on the cases of Xintiandi and Liangwancheng. They conclude that the 
wave of urban renewal and the consequent widespread displacement in Shanghai 
has changed urban functions, land use and appearance. In the case of Xintiandi 
and Liangwancheng, the land has been transferred from low-income residents to 
upper-end commercial land use and high-status residential land use. City renewal 
comes at the expense of communal values. Old lilong communities have been 
almost destroyed out of existence in Shanghai due to the large scale of demolition 
(Imrie and Thomas, 1999). Projects such as Xintiandi and Liangwancheng might be 
thought to help Shanghai‟s economic development, but they have been criticized for 
failing to take into account the cultural status of old lilong neighbourhoods and, 
more importantly, the interests and preferences of their residents (He and Wu, 
2007). The interests of developers have been prioritized throughout, while those of 
the residents have been neglected. 
 
The adverse effect of the Xintiandi and Liangwancheng projects have pushed up 
house prices in the surrounding areas and pushed low-income inner-city residents 
to the urban fringe, where house prices are anything but low. In almost completely 
redeveloping the inner city, Shanghai Municipal Government, along with the local 
district governments, has become addicted to land leasing and to the revenue that 
results, thereby causing a huge bubble in property prices. 
 
2.10 Conclusion  
 
As we have seen, China has experienced rapid urbanization since the 1980s, in 
particular in its East Coast cities, which were chosen as pilots of reform and 
opening-up. Before that, however, urbanisation had been strictly controlled through 
the centrally planned economy and central urban policy. Limited capital and 
resources were invested in the western and central parts of China in an attempt to 
realize the goal of balanced development and national defence needs. However, 
since the launching of reform policies, coastal cities have been seen as the drivers 
of economic development in China.  
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The unprecedented scale and speed of urbanisation has attracted the attention of 
scholars, planners and, latterly, social media. Even after decentralization, however, 
central government has continued to play an important role in the process of 
urbanization, but local government has become the leading player as a result of 
reform in housing and land policies. The furious pace of urbanisation has been 
caused by rapid migration to urban areas, but this has resulted in social segregation 
and urban sprawl. While urban restructuring has led to the appearance of 
phenomena arguably similar to those in Western cities such as gentrification, 
urbanization in the Chinese context has a number of aspects generally considered 
to be unique such as the two-track system of land ownership. Urbanization in China 
has Chinese characteristics. 
 
Urban restructuring in Shanghai has occurred both in the city centre and inner city 
and on the urban fringe. Various forces have driven this urban restructuring, 
including local government and central government, plans and global investments 
working together in a process that has been characterised as post-socialist 
urbanization. The development of Lujiazui and Pudong and the restructuring of 
Shanghai‟s city centre and inner city have been the flagship projects, alongside 
smaller projects such as Xintiandi. 
 
Shanghai faces competition from inside and outside the city region. The Hongqiao 
project, which is the focus of this thesis, was launched under conditions of 
competitive entrepreneurial urbanism, with the competition coming not only from 
rival cities and regions such as Guangzhou and the Pearl River Delta, but also from 
cities such as Kunshan adjacent to Shanghai. Shanghai sits at the head of a region, 
the Yangtze River Delta, which is one of the country‟s three industrial bases and 
economic growth poles and has been at the forefront of reform. It is to the regional 
setting that this thesis turns next in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3  
Competitive urbanism in its regional setting 
 
3.1 Introduction: Shanghai in the context of the Yangtze River Delta 
 
The Hongqiao project needs to be considered in a regional context for three main 
reasons. In the first place, the sheer size of the project necessitates a regional 
focus. Secondly, Hongqiao is designed to become the new commercial and service 
sector for its region. Thirdly, Hongqiao should reinforce Shanghai‟s place as 
„dragon head‟ of China‟s richest and most populous region, the Yangtze River Delta 
(YRD), with its population of over 32 million. Unlike some projects which incorporate 
an agenda that underpins regional strategies, Hongqiao is an undertaking launched 
by the Shanghai Municipal Government with support from the central government, 
but without input from nearby authorities, whether at provincial or city levels. Indeed, 
as we shall see in section 3.4, the project is designed specifically to boost the 
fortunes of the western part of Shanghai in the teeth of fierce competition from 
neighbouring municipalities in Jiangsu province. In this sense, one might almost 
argue that Hongqiao is a localist project supported by a strongly regional discursive 
platform. It is, therefore, a project that can best be understood within a regional 
context both because of the realities of inter-urban competition on the ground and 
because of the claims made for it as a means of reasserting Shanghai‟s pre-
eminence in the YRD as a metropolitan region.  
 
In this light, it is important to preface this chapter with a brief description of the 
region. The YRD is by now predominantly urban and, like other Chinese city 
regions, it is not an administrative entity -- a mismatch between urban spread and 
administrative boundaries being a normal feature of contemporary city regions.  
Both of the country‟s two largest city regions, the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl 
River Delta (PRD), have vast central cities (Shanghai and Guangzhou) next to 
various other often-large cities (especially in the case of Shanghai). The core area 
of YRD consists of the economic centre of Shanghai, the two sub-centres of 
Nanjing and Hangzhou, both provincial capitals, and 13 lower-rank cities.   
 
Although the YRD is not an administrative unit and has no institutional authorities, it 
has recognised boundaries. These were expanded in 2008 by the State Council in 
Beijing to include the two provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang as well as Shanghai 
municipality. The YRD ? is now one of the two major manufacturing centres of 
China. Its GDP has reached 11833.3 billion RMB, which accounts for about 20.80% 
of China‟s total of GDP in 2013, as shown in Table 3.1. Indeed, the YRD has 
become the most economically developed region not only in the eastern part of 
China, but also in the whole of the country. The gross domestic products of 
Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang are among the highest ranking in the country, 
holding 11th, 2th and 4th places respectively, with average growth rates of 9.7, 10.1 
and 12.5% in 2013 based on China Statistical Yearbook, released by National 
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Bureau of Statistics. Secondary and tertiary industry has developed not only in 
quantity, but also in quality. In 2009, the total value of tertiary industry was higher in 
the YRD than secondary industry, showing how the balance of development is 
changing in the region (see Table 3.2). Thus, it is now not only the YRD‟s level of 
economic development, but also its quality that is improving. 
 
Table 3.1 Proportion of the YRD in China's GDP (1978–2013) 
Year China's total GDP 
(RMB100mil) 
Yangtze Delta's GDP 
(RMB 100 mil.) 
Proportion 
1978 3624.10 645.77 17.82% 
1980 4,517.80 811.37 17.96% 
1985 8,964.40 1,546.06 17.25% 
1990 18,547.90 3,070.94 16.56% 
1995 58,478.10 11,142.61 19.05% 
2000 89,403.60 19,170.22 21.44% 
2001 94,346.40 21,210.90 22.48% 
2002 102,398.00 23,836.51 23.28% 
2003 116,694.00 27,902.61 23.91% 
2004(First half) 
⃰⃰2008 
2010 
2012 
2013 
58,774.00 
314,045.00 
401,513.00 
519,470.00 
568,845.00 
15,285.00 
66,514.53 
85,002.51 
108765.85 
118333.00 
26.00% 
21.18% 
21.17% 
20.94% 
20.80% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook. 
Note: YRD has been enlarged to whole area of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces and 
Shanghai since 2008. 
Sources: Statistical Data for 50 Years of New China, Beijing: China Statistics Publishing 
House, 1999.China Statistics Almanac 2003; Communiqué on Statistics of China's National 
Economy and Social Development, China Statistical Information Web; Industrial Map of the 
Yangtze River Delta (2005), Shanghai: Fudan University Publishing House, 2005; Shanghai 
Industries report: Shanghai Industries and the Yangtze Delta Megalopolis, International 
magazines, January 2008.  
 
Table 3.2 Main figures of Yangtze River Delta Economic Region in 2009 
Cities GDP Secondary Industry Tertiary Industry Population 
Shanghai 15046.45 6001.78 8930.85 1379.39 
Jiangsu 34457.3 18566.37 13629.07 7625 
Zhejiang 22990.35 11908.49 9918.78 5060 
Source: (NBS, 2010) 
 
This chapter starts with an examination of the complicated hierarchical national and 
regional administrative structure before going on to discuss the city-region alliance 
in the YRD. The Hongqiao project was launched in a climate of fiercely competitive 
urbanism from Shanghai‟s neighbouring cities.  It has been seen as a new platform 
and trading centre for Shanghai‟s existing four functional centres, in finance, 
economics, shipping and trading. Therefore, the regional background of the 
Hongqiao project needs to be examined before looking into the planning process 
behind the project, its governance mechanism and its wider implications for urban 
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change in Shanghai. This chapter aims to put the Hongqiao project in the context of 
competitive urbanism in the YRD. 
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, the 
hierarchical national and regional administrative structure in China is reviewed and 
background information is provided to understand the reasons for competitive 
urbanism in the YRD. In the second section, the new city-region alliance in the YRD 
is examined, alongside the failure of examples of city-region alliances, a failure 
which reflects the fierce urban competition present in the YRD. In the third section, 
Hongqiao is discussed within the wider context of the western peripheries of 
Shanghai. The Hongqiao project is designed specifically to boost the fortunes of the 
western part of Shanghai in the teeth of this fierce competition from neighbouring 
municipalities in Jiangsu province. Finally, a discussion of competitive regional 
growth in the west of Shanghai concludes this chapter. 
 
3.2 The hierarchical national and regional administrative structure 
 
In China, both historically and in the contemporary period, power has swung 
between the centre and the provinces. The last few decades have seen 
considerable budgetary and political power being exercised at the provincial level 
and, indeed, at lower city, county and even district levels. The Chinese 
administrative system has been significantly restructured since the period of 
economic reform began in 1978. Much of the power of economic reform was gained 
through the decentralization of administrative and economic decision-making from 
central government to local government at various levels (Ma, 2005).  
 
In the era of the centrally controlled and planned economy, horizontal links between 
cities were recognised as less important, but the links between cities at a 
hierarchical administrative level were important because central government 
directly engaged in economic activities. Even in industrial planning and layout in 
specific cities, central government played a dominant role (Vogel et al., 2010). The 
shifting of the economic power of decision-making and production from central to 
local government has led to an era of intense competition between neighbouring 
governments, between urban centres and the urban edge, between cities and rural 
areas and, above all, between city and city competing for national and global 
investments (Ma, 2005). The intensified competition and conflicts have impacted on 
the formation of city regions. This situation is more pronounced in the YRD due to 
the region‟s role as pilot for economic reform.  
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Figure 3.1 China‟s administrative structure 
Source:(Ma, 2005). 
 
Government at city and district levels have become more entrepreneurial in order to 
attract investment, particularly in terms of planning industrial parks. However, an 
excessive emphasis on the city rather than the city region impacts on the formation 
of city-region alliances in the YRD. However, before we discuss city-region 
alliances in the YRD, it is necessary to review China‟s hierarchical administrative 
structure, which has four basic administrative levels (Figure 3.1) (Ma, 2005). The 
higher the rating of a city, the more political weight it carries, so the leadership of a 
provincial-level city, prefectural-level city and township have an interest in enlarging 
and rescaling the administrative rank of their jurisdiction. This phenomenon is most 
common in the transformation of administrative entities from county-level cities to 
districts. In a regular process of up-scaling, counties are being converted into cities 
(Chien, 2013). Many counties changed from rural status to urban in order to 
upgrade (Ma and Wu, 2005).  
 
YRD is no exception to the above points. It has a complicated administrative 
structure, and there are no regional administrative bodies covering the Delta. In the 
YRD, there are one provincial-level city, Shanghai, and two provinces, Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang. Each province has five levels of administrative structure, while Shanghai 
has three, and like in the rest of China, there exists a separate administrative 
structure for urban and rural areas. Shanghai today is sub-divided into 16 districts 
and one district-level county, Chongming Island. Pudong New District is a sub-
provincial-level district higher than the others (Figure 3.2). Zhejiang and Jiangsu 
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provinces have five administrative levels: provincial, prefectural, district, town and 
township. At the prefectural level, some cities enjoy different administrative statuses. 
For instance, Nanjing, Hangzhou and Ningbo are sub-provincial-level cities, and 
Wenzhou and Zhenjiang are prefectural-level cities (see Figure 3.2).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Administrative structure in urban and rural system  
Source: the author 
 
As elsewhere, the formation of a city-region alliance depends on the cooperation of 
each administrative unit in the YRD. It is obvious, therefore, that powerful local 
governments leading growing economies are unlikely to push hard for regional 
coordination, especially when the success of officials is judged on local results. 
Nevertheless, there are impulses towards the creation of a regional institutional 
infrastructure, as we will see in the next section. 
 
3.3 New city-region alliances in the YRD  
 
Globalisation of local economies has hastened the development of city regions in 
the past three decades; the internationalization of markets and specialization of 
different functions as well as the labour force are promoted by globalization at 
different geographic scales (Zhao and Zhang, 2007). Against this backdrop, a city-
region agenda has been slowly emerging in China, especially in the PRD, where 
the regional cities are contained within one province, facilitating regional 
coordination plans (Ye, 2014). As the report by the China Mayors Association (2004) 
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points out, China needs to adjust its strategy to pay more attention to the 
development of city regions rather than the rampant urban sprawl of each city. 
Between 1996 and 2005, during the Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plans, central 
government proposed about 10 trans-provincial economic regions in the eastern 
and western parts of China (Xu and Yeh, 2010). The rise of city regions in China 
will be discussed in the following sections in terms of exogenous and endogenous 
forces before considering the process of building city-regions alliances in the YRD. 
 
3.3.1 Exogenous and endogenous forces driving the formation of city regions 
in China  
 
According to Xu (2008), there are various reasons for the creation of city regions in 
China. First, provincial and local governments expect to get more financial and 
policy support from central government when they undertake regional development 
following the guidance from central plans. Second, they hope that forming an 
institutional city-region base can help in getting an advantageous position on the 
national and global economic map. Third, central government wants to see some 
governing capacity to be transferred to the region to enhance its regional 
development policy. Here, the emphasis is put on exogenous and endogenous 
forces pushing towards the creation of Chinese city regions. While the formation 
and development of city regions has a different trajectory according to the region, it 
can be argued that the formation of Chinese city regions can be attributed to two 
main driving forces: FDI flows and promotion by governments at different levels. 
 
First, FDI inflows have been impacting on the development and formation of 
Chinese city regions (Zhao and Zhang, 2007). Given economic liberation and 
decentralization, in particular, the flow of FDI from Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
elsewhere in East Asia, as well as from some developed countries has shaped the 
landscape of China‟s geo-economy (Zhao and Zhang, 2007). China has actively 
integrated itself into the global economy. Particularly as a result of its accession into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, a large amount of FDI and 
investment has poured into China. FDI has tended to be concentrated in coastal 
urbanized areas of China, in particular the Pearl River Delta region in the south, the 
Bohai Rim Region (BRR) in the north and the Yangtze River Delta region as shown 
in Table 3.3. These have become major recipients of FDI in China, ushering in a 
heated wave of industrialization and urbanization, spatial clustering, economic 
development zones and industrial parks, all of which have reinforced the formation 
of city regions.  
 
Table 3.3 The flow of FDI in three city representatives in three city regions (1987–
2009) 
City The flow of FDI in 1987-2009 Billion/dollars 
Shanghai 90.94 
Beijing 47.47 
Shenzhen 44.60 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook in 2010. 
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Second, local entrepreneurial government has also made a significant contribution 
to the formation of city regions in China. A series of institutional arrangements were 
taken by local governments to mobilize all economic resources to promote 
economic development, in particular promoting the spatial convergence of 
economic activities of industrial clusters and parks. The formation of city regions 
has also been reinforced by wave after wave of preferential policies promoting the 
creation of economic development zones and industrial parks issued by 
governments at various levels (Zhao and Zhang, 2007). Xu and Yeh (2010) argue 
that central government puts pressure on cities to form city regions in order to be 
able to assert more central control.  
 
The three coastal regions of PRD, BRR and YRD have become concentrations of 
FDI, attracted by the large number of export-oriented assembling and processing 
plants (Zhao and Zhang, 2007). They have polarised the whole national economy of 
China. In particular, the YRD has been almost completely urbanized in the past 
three decades around its 16 core cities, with Shanghai remaining the largest and 
most important city. The YRD city region has been labelled as the sixth-largest city 
region in the world in terms of economic scale  (Ning, 2002) and has now become 
the largest one. As centralized controls were gradually relaxed, city planners and 
local governors were influenced by internal and external drivers (Yuan and James, 
2002). The YRD has experienced significant transformation. Scholars have 
examined this transformation in terms of cooperation and competitiveness within 
the city region, attracting FDI, regional transportation planning and pollution (Luo 
and Shen, 2008, Luo and Shen, 2009, Wu and Zhang, 2007). These themes will be 
discussed in the section that follows. 
 
3.3.2 Examples of city-region alliances in the YRD 
 
The impulse towards city-region planning and alliances in the YRD can be 
attributed not only to competition from global city regions, but also to intercity 
competition in the YRD. With intensified intercity competition in the economic 
transition from central planning to a relaxed market economy, local authorities have 
become more entrepreneurial in pursuing their local interests (Wu, 2007). This has 
contributed to urban sprawl to the point where the land between the core cities of 
the YRD has been more or less completely urbanised, leading to the gradual 
formation of an urban agglomeration. The high-speed rail lines from Shanghai to 
Nanjing and Hangzhou have brought these cities closer together, accelerating the 
trend towards the formation of city agglomerations in the YRD. In addition, 
economic globalization and industrialization have boosted the performance of some 
small city and rural areas and transformed them into economic centres, leading to a 
polycentric structure for the YRD. (These are examined in more detail in section 
3.5.)  At the same time, however, a series of negative externalities have 
accompanied intensified intercity competition, such as the duplication of port 
infrastructure, environmental pollution of Taihu Lake and surrounding area and 
urban sprawl in the YRD. In an attempt to deal with the problems created by 
intercity competition, city-region planning has come to the fore in China in the last 
ten years. A series of city-region plans and regional strategic plans have been 
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proposed in the YRD, which can be variously considered as bottom-up, state-led 
and top-down. 
 
While there is a lack of any cross-prefecture regional governance in China at the 
mega urban level, there has been recent activity to create city-region alliances. 
There are examples in both the PRD and the YRD. Here, I will discuss the example 
of the following city-region alliances: the Nanjing city region and the Suzhou-Wuxi-
Changzhou city region. Both offer the potential of greater integration in the Yangtze 
River Delta. 
 
As the first cross-jurisdiction plan, the Nanjing city-region plan was launched in 
2001 and approved by Jiangsu province government in 2003. Luo et al. (2008) 
describe the Nanjing project as „bottom up‟ and contrast it with the Suzhou project, 
which they see as „top down‟ (p. 317). Nanjing city actively formulated the Nanjing 
city region in response to the challenge seen to be posed to Nanjing by the cities of 
Suzhou and Wuxi, even to the extent of losing its status as capital city of Jiangsu 
province. Nanjing believed its economic status to be under threat due to the rise of 
Suzhou, Wuxi and other cities in the lower reaches of the YRD. Nanjing city 
government attempted to break through jurisdictional fragmentation and combine 
with surrounding cities. It formulated and introduced the Nanjing city-region plan in 
an attempt to consolidate the central role of Nanjing city and strengthen economic 
linkages with surrounding cities. The Nanjing city region was composed of eight 
prefecture-level cities in two provinces: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Yangzhou and Huaian 
(from Jiangsu province) and Wuhu, Maanshan, Chuzhou and Chaohu (from Anhui 
province). The developmental axis reflects the Yangtze River economic belt and 
traffic axes into and out of Nanjing (Luo et al., 2010a). Nanjing city region is very 
important also because it includes cities in Anhui Province. There is a tension 
between the desire to be market-led, on the one hand, and the leading role of the 
state, on the other (p. 319). Anhui province was actively involved in working on the 
city region plan proposed by Nanjing city; the province had been attempting to 
cooperate and integrate with the YRD (it stands outside the conventional borders of 
the region), and the Nanjing city region plan was seen as a good opportunity to 
strengthen economic ties with the YRD.  
 
„At city level, all member cities in Anhui province were willing to be member 
cities of Nanjing city-region. They repositioned their statuses in consideration of 
the new context of building Nanjing city-region in related plans and 
development strategies. For example, Ma‟anshan repositioned its status as a 
suburban area of Nanjing and a key leisure and vacation base in Nanjing city-
region in its urban master plan.‟ (Luo et al., 2010b)  
 
The Nanjing city region plan focused on strategies of spatial and industrial 
relocation, infrastructure planning, regional coordination and ecological and 
environmental protection. Among these strategies, industrial development and 
planning were the most important aspects of the city-region plan for local 
governments, but they led to significant disagreements among city governments in 
terms of where the city-region plan saw industry being relocated – industrial 
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development and location being regarded as key to local development because of 
the tax and job opportunities it brings. Industrial planning was excluded from the 
Nanjing city-region plan, and this ultimately contributed to the short life span of the 
Nanjing city region. Luo et al. (2010a) wrote that they were not optimistic about the 
future of the Nanjing city region because of fragmented planning and a lack of long-
term political vision. Indeed, the city-region plan did not last long and was almost 
suspended in 2010. 
 
When the leadership of Jiangsu changed, the original development strategies and 
plans developed by the former leadership were also changed. Luo Zhijun, 
Communist Party Secretary of Jiangsu province since 2010, wanted to put his 
imprint on the province‟s economic development strategies. He shifted the focus to 
development along the Yangtze River in Jiangsu. Luo changed the development 
strategy for two reasons. First, as the newly installed leader, he wanted to construct 
his own development strategy and distinguish it from that of the former leaders. 
Second, he feared that Jiangsu province had become divided into two parts -- the 
first part, south of the Yangtze River, including some cities in Anhui province, and 
the second part, north of the Yangtze River, in the north of Jiangsu. If Jiangsu 
province were to be divided into two parts, it would lose its economic advantage 
and position as an economic powerhouse (interview S2012063004). 
 
Other examples exist in the YRD, such as the Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou (SWC) city 
region. The SWC city region was established in 2002 and was the first one to be 
approved by central government. It was seen by the Ministry of Construction as a 
good solution to address excessive urban competition. The SWC city region was 
composed of the three prefecture-level cities of Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou. It 
was created by Jiangsu provincial government as a new regional entity. It had four 
objectives (Luo and Shen, 2008). Its first objective was to become the engine of 
development in Jiangsu province and to play a dominant role in promoting the 
development of the central parts of Jiangsu. Its second objective was to address 
excessive urban competition and to promote integration and enhance regional 
competitiveness. Its third objective was to adjust competitive relationship with 
Shanghai. Its final objective was to enhance regional competiveness in the light of 
competition from economic globalization. Based on these objectives laid out in the 
SWC city-region plan, the intention of provincial government was directly reflected 
in this plan, which was implemented in a top-down manner according to Luo and 
Shen (2008). 
 
Local city governments have been bargaining with the provincial government to 
maximise their local rights and interests in the process of implementing a city-region 
plan. One interesting instance is the competition to host a new airport. A proposal to 
construct a new airport in the SWC city region was developed due to the relocation 
of international flights from Hongqiao to Pudong airports. As will be discussed later 
in Chapter 5, each city was actively battling to house the airport, with each city 
putting their own interests first. Finally, though Wuxi was given permission to build it, 
Suzhou and Changzhou still continued to expand their own airports despite their 
limited capacity (Luo and Shen, 2008). Although the goal of the SWC city region 
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plan is to address excessive urban competition, the provincial government wanted 
further compromise in the plan. It lacked the teeth to lessen the existing problems of 
urban competition in the SWC city region, and this has been seen as the main 
reason for the unsuccessful plan completion (Luo and Shen, 2008). The SWC city-
region plan has been all but scrapped since a change in leadership in 2009. 
Entrepreneurial local government turned it focus to local interests rather than 
regional ones. This suggests that intercity competition counts for more than regional 
cooperation, as a result of which the SWC city region exists in name only. In 
particular, Suzhou has been seeking to active integrate itself into Shanghai‟s 
economic orbit rather than integrating into Nanjing city region. The same can be 
said, if to a lesser extent, of Wuxi and Changzhou (S2012063004). 
 
In order to alleviate urban competition and to regain functional importance in terms 
of economic governance for central government in the YRD, the State Council in 
Beijing proposed guidelines for the industrial and economic development of the 
YRD. In the guidelines, the YRD was enlarged to include two provinces, Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang, and Shanghai municipality, which contained a total of 16 cores cities 
in 2008. These guidelines have been implemented, proving advantageous to a 
larger spread of the core cities of the YRD. In addition, this has led to the 
strengthening of the governing capability of central government as a result of the 
adoption of its industrial guidelines. Since the launch of the industrial and economic 
development guidelines in the YRD in 2008, the sheer number of local city 
governments at different tiers of the municipal structure has handicapped the 
smooth implementation of regional plans. As a result, the municipal government of 
Shanghai and the prefecture-level city government of Changzhou have increasingly 
promoted their own interests rather those of the whole region. Against this 
background, the city-region alliance has not functioned well, and it cannot be said to 
have been successful (interview S2012070101).  
 
The lack of success of city-region planning in the YRD can be attributed to a 
tendency to revert to urban competition, a lack of coordination among 
administrative entities, conflict of interests among governments at various levels 
and the arbitrary action of local government leaders (Luo and Shen, 2008, Luo et al., 
2010a, Xu, 2008). Let us look at each of these in a little more detail. First, the fever 
to attract FDI, which might be said to be an inevitable concomitant of the CCP‟s 
approach to economic development, has made urban competition with city regions 
(Zhang, 2011); the contradictions and conflicts for local government have been and 
remain irreconcilable, even now. Second, while city-region alliances were 
formulated both through “bottom-up” and “top-down” processes, there was no 
regional-level administrative entity to coordinate regional governance. Even though 
provincial governments played a coordination role, local prefecture-level cities have 
gradually become more powerful with decentralization, and their governments, 
responsible for local development, have resisted implementing plans when they 
have considered that their interests were being infringed (Luo et al., 2010a). Third, 
the focus was on the interests of local cities rather than those of the whole city 
region; the participants of city-region alliances have been competing and protecting 
their interests, with no city willing to sacrifice some of its interests for the city-region 
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alliance. Finally, in the context of pursuing economic growth as a core goal, local 
leaders treated growth of GDP as their top priority, and local leaders have 
significant power to implement their own economic and strategic planning during 
their limited term of office. Economic performance is seen as the core indicator for 
promotion, but the new wave of city-region planning and alliances are framed in the 
medium and long term, and not in the short term (interview S2012071002). For 
these reasons, the various city region plans in the YRD have failed so far.  
 
At a city level (both at provincial and prefectural levels), the picture is clearer. 
Shanghai is being transformed into a modern service centre, which focuses on 
tertiary industry. Nanjing and Hangzhou have become regional sub-centres, and 
Suzhou and Changzhou have become traditional industrial centres in the YRD. 
These cities have tended to form organic city regions, but it remains the case that 
the YRD has no regional administrative structure and its cities have formed informal 
and impromptu intra-regional links in order to cooperate in terms of industrial 
development and transport and industrial planning in order to gain competitive 
advantage. It is obvious that urban cooperation has become increasingly important 
in the YRD, particularly in the field of transportation planning and environmental 
conservation, but what cooperation there is exists in the teeth of fierce competition. 
The Hongqiao project is also encountering fierce competition from surrounding 
districts in Shanghai and neighbouring cities in the YRD. It is against this 
background that the next section will discuss Hongqiao within the wider context of 
the western peripheries of Shanghai before focusing on the mega urban project of 
Hongqiao in Chapter 5. 
 
3.4 Hongqiao within the wider context of the western peripheries of Shanghai  
 
3.4.1 Rough geography of the west of Shanghai 
 
Since 1978, the Shanghai Municipal Government has been focusing on urban 
regeneration in the city centre and the development of Pudong district, which was a 
national development strategy in the 1990s. Less attention was paid to the field of 
urban development in the suburbs, with the consequence that Shanghai could not 
compete with its neighbouring cities. Shanghai‟s growth rate of GDP and FDI 
lagged behind those of neighbouring cities (Li and Wu, 2012). It was under these 
conditions of regional urban competition and under pressure from central 
government that a series of active steps were taken by the Shanghai Municipal 
Government. The most compelling one is the Project 173 launched on April 23, 
2003 in an attempt to attract FDI investment to the suburb of Shanghai (Li and Wu, 
2012). 
 
West Shanghai has four suburban districts -- Jiading, Qingpu, Songjiang and 
Minhang -- located on the border with Suzhou in Jiangsu province and Jiaxing in 
Zhejiang province (Figure 3.4). The west of Shanghai has not yet reached complete 
urbanization. Land-use characteristics are mixed, with a scattered distribution of 
industrial parks, rural villages and gated communities, one next to the other in a 
state of disorder. Hongqiao, located in the less-developed district of Minhang, is no 
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exception. The site of the old Hongqiao airport was surrounded by chengzhongcun 
(villages in the city; see Chapter 2) and the more-developed urban areas of Suzhou 
in Jiangsu province (Figure 3.4). In short, west Shanghai had been a semi-rural 
area sandwiched between the urban-developed Shanghai city centre and 
neighbouring cities to the west.  
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Shanghai has experienced fast economic development 
and urbanization from the late 1980s. Since then, a series of urban projects were 
launched by the Shanghai Municipal Government such as the development of 
Pudong New Area and urban regeneration in the city centre (He and Wu, 2005). In 
the process of the regeneration of the city centre, measures were taken to 
encourage the manufacturing sector to relocate in industrial parks in the western 
suburbs of Shanghai, giving room for commercial and housing development in the 
city centre. Measures have included special incentives of land at reduced prices, 
tax incentives and lower administration fees (Luo and Shen, 2008). Under the 
impetus of the Shanghai Municipal Government and, increasingly, entrepreneurial 
district governments, the city centre of Shanghai has been transformed from a 
dilapidated, crowded and disinvested infrastructure to a modern downtown (see 
Chapter 2). Meanwhile, the construction of industrial parks attracting FDI in the 
west of Shanghai has been an important factor kick-starting the urbanization of 
suburbs in this part of the city since the 1990s (He and Wu, 2005).  
 
                     
Figure 3.3 Location of West Shanghai and City Centre 
Jiading   
 
Central City 
Qingpu    
Song jiang     
Minhang     
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Source: compiled from Shanghai Urban Planning. 
 
In 1986, Shanghai was selected as one of 14 Open Coastal Cities to be an arena 
for the establishment of Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZ) 
(Luo and Shen, 2008), which enabled this city to finally catch up with others, which 
had been selected as Special and Economic Zones by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s. 
Hongqiao was the first ETDZ established in Shanghai.  
 
Table 3.4 Main national economic development zones in Shanghai 
Name Level  Scale 
(sq 
km) 
Time  Leading industries Location  
Waigaoqiao 
Free Trade Zone 
National 
State  
10  
June 
1990 
International trade, 
logistics, advanced 
manufacturing industry 
Pudong  
Zhangjiang High 
Tech Park 
State  25 
July 
1992 
Biomedicine, integrated 
circuits and software 
Pudong  
Jinqiao Export 
Processing Zone 
State  27.38 1990 
Electronic information, 
optical and electrical 
machinery, precision 
machinery, fine chemicals 
Pudong  
Minhang Economic 
and Technological 
Development Zone 
State  3.5 1986 
Mechanical and electrical; 
medicine, medical and 
Light Industry 
Minhang  
Caohejing New 
Technology 
Development Zone 
State  10.7  1991 
Microelectronics, 
optoelectronics, computer 
machine software and new 
materials 
Minhang  
Hongqiao 
Economic and 
Technological 
Development Zone 
State  0.625 1986  
Business, tourist residence 
and foreign affairs 
Changning  
Lujiazui Finance 
and Trade Zone 
State  28  1990 
Finance, Insurance and 
Securities and Trading 
Pudong  
Shanghai Zizhu 
high-tech Industrial 
Development Zone 
State  13 2001 
Software technology, new 
materials, optical 
communication devices 
and systems, Micro Electro 
Mechanical, life science, 
aerospace 
Minhang  
Shanghai 
Economic and 
Technological 
Development Zone 
of Chemical 
Industry 
State  29.4 1996 
Petrochemical processing 
and natural gas chemical 
industry 
Jinshan  
Source: (SMG, 2010). 
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It was set up by the municipal government in 1983, but was the smallest ETDZ in 
the whole of China with a size of 0.625 square kilometres. It was granted national-
level status in 1986 (Shanghai Development Park, 2009). A hierarchic system of 
different levels of manufacturing-oriented ETDZs was established in the spring tide 
of the “zone fever” since 1986. Each of these “levels” came with different 
preferential policies (tax breaks, cheaper land prices and lower business rates); 
those granted by the central government came with more benefits. Each district and 
county was actively building its own ETDZ in Shanghai. By 2001, the number of 
ETDZs (at different levels) had reached its peak of 177 within Shanghai. Of these, 
only 9 ETDZs acquired the higher status (and preferential powers) granted with 
their status by central government within the suburbs of Shanghai. These 9 ETDZs 
have become Shanghai‟s development focus in terms of the manufacturing sector. 
The location, leading industries and date of establishment of these ETDZs are 
given in Table 3.4 (Shanghai Development Park, 2009). 
 
In the 2000s, the process of “zone fever” was key in the urban expansion of 
Shanghai‟s suburbs by attracting foreign investment, firms and residents. This was 
accompanied by a strategy of state-led suburban new town development in and 
around Shanghai (Shen, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Location of Hongqiao and other cities close to Hongqiao. 
Source: (Li and Wu, 2012) 
3.4.2 Placing Hongqiao within its regional context (west Shanghai and YRD) 
This chapter now moves on to look in more detail at the regional background to the 
Hongqiao project. In the districts around Hongqiao and across the border in Suzhou, 
there has been a series of urban development projects, including One City and 
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Nine Towns, university towns, property-led projects and infrastructure development 
of underground line within West Shanghai, which has accelerated urbanization. 
These projects will be discussed in the following pages before we come to a review 
of the Hongqiao project. However, in order to understand the development and role 
of Hongqiao in a regional context, it is beneficial to dedicate a few pages to an 
analysis of the rapid growth of Shanghai‟s immediate western neighbour, the city of 
Kunshan. 
 
3.4.2.1 From the perspective of Shanghai‟s neighbouring city, Kunshan 
 
Kunshan and its rapid development has attracted much investment and attention. 
Located on the border with Jiading district of Shanghai, Kunshan is an 
internationalized and economically advanced county-level city under Suzhou in 
Jiangsu province (Li and Wu, 2012). Kunshan has attracted a lot of attention from 
academic researchers and policy-makers (HAO et al., 2012). Its development is not 
primarily attributed to the Township Enterprise Programme of the 1980s in the 
south of Jiangsu (Sunan), but rather to huge investment from Taiwan in particular, 
as well as  from companies re-investing from the Third Front and some companies 
moving out of Shanghai (Li and Wu, 2012). Driven by these factors, Kunshan has 
transformed itself into one of the fastest developing county-level administrations of 
China, rising from a rural county in 1978 to the point where it is now a county-level 
city; in the process, it has internationalized its manufacturing base. Due to its 
proximity to Shanghai, Kunshan appeals to potential investors by playing on its 
being “not Shanghai, but almost Shanghai” (Chien, 2013) when it comes to 
competing for investment with Shanghai.  
 
The most recent venture in Kunshan, Huaqiao International Business Park, has 
been proposed and promoted by both Kunshan local government and Jiangsu 
provincial governments (Li and Wu, 2012). Based on investment brochures and 
marketing literature by Kunshan government, Huaqiao International Business Park 
was designed as a place for the development of service industry and to serve the 
10 planned new towns in the west of Shanghai (see below). More broadly, thanks to 
factors such as its entrepreneurial government and FDI and policy support from 
higher tiers of government, a mismatched relationship has come into being between 
economic performance and Kunshan‟s administrative level. This is referred to as a 
mismatch between a small shoe (Kunshan‟s lower administrative ranking) and a big 
foot (successful economic performance) (Chien, 2013). Kunshan‟s administrative 
level has been county level, which is a rank lower than city; however, Kunshan‟s 
economic performance has greatly exceeded what its administrative ranking should 
merit. Kunshan‟s dazzling economic performance can be explained from the 
perspective of Kunshan's contribution to national GDP. Kunshan‟s total GDP was 
2,430 million RMB in 2011, which was more than that of some western and inland 
provinces such as Hainan, Tibet, Qinghai and Ningxia. In 2010, Kunshan produced 
4.7% of all China‟s GDP and 2.5% of its trade (Chien, 2013). The reasons behind 
Kunshan‟s extraordinary growth rates will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
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The transformation of Kunshan can be attributed to the following three factors: 
locational advantage, the crucial role of entrepreneurial leaders and the driving 
force of FDI. First, locational advantage has been recognised as one of the 
important factors for the transformation of Kunshan. Kunshan has made full use of 
its locational advantage close to Shanghai and the greater opportunity this provides 
to promote economic development. Because of the advantage of its proximity to 
Shanghai, Kunshan has gained huge collateral support from Shanghai Municipal 
Government in terms of funding and skills. The most prominent example of this 
support is that the collective township and village enterprises (TVEs) of rural 
Kunshan, to a large extent, relied on the cooperation of state-owned enterprises in 
Shanghai in the field of attracting investment, equipment, skilled workers and 
engineers from Shanghai in the early days of reform and opening up (HAO et al., 
2012). Importantly, in terms of attracting FDI, relying on Shanghai‟s convenient 
location and the opportunity of development of Pudong, a large amount of FDI was 
poured into Shanghai and neighbouring cities, including Kunshan (Li and Wu, 2012).  
 
Second, entrepreneurial leaders have had a crucial role to play in promoting the 
transformation of Kunshan, as discussed by Chien (2013). Kunshan‟s status as a 
Special Economic Zone would not have been granted by the State Council without 
entrepreneurial leaders. With the designation came a series of special institutional 
arrangements such as low-priced land, preferential policies and tailored institutions 
catering to the requirements of enterprises (HAO et al., 2012, Chien, 2007). Third, 
FDI has also been an important factor for the transformation of Kunshan, which has 
become an international manufacturing base of high-tech information 
communication industries (Chien and Wu, 2011). Taiwanese investment has 
formed spectacular landscapes in terms of the IT industry in Kunshan.  
 
The importance of Taiwan‟s investment is reflected in a  number of economic 
indicators. Taiwan‟s investment has produced 50% of revenue and 60% of taxation; 
it has created 70% of employment and brought 80% investment and 90% of exports 
for Kunshan (Chien and Wu, 2011). At the same time, a large number of senior 
technical and management personnel from Taiwan have settled in Kunshan. Many 
Taiwanese-style buildings and shops have appeared in Kunshan, and there are 
Taiwanese schools there too. Indeed, Kunshan is known as „little Taipei‟ (Interview 
S2012063004).  
 
Finally, new local state power produced by administrative restructuring can be also 
attributed to Kunshan‟s administrative transformation, as discussed by Chien (2013). 
Local cadres in Kunshan have left no stone unturned in realizing the process of 
administrative restructuring from rural county to county city. This rapid ascent up 
the administrative ladder brings huge policy gains and funding advantages for local 
government. Kunshan‟s local government officials have, therefore, been able to 
build greater competence to mobilize resources to promote economic development. 
 
Across the border from Shanghai, Kunshan, and even Suzhou itself have 
experienced fast development in terms of GDP growth, and this has posed severe 
pressure and threats on West Shanghai and, indeed, the whole of Shanghai. The 
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city of Shanghai itself has been brought into competition with Suzhou and Kunshan 
in attracting FDI. Not only is Hongqiao facing fierce competition from outside, but it 
is also facing huge competition from neighbouring districts west of Shanghai.  
 
3.4.2.2 From the perspective of western Shanghai 
 
While much of Shanghai has been transformed by any number of urban projects 
including airports, convention centres, a new CBD, new districts, gated 
communities, skyscrapers, downtown plazas and the like sprouting up all over the 
city, the picture in the western suburbs has been somewhat different. This section 
examines the western suburbs in more detail, relating developments there to those 
in Kunshan across the border. Prominent among the projects to have been 
undertaken in areas not distant from Hongqiao are One City, Nine Towns (yicheng 
jiuzhen), Songjiang University Town and Project 173; these will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
In order to promote urbanization in the fridge of Shanghai, under the leadership of 
former Shanghai party chief Chen Liangyu, the pilot project known as One City, 
Nine Towns was planned and launched in the western suburbs of Shanghai in 2001 
(Shanghai Municipal Government document no. 1, quoted in Shen and Wu, 2012). 
Ten towns were built in the style of towns in Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Spain, North America and Scandinavia respectively (Xue and Zhou, 2007, Shen, 
2011). After several years of intensive construction, even though the project faced a 
great deal of criticism, the planned towns have taken shape in the suburbs of 
Shanghai, with the exception of two towns in the original plan. These are 
Chenjiazhen in Chongming County and Lingang in Nanhui district, which were 
abandoned (Shen and Wu, 2012).  The One City, Nine Towns project has triggered 
a fierce debate among professionals, planners and citizens because the eight 
western-style high-end new towns have been likened to ghost towns due to low 
occupancy rates (Miller, 2013). Even though new flats in some new towns are sold 
out, they were treated as real estate investments by buyers (mostly from Shanghai 
city centre and the surrounding cities) rather than as residences (Hao et al., 2012).  
While the new towns have been criticised for the huge investment from government 
and private sectors not only in their construction, but also in supporting projects of 
transportation and greening, the wider districts, in which the new towns have been 
built have urbanised at very high rates. In particular, Songjiang has ceased to be an 
isolated county partly through the new towns, but also through the establishment of 
a university, which will be reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Songjiang was chosen as the one city in the One City, Nine Towns project. As part 
of the project, Songjiang was designated as a university town. Songjiang University 
Town is just one drop of water in the tide of the construction of new towns in China 
(Xue et al., 2013). However, after Hongqiao, it is the most important project in west 
Shanghai, in particular for Songjiang, whose district government has brought large 
educational investment from Shanghai for the construction of several university 
campuses and a large property investment from the private sector and 
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transportation infrastructure. The whole project covers more than ten square 
kilometres of built-up area in Songjiang. 
 
Songjiang University Town consists of seven universities; the campus covers an 
area of 5.47 square kilometres. This land was donated by Songjiang district 
government to support the development of education in Songjiang. Songjiang 
district government and Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (SMEC) have 
played an active role in the construction of the university town. Songjiang district 
government has managed the transformation of “immature land” into “mature land” 
(see Chapter 5) through land levelling and the provision of infrastructure; SMEC 
was in charge of the construction of facilities surrounding the university campuses, 
with each university responsible for the construction its own campus (Shen, 2011). 
The project was launched in the context of the reform of higher education in 1999 in 
China as a result of which the enrolment rate into higher education increased and 
was expected to reach 50% of all young Shanghainese in 2005, according to plans 
drawn up by the Municipal Education Commission (MEC) (Shen, 2011). Such a 
sharp increase in the number of students exceeds the capacity of the old campuses 
in the city centre, and some universities would have to be relocated to the suburbs 
according to the MEC plan. Helped by the plan to construct the new Songjiang City 
as part of the One City, Nine Towns project and thanks to the lobbying undertaken 
by the Songjiang district government, Songjiang was chosen as the location for the 
university town. Seven universities with about 100,000 students and staff were 
relocated to Songjiang University Town by 2005 (Shen, 2011). There is no doubt 
that the university town has promoted urbanization and the development of 
infrastructure and real estate in Songjiang (Shen, 2011).  
 
Another important project in Songjiang has been the construction of Thames Town. 
Modelled on an assortment of English town landscapes, this is a prestige project 
designed to attract wealthy Shanghainese and Taiwanese working in Kunshan 
(Shen and Wu, 2012). The project of Thames Town is an upmarket residential area; 
the houses have mainly been bought by private investors for investment rather than 
actual residence and mainly let empty. Although this project has been criticised in 
part for being outside commuting range of Shanghai, it has attracted much attention 
and served as a publicity flag bearer for the district.  
 
In 2003, Project 173 was announced in an attempt to attract more FDI in the 
context of Shanghai‟s city rivalry in the manufacturing sector with neighbouring 
parts of Jiangsu Province (Li and Wu, 2012). This project was more related to the 
development of manufacturing in Shanghai and so differs from the two projects 
mentioned above. Shanghai‟s Project 173 was an attempt to promote industrial 
development in the suburbs of west Shanghai. It consists of three industrial 
development zones, which were chosen by Shanghai Municipal Government in the 
west of Shanghai in Songjiang, Qingpu and Jiading districts, together covering 173 
square kilometres (Figure 3.5). 
 
- Chapter 3 - 
69 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Location of 173 Project in Shanghai 
Source: Li and Wu, 2012. 
 
With neighbouring cities in Jiangsu Province capturing the lion‟s share of inward 
investment, Shanghai Municipal Government adopted a series of policies including 
government subsidies, tax relief and preferential land policies to attract 
manufacturing investment into the west of Shanghai. Arguably, however, these 
policies damaged Shanghai‟s interests by stoking up competition in reducing land 
premiums. Ultimately, Shanghai could not compete with cities in Jiangsu province, 
which have a lot more land that can be developed than Shanghai. 
 
Due to the limits in the amount of land it had at its disposal compared with 
neighbouring cities in Jiangsu province, Shanghai Municipal Government  did not 
treat Project 173 as its primary development priority and abandoned related 
preferential policies when Chen Liangyu stepped down as Shanghai Municipal 
Party Committee Secretary in 2006 (Li and Wu, 2012). Shanghai's development 
focus has gradually shifted from an emphasis on the manufacturing sector to 
developing the service sector. This has led to a transformation in the competitive 
relationship between Shanghai and Suzhou in the past few years. As a result of 
competition between Shanghai and cities in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, 
guidelines for the promotion of reform and in the economic and social development 
of the Yangtze River Delta region were announced by the State Council (Shanghai 
- Chapter 3 - 
70 
 
Municipal Government, 2010) in order to reduce damaging industrial competition 
and achieve harmonious development in the Yangtze River Delta.  
 
3.5 Some conclusions on competitive regional growth in the west of Shanghai 
 
How has this regional competition affected the districts around Hongqiao? The 
impact appears to have differed somewhat between the two closest districts that 
once included the land on which Hongqiao stands. Stretching eastward from 
Hongqiao, Changning lies much closer to the city centre and has grown much 
faster. There is, indeed, a huge difference in the degree of development in the 
adjacent districts of Changning and Minhang. In Changning district, near Hongqiao 
Airport with its transportation advantages, two prestigious state guesthouses have 
been built to receive central leaders and foreign guests, as well as to host  business 
events (Wang, 2005). Economic growth in Changning has also been driven by the 
establishment in the district of the Hongqiao Economic and Technological 
Development Zone designed to develop foreign trade. The zone was proposed by 
the Shanghai Municipal Government in 1982 and approved by the State Council in 
1986, and this then grew into the Hongqiao Foreign Trade Centre, Shanghai's 
largest high-standard integrated industrial and commercial area together with 
residential facilities (Wang, 2005). As discussed earlier, Hongqiao ETDZ was the 
first one in Shanghai with national status (higher preferential policies) and has 
gradually become a foreign trade centre due to its location in the city centre. A large 
number of foreigners live there, turning it into an upmarket residential area. In 
addition, being one of the smallest ETDZs in China, with just 0.625 square 
kilometres and high demand for location, the cost of commercial activities has been  
rising sharply here, which has forced relocation of other industries, in particular the 
manufacturing and small companies. It has suffered fierce competition, and its role 
has gradually weakened in terms of driving economic growth of the surrounding 
area.  
 
A series of further projects were undertaken on the Changning side of the Hongqiao 
area. Luxury villas first directed to foreigners were built along Hongqiao Changning 
district between 1980 and 2000. An international consular district was constructed 
as well as a hotel district and a new zone for commercial buildings and up-market 
apartments between 1990 and 2000. The part of Changning district closest to 
Hongqiao has become a foreign business area and a high-end residential area after 
20 years of intensive development (Wang, 2005). Meanwhile, there has been much 
less development on the Minhang side of Hongqiao airport. Minhang district to the 
west and southwest lies further from Shanghai city centre and, as such, has been 
characterised by rural villages and small suburban factories (Interview 
G2012062101).  
 
As we have seen, the suburban districts of Qingpu, Jiading and Songjiang in the 
west of Shanghai have experienced intensified competition in terms of economic 
and urban development. From the perspective of economic development, these 
districts have established industrial parks to attract investment. In order to win the 
battle of attracting investment, each district has been competing to offer preferential 
- Chapter 3 - 
71 
 
policies of tax reductions and exemptions, providing cheaper land and reductions in 
management fees for investors. From the perspective of urbanization, a series of 
urban projects were launched by local governments in order to realize economic 
and urban growth. The launching of the Hongqiao project is recognized as a good 
opportunity for surrounding districts as it has brought large amounts of investment 
from the public and private sectors in infrastructure and transportation in west 
Shanghai. Most important have been the preferential policies issued by the central 
and Shanghai Municipal Governments. 
 
When the Hongqiao project is placed into the expanded picture of its neighbouring 
cities in the YRD, intensified competition for Hongqiao comes from the core cities of 
the YRD, including the neighbouring cities of Kunshan, Suzhou, Hangzhou and 
even Nanjing. We can explain intensified competition based on the perspectives of 
industrial planning and mega urban projects. Based on industrial planning, 
Hongqiao project faces intense competition from Huaqiao Business Zone launched 
by Suzhou and Jiangsu province, which has basic rationale similar to that of the 
Hongqiao project. It shows that competition between west Shanghai and its 
neighbouring cities has changed and evolved from the manufacturing sector 
towards the service sector, and the same process has occurred with the cities of 
Hangzhou and Nanjing. Nanjing and Hangzhou, as leading sub-centre cities in the 
YRD, have launched mega urban new-city projects earlier than Hongqiao. The 
Hongqiao project was launched in the context of competitive regional growth and 
has attracted a great deal of attention from media and government circles. In 
Chapter 2, we reviewed the literature on Chinese urbanization and Shanghai‟s 
transformation. In this chapter, we have discussed the regional context within which 
the Hongqiao project has been developed. We have seen how inter-urban regional 
competition has become a crucial feature of the picture of urban growth. Shanghai 
has experienced wave after wave of urban change and growth, the Hongqiao 
project being a landmark project in the process of urban growth. Before moving on 
to a discussion of how Hongqiao is being developed (in part as a rival centre to 
Kunshan and other growth centres west of Shanghai) in Chapter 5, we will review 
the research methodology, fieldwork, data collection and related issues in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Chapter 3 - 
72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Chapter 4 - 
73 
 
Chapter 4  
Fieldwork and methodology 
 
This chapter explains and justifies the methodology used in this research and the 
main constraints of this work. Despite the recommendations put forward by many 
scholars doing fieldwork in China (Heimer and Thøgersen, 2006, Cornet, 2010, 
Turner, 2010), a full survey  reviewing urban change is still rare in China. This 
research uses as its case study the Hongqiao project in Shanghai to review urban 
change in China through fieldwork. The first part of this chapter (section 4.1) will 
describe the aims, scope and phases of fieldwork in Hongqiao. Information 
regarding methods used to collect data and arrangements for the fieldwork will be 
provided. The second part of the chapter (section 4.2) explores the study area and 
initial access to the fieldwork. The section, then, continues with a presentation of a 
full survey questionnaire, which introduces the process of observation and analysis 
of documents, the pilot questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews and the full 
questionnaire survey itself, followed by a discussion of the major problems 
encountered in the process of conducting the fieldwork. A copy of the questionnaire 
survey with a sample answer and the interview questions can be found in the 
Appendix.  
 
4.1 The aims, scope and phases of fieldwork 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the primary aims of my research are to assess the 
nature of competitive urbanism in Shanghai and its region and to contribute to the 
literature on the main features of entrepreneurial urbanism in China. The detailed 
picture of the Hongqiao project presented here is used to draw conclusions about 
the main features of urban growth coalitions in China today and to investigate the 
consequences of the Hongqiao project on local residents in terms of impact on their 
livelihoods. In the concluding chapter, comparisons are made with other projects in 
Shanghai (He and Wu, 2007) and Beijing (Broudehoux, 2007) to draw a wider 
picture of the effect of urban development projects on those who are displaced and 
thereby to connect with discussions about the consequences of neoliberal urban 
restructuring in other parts of the world.  
 
The aim of my fieldwork was to collect detailed information and data about primarily 
the following: (1) Hongqiao Airport and the surrounding area, particularly relating to 
the economic development and the characteristics of the urban villages in the 
environs of the airport; (2) the Hongqiao project; (3) the number of relocated local 
residents, villagers and factories and shops, as well as land expropriation and 
compensation issues; (4) the attitude of relocated villagers towards relocation and 
resettlement in Hongqiao and the situation of their lives before and after relocation; 
(5) the impact of the project on people who live in surrounding areas; (6) the main 
participants and their different interests in the twin projects of Hongqiao transport 
- Chapter 4 - 
74 
 
hub and business district to examine the question of who benefits and who loses 
out in the project; (7) the governance mechanism used and the methods of project 
promotion; (8) preferential policies introduced by government at various levels; and 
(9) the policies of Hongqiao Business District Committee and the surrounding 
district government towards attracting investment. 
 
Due to the complexity and scale of the Hongqiao project and in order to shed light 
on these aims of my fieldwork, several methods were adopted to collect the various 
data, as follows: 
 
 An analysis of planning and economic development documents  
 Observation of the development site 
 Survey questionnaires with relocated villagers (preceded by a pilot survey) 
 In-depth interviews with experts 
 In-depth interviews with relocated villagers 
The details of these aims and the constraints I encountered will be presented in the 
following sections.  
 
Prior to the actual fieldwork, desk and Internet-based research was conducted to 
collect background information about the Hongqiao area (as shown in Figure 4.2), 
the progress of the Hongqiao project and its detailed planning based on research 
materials collected when I worked on a research project for Minhang District 
Government in 2009. 
 
The fieldwork itself took place in two different phases. The first phase was between 
November 2011 and February 2012 during which various methods were tested by 
conducting a pilot survey and interviews and through observation. In order to gain a 
first impression of the Hongqiao project and the relocated villagers‟ attitudes 
towards the Hongqiao project, I walked all around the Hongqiao project construction 
site, the demolished area and the Aibo Community resettlement site, where a new 
settlement has been gradually formed with a vegetable market, schools, nursing 
home, small hotels, restaurants and other living facilities. In addition, secondary 
data about the planning of the Hongqiao transportation hub and business district 
and industrial development policies was obtained. Alongside this, information on the 
actual mechanisms of the relocation scheme and construction of Hongqiao 
transportation hub was collected in preliminary interviews with officials of Hongqiao 
business and Minhang district, developers, planners, experts and academics who 
have been heavily involved in the project. Based on these preliminary findings in 
the pilot survey, a much more detailed and accurate understanding of the 
governance mechanisms of the Hongqiao project and the attitudes of relocatees 
towards the Hongqiao project was formed, and my research questions and 
research methodology were refined for the second phase of fieldwork. 
 
The second phase of the fieldwork took place between June 2012 and August 2012. 
In this phase, extensive semi-structured and in-depth interviews were conducted to 
collect first-hand data, and a questionnaire survey was carried out to collect 
qualitative information. The target interviewees were participants of the Hongqiao 
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project -- government officials, planners, academics, real estate developers, 
relocated villagers, urban residents and villager leaders. Interviews were conducted 
with at least three people from each of these groups and many more in the case of 
government officials and relocated villagers. I was also able to interview one 
relocated business owner. The questionnaire survey mainly focused on relocated 
people with the aim of understanding their attitude towards the Hongqiao project 
and its impact on their lives.  
 
4.2 The study area and initial access to fieldwork 
 
Hongqiao is a newly created district located in the western part of Shanghai. This 
part of the western suburbs of Shanghai had been almost entirely ignored in round 
after round of industrialization and urbanization since the 1990s. Hongqiao was, 
therefore, semi-rural and semi-suburban before the Hongqiao project was initiated 
in 2007. The launching of the project started a new wave of urban development in 
Shanghai – not only with the planning and building of the hub and business district, 
but also through the construction of new high-speed railway lines linking Shanghai 
to the main cities of the YRD, as shown in Figure 4.1. The newly created business 
district covers an area of 26.2 square kilometres, to which its neighbouring district 
of Minhang has contributed 17.8 square kilometres. The Hongqiao project has led 
to the relocation of 11 villages, 3874 households and 1381 businesses and shops. 
Relocated households were resettled in a newly built housing complex named Aibo 
Community located in the northwest part of Hongqiao business district as shown in 
Figure 4.3. Business companies and shops were relocated to other places of 
Minhang and other districts.  
 
Prior to undertaking my PhD fieldwork, when I was a Master‟s student at East China 
Normal University, I conducted fieldwork for a consultancy project funded by 
Minhang District Government. The fieldwork focused on investigating the impact of 
the Hongqiao transportation project on the development of Minhang district. During 
this research, I carried out a site investigation and visited the Hongqiao transport 
hub in 2009, which at the time was a construction site. All the transportation 
facilities were being built, while local residents and factories had already been 
relocated. The focus of that research project was purely on the impact of the 
transport hub on the development of Minhang district; other issues such as the 
effect of the urban development project on relocated residents was not investigated. 
When the focus of my PhD research shifted to the study that I have undertaken 
here, I was able to build on the good connections I had secured with a number of 
officials involved in the Hongqiao project. 
 
Choosing East China Normal University, one of the foremost centres in China for 
urban research, as my base in Shanghai was important for my fieldwork. Students 
of my former colleagues provided a lot of help in conducting the survey as they 
were very experienced with survey methodology and the Shanghai context and 
some of them could speak the Shanghai dialect. 
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Figure 4.1 The position of Hongqiao and Shanghai in the YRD showing the high-
speed rail lines terminating at Hongqiao station 
Source: Author. 
 
 
.  
Figure 4.2 The location of Hongqiao project within Shanghai 
Source: Author. 
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In China, relationships and networks are extremely important factors in conducting 
fieldwork; my former teachers at East China Normal University helped me contact 
officials for my in-depth interviews. In particular, my contacts in Minhang district 
were essential as they arranged interviews with other officials and were able to 
obtain policy documents for me, which was vital for me in completing my research. 
Without my contacts it would have been impossible to interview local officials and 
obtain invaluable data of a sort that is rarely made publicly available. 
 
Figure 4.3 Layout of the Aibo Community villages in Hongqiao business district 
Source: Author. 
 
4.3 Survey questionnaire  
 
My research involved observation and document analysis, interviews and a 
questionnaire survey. There was some overlap between the interviews and the 
questionnaire survey because in the process of administering the questionnaire, it 
became clear that some respondents were illiterate; as a result, the questionnaire 
survey was inevitably transformed into an interview. The questionnaire survey and 
the interviews each had their own focus. The survey was designed to obtain 
comprehensive data on the impact of the project on relocated villagers through a 
questionnaire; meanwhile, interviews were designed so as to get further detailed 
information on attitudes towards relocation. 
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4.3.1 Observation and document analysis 
 
Before starting my pilot survey, I spent seven days and a number of nights in the 
Aibo Community in order to have a good understanding of this area. During this 
time I walked around the whole area and the site of the business district, observing 
the situation of the Hongqiao project and Aibo Community. Direct observation was 
important in helping me to understand the scale of the project, the type of building 
work going on, the nature of the new spaces being created and the living conditions 
in the newly built Aibo villages. 
 
Secondary data for this research has mainly come from the governments of 
Shanghai City, Minhang district and Hongqiao business district. Policy documents, 
planning and design documents, internal reports as well as promotional materials 
were obtained from Shanghai Municipal Government, Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee, Minhang District Government and Shenhong Company. 
These documents provided detailed information about Shanghai‟s developmental 
strategy, both short and long term, and the municipal government‟s targets for the 
Hongqiao business district. 
 
Among documents that I analysed for this research are regional planning 
documents for the Yangtze River Delta, Shanghai‟s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-
2015). Minhang district‟s master plan and regional development plan, Minhang 
district yearbook and economic data as well as Shanghai‟s master plan, which 
provides direction for Shanghai‟s urban and industrial development, are important 
for obtaining an understanding of the Hongqiao project. Other materials analysed 
include documents introducing the Hongqiao transport and commercial hub, the 
Hongqiao Business District regional plan, planning documents for Shanghai 
Hongqiao business district‟s commercial development, spatial planning documents 
for Hongqiao transport and commercial hub, the plan for the core area of Hongqiao 
transport and commercial hub, industrial planning documents for Hongqiao 
business district and the plan of the greater Hongqiao area, which contains 
abundant information on the function and position of Hongqiao business district in 
the YRD, including maps.  
 
Shanghai and Hongqiao business district websites provided plenty of information 
about the progress of the project and preferential policies issued to attract 
companies to locate in Hongqiao. In particular, substantial information on land 
premiums, leased land plots and real estate developers were obtained from 
websites.  
 
The review and analysis of these documents not only provided factual data on the 
project before fieldwork began, but also furnished me with very important 
information on the aims of the government‟s strategy for the Hongqiao project. In 
sum, observation and document analysis were very important steps for me to take 
in order to acquire up-to-date data before conducting the pilot survey. 
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4.3.2 Pilot survey questionnaire 
 
In the first period of fieldwork, a pilot survey questionnaire was conducted with 30 
relocated villagers in the new Aibo Community. This pilot survey was carried out to 
spot any potential problems such as precision and conciseness of questions, length 
of questionnaire, language comprehension, appropriate time for interviews and 
access to respondents. The pilot questionnaire was also an opportunity to explore 
the main themes and problems that the relocatees face and hence refine my 
research questions and redesign the questionnaire. Through the pilot survey, I was 
able to gain a first impression of the Hongqiao project, its progress and the attitude 
of relocated villagers towards relocation and compensation. In particular, I was able 
to gain an understanding of the general situation of villagers after relocation; this 
was extremely important in helping me redesign the questionnaire. 
 
The main lessons from this pilot questionnaire survey were the following. Firstly, I 
found that villagers were less willing to be interviewed or surveyed when they 
assumed that members of my team and I belonged to the local government or were 
supported by government. Villagers feared that that we were collecting information 
for the government and, thus, were reluctant to answer our queries. Villagers were 
particularly sensitive to questions about their personal information such as income 
and household members. They were afraid to expose their names. In terms of 
length of the survey, I soon found that a questionnaire with more than 25 questions 
took too long to administer, and the patience of respondents dwindled. In addition, 
many respondents could not speak Mandarin Chinese. I first showed written proof 
that I was not from government, and I explained that I was actually conducting 
independent research as part of an academic study designed to look into the impact 
of the project on their lives. In order to encourage them to agree to an interview, I 
prepared some small gifts for the interviewees, and I was as efficient as possible, 
saving time by simplifying questions and focusing on the main ones. Secondly, 
when Iconducted the pilot survey in the five villages of Aibo Community, I found out 
that interviewees who were relocated from same villages before relocation had 
similar basic information about relocation. To ensure the quality of the interviews, I 
limited the number of respondents from the same village before relocation. I 
decided to choose two households out of 26 in each residential building in the Aibo 
Community to avoid repetition of information. In addition, I created a representative 
sample in terms of age, economic class and gender. Where possible, I tried to ask 
family members other than the (male) household head to respond to our survey. I 
realise this is at best a somewhat improvised way to obtain a demographic balance, 
but in the circumstances it seemed to be the best approach available. 
 
Lastly, I learnt how to conduct interviews efficiently. Many interviewees complained 
about the issue of insufficient compensation and repeatedly asked us to report this 
complaint to the higher levels of government. Our interviews were often interrupted 
by their complaints about their future prospects in terms of job opportunities and 
income, all of which prolonged our interview. In order to ensure that each interview 
did not occupy too much time, I learnt how to deal with these points without creating 
dissatisfaction or unhappiness on the part of the interviewees. 
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4.3.3 In-depth interviews  
 
In-depth interviews were very important in complementing, nuancing and furthering 
the information gathered from the secondary sources. In particular, when it came to 
issues of relocation and displacement of villagers, it was very important to contrast 
the information gathered from the surveys with that received from government 
officials. This reflects a key point made by Heimer and Thøgersen (2006) that while 
interviews are likely to be the central task when conducting fieldworks in China, 
conversation is a key way of collecting data. For this purpose I decided to carry out 
in-depth interviews with several relocatees who were resettled in Aibo Community 
and a number of local officials, planners, and scholars in several organizations who 
had been responsible for issues raised by the Hongqiao project such as land 
acquisition, relocation of villagers and factories and the construction of Hongqiao 
Business Zone. In terms of access to these professionals, I was greatly indebted to 
my contacts from East China Normal University. With this help, I was able to 
interview senior officials from Minhang District Government, Shenhong Investment 
and Development Company (abbreviated to Shenhong Company in the following 
chapters), Hongqiao Business District Management Committee, Shanghai Airport 
Group, the planning departments of Minhang and Hongqiao districts, the 
Development and Reform Commission in Minhang district, Xinhong street 
committee, Huacao town government, the demolition and relocation headquarters 
in Huacao township and relocated villagers. 
 
The purpose of the in-depth interviews with officials and relocated villagers was to 
collect information to answer questions concerning the following issues: (1) what 
the process of relocation involved; (2) how the Hongqiao project was managed; (3) 
what governance mechanisms were in place for the project; (4) what the impact of 
the project was on local residents; and (5) what the attitudes of relocatees were. 
Many specific details on the planning of the project, land acquisition and 
development, the relocation of villagers, the operation and coordination 
mechanisms of the project and the concerns and expectations of relocated villagers 
were obtained through in-depth interviews. In particular, I was able to form a 
coherent picture of the land-based urban growth coalition and rolling development 
in the Hongqiao project, as well as gain a clearer understanding of the role of 
entrepreneurial local government as the main driving force behind the project as a 
result of my in-depth interviews. 
 
53 in-depth interviews and three group discussions were conducted during the two 
periods of fieldwork in Shanghai. The duration of each interview ranged from one to 
two hours. The interviews were held with relocated villagers, officials, planners, 
scholars, administrators from state-owned companies, village leaders and real 
estate developers. (For detailed information on the interviews, see Appendix.) In 
addition, before and after interviews with officials, three group discussions were 
held with officers from Minhang District Government, Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee and Shenhong Company to get their views on the main 
research questions. I should state that I interviewed some key officials and planners 
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more than three times. However, officials tended to be reluctant to answer 
questions related to land acquisition and financing of the project. 
 
Face-to-face interviews gave me a thorough understanding of the process, 
operation and management mechanism of the project as well as the attitude of 
relocated villagers towards the project.  
 
4.3.4 Survey 
 
In my second period of fieldwork, I carried out a questionnaire survey with villagers 
displaced from the settlements, which were destroyed to make room for the 
Hongqiao project. This represents important and valuable data as there has been 
very little systematic research on the attitudes of displaced residents.  
 
In order to get the best results, preparatory work for the survey was conducted. As 
350 questionnaires were planned and each questionnaire would take more than 
one hour to complete, it would have been impossible to carry out such extensive 
work without the help of a team. Therefore, I recruited 16 students from East China 
Normal University and chose students with extensive experience in fieldwork who 
had conducted fieldwork for their supervisors. There was, thus, no need to provide 
them with detailed training. I gave them a short introduction to my research aims 
and intentions and the data and information I needed to collect through the survey, 
as well as a health and safety briefing. The full survey proved invaluable in giving 
me the data to analyse the impact of the project on relocated villagers (see Chapter 
7).  
 
As there were around 3874 households displaced from 11 villages and resettled in 
the newly built Aibo Community, I had to create a sample representative enough to 
be valid for research purposes. The relocation process was very complicated (as 
will be shown in Chapter 7), and compensation and allocation to new flats was 
based on the type of property previously held (size, type of land, construction 
materials, etc.), which means that residents interviewed needed to be from different 
economic backgrounds. At the same time, displaced residents were more or less 
rehoused together with their former neighbours making these villages relatively 
homogeneous. It was important, therefore, that the sample captured residents from 
the different villages in Aibo to show the diversity of situations. In order to make the 
survey sample representative, questionnaire survey sheets were distributed almost 
equally among the five villages. 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.1, 350 questionnaires were distributed when we went 
around door by door in the five new villages of Aibo Community. Two households 
were randomly selected for each of the residential buildings that make up each of 
the villages. In order to ensure the randomness, I chose flats numbered 202 and 
404 in each block as our surveyed households. As some households in some 
buildings were empty, apartments 301 and 501 were visited as alternatives. I did 
not have help from the Village Committee in delivering the questionnaires (see 
below), so I decided to visit the households and conduct the survey in situ. To 
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maximise the response rate I chose to knock on doors, deliver questionnaires and 
have them filled in through face-to-face interviews around the middle of the day 
when hot conditions outside made it most likely that people would be at home. Our 
response rate was very high, with 344 out of 350 questionnaires collected, which 
was the result, I believe, of conducting home visits and the initial site survey. 
 
Table 4.1 Sample distribution by village 
Villages in Aibo Community No of questionnaires 
Village 1   76  
Village 2   74  
Village 3   74  
Village 4   66  
Village 5   60  
Total    350  
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
Before the survey, I trained my survey team to choose respondents from as wide a 
range of demographic factors as possible, trying to keep a balance between male 
and female, and young and old in an attempt to ensure representativeness and a 
lower chance of bias from survey methods and procedures. Each member of the 
interviewing team was told to try to choose both female and male interviewees and 
to provide a cross-section of age groups as I noted above.   
 
Table 4.2 Questionnaire distribution by age and sex 
Age/ 
Sex 
Village 
1 
Village 
2 
Village 
3 
Village 
4 
Village 
5 
 Tota
l 
Percentag
e 
<40 16 10 8 12 6  52 15.12 
41-60 38 34 32 24 18  146 42.44 
>61-80 22 30 34 30 30  146 42.44 
Female 30 27 30 25 22  134 38.95 
Male 46 47 44 41 42  210 61.05 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
Table 4.2 shows that our survey was relatively successful in covering different age 
groups. The lower rate of respondents who were younger than 40 reflects the loss 
of young people from the Aibo Community. This can probably be attributed to a 
belief that there are fewer job opportunities in the Hongqiao area for young people, 
pushing people to look for jobs in the city centre and for housing nearer to jobs, 
while the older generation who used to rely on income from agriculture and renting 
out their properties told us that they felt they had little choice but to relocate to Aibo 
and stay there. Table 4.2 also shows that there were fewer female respondents. 
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Based on my survey experience and understanding of the project, I believe this can 
be attributed to two factors. Firstly, many women are still illiterate or only partially 
literate, making it difficult for them to understand all the questions in the 
questionnaire; I noted that several hesitated and then refused to answer my 
questions, and the role of respondent was passed on to their husbands or sons. 
Secondly, mainly male household heads were in charge of relocation and 
compensation issues, so women were less confident about responding to these 
issues.  
Table 4.3 Questionnaire distribution by occupation 
Groups     Before 
relocation 
Percent 
% 
After 
relocation 
Percent 
% 
Villagers 286  83.14 243  70.64 
Self-employed persons 30  8.70 24  7.00 
Teachers and village leaders 12  3.49 12  3.49 
Security workers and 
cleaners 
4  1.16 65  18.90 
Factory workers  12  3.49 0   
Total 344  100 344  100 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012.  
 
Table 4.3 shows that the majority of our respondents had been farmers, which 
reflects their social and economic status before relocation. It is worth noting that 
self-employed persons can be divided into a number of sub-groups including 
traders and artisans, which I found to be an important group when I interviewed 
Aibo Community residents. I have grouped together teachers and village leaders as 
both were actively involved in relocation and compensation tasks for local 
government. As they were in charge of relocation issues, so their answers were 
fuller and more informed that those of relocated farmers. It should also be noted 
that job opportunities for manual workers in factories and self-employed workers 
declined after relocation, while job opportunities in the lower-order service sector -- 
security guards and cleaners -- absorbed 18.90 percent of respondents, reflecting a 
change in the job market and a lowering of employment status after relocation.  
 
4.3.5 Major problems encountered in the fieldwork 
 
The major problems and difficulties in the two fieldwork phases in Shanghai were 
accessibility issues, sensitivity over undisclosed data and unwillingness to be 
interviewed. 
 
I will discuss the issues around accessibility first. The themes of relocation, 
compensation and resettlement have become the topics of heated debate in the 
context of rapid urbanization in China, and they have attracted a lot of interest and 
concern on the part of the mass media and planners. As a result, local governments 
who are responsible for issues of land acquisition, compensation and resettlement 
have come under considerable pressure. In the case of Hongqiao, one resident in 
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particular has fought against Minhang District Government for more compensation 
through intense protests which have elicited media attention at home and abroad 
(Interview G2012062102). In addition, eight displaced families have still not signed 
a relocation agreement with Minhang District Government, even though their 
houses were demolished and the land taken away from them. These cases have 
meant that fieldwork has become much more difficult in Hongqiao; local 
government did not want us to interview villagers relocated to Aibo Community. 
When I went to Aibo to conduct my first site survey in November 2011, I was easily 
distinguished from local villagers. When I took some photographs of local residents 
and their dwellings, we were followed by the police, who appeared to believe I was 
journalists.  
 
At the start of my fieldwork, I was able to contact the village committee leaders 
through my connections, and I attempted to get help from them to carry out the 
survey questionnaires. This would have made the survey much easier to carry out 
because local villagers are still very cautious when interviewed by strangers. 
However, when leaders of the village committee went through my list of interview 
questions and questionnaire, they thought the questions covered issues that were 
too sensitive and were reluctant to offer help. Therefore, I had to carry out the 
survey directly with the villagers themselves. As I mentioned in 4.3.4, the majority of 
younger villagers moved to the city centre to find jobs rather than live in 
resettlement sites, so there is an over-representation of more senior villagers in our 
sample. As the older residents generally have lower educational levels, it was 
difficult sometimes for them to understand our survey questions. The questionnaire, 
even after revisions from the pilot survey, was too long (20 to 30 minutes) for some 
respondents particularly in the heat of a Shanghai summer (temperatures often 
exceeding 35 degrees centigrade). In addition, some villagers were unwilling to take 
part in the survey because they thought it would not help improve their situation.  
 
Some useful steps were taken to deal with these problems, where they arose in 
time after the pilot survey had been completed and before the full survey. Firstly, 
after the pilot survey, I decided to focus on the main issues during the process of 
the questionnaire survey, shortening the length of some questions and redesigning 
the survey to make it easier to understand. Secondly, as far as the interviews were 
concerned, it soon became clear that I needed one set of questions for officials and 
another for relocatees. For officials responsible for relocation and the construction 
and operation of the Hongqiao project, interview questions focused on the planning 
of the Hongqiao project, the process of land acquisition, relocation, resettlement 
and compensation and the governance mechanism of the Hongqiao project (see 
Appendix). As for questions put to relocatees, these focused on what they had lost 
and won in the relocation process, and their attitudes towards relocation and 
resettlement. 
 
I turn now to issues around sensitivity over undisclosed data. Some topics to do 
with land acquisition, its cost to the district government and the attitude of 
relocatees towards relocation were treated as sensitive data in my communications 
with local officials. Particularly when it came to the amount of land expropriated, 
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local officials became cautious when interviewed. They refused to give me data 
about land expropriation and documents on compensation, and even refused to 
answer some of my questions. However, officials whom I interviewed sometimes 
shared their comments and opinions with me off the record. For instance, officials 
admitted to me in private that relocated villagers contributed most, but lost most in 
the Hongqiao project when asked on the subject. I immediately agreed to 
anonymise the names of officials and experts I interviewed who had been in charge 
of the relocation scheme so as not to cause them any problems. All relocatees have 
also been anonymised.  
 
I encountered difficulties of access to various groups of relocatees. Relocated 
people can be categorised as villagers, urban residents, owners of relocated 
factories and shops and migrant (or floating) workers. It is difficult to track certain 
displaced populations, particularly the migrant workers who have been forced to 
move back home or find work in other places. They were not relocated by the 
authorities as they were not registered to live there. As for the owners of factories 
and shops, they have been displaced to surrounding districts in Shanghai and other 
cities to continue their businesses as they do not fit the requirements for the high-
end service sector sought for the Hongqiao business district. Without a hugely 
challenging investigation, it is not possible to track down these people, so I have 
inevitably concentrated on the relocation of people who were officially registered 
with a hukou to live there. There are further important reasons that prompted me to 
focus on relocated villagers. Firstly, they formed the majority of the relocated 
population affected by the Hongqiao project. Compensation and resettlement of 
local villagers was the key task for local government. Secondly, local villagers are 
the only actors that have contributed land for the project; even local officials 
admitted that villagers have made a major contribution but lost most in the project. 
For these reasons, therefore, when it comes to the impact of the project on former 
residents, emphasis was placed on villagers in my research.  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
I completed my fieldwork in half a year. My questionnaire survey and list of 
questions for interviewees experienced many rounds of modification after pilot 
fieldwork in Hongqiao. In the two periods of fieldwork in Shanghai, I used a variety 
of methods: analysis of planning and economic development documents, 
observation of the development site, a questionnaire survey with relocated villagers 
(including a pilot survey), in-depth interviews with experts and officials as well as in-
depth interviews with relocated villagers. The pilot surveys helped me understand 
the basic situation and context in Hongqiao and, in particular, the demands and 
thoughts of relocated villagers. This pilot phase was important in helping me 
improve the questionnaire and interview questions and identify the main problems 
faced by local officials and relocated villagers. 
 
Due not least to my contacts in the field, it was easy to progress into the second 
part of my fieldwork. The in-depth interviews provided a series of good opportunities 
to meet local officials and planners responsible for the operation of Hongqiao 
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project and, importantly, to conduct face-to-face interviews with local officials. This 
helped me build a close relationship with them, which became a useful way of 
obtaining data. Through an intense schedule of interviews and questionnaire survey 
work during the two field trips, a wide variety of first-hand and second-hand 
research data was collected. The results of the questionnaire survey, which directly 
reflects the attitudes of relocated villagers towards relocation and compensation, is 
the main foundation of this research. However, I encountered a number of 
difficulties, including principally accessibility to interviewees such as local officials, 
planners and relocated residents, and sensitivity to the release of documents and 
data related to the Hongqiao project. Thanks to my good connections in Hongqiao I 
was able to overcome at least some of these difficulties.  
 
The empirical findings in the chapters that follow are based on the first- and 
second-hand research data described above. The findings and discussion are 
presented in the following way. Chapter 5 introduces the Hongqiao project in detail, 
setting out the principal elements of first, the transport hub, and then, the business 
district. This chapter is based both on documents that I was able to obtain and on 
in-depth interviews with officials. In Chapter 6, I focus in on the main actors in the 
project, looking at the role of government at various levels, at the bodies that were 
specially created to drive the project forwards and at the coalitions that were formed 
to promote the project, fund it, attract investment and organise the compensation 
and relocation. The chapter relies heavily on the in-depth interviews that I 
conducted during my fieldwork. Lastly, Chapter 7 introduces the results of the 
questionnaire survey and discusses relocatees‟ answers to questions about their 
lives before relocation, the relocation process, compensation and their new lives in 
Aibo Community. The discussion is alimented with observations from in-depth 
interviews both with village leaders and with officials. 
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Chapter 5  
Hongqiao: Vision, planning and design of the project 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The western outskirts of Shanghai have been treated as a growth battleground. A 
game of geographical one-upmanship through the development of a Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ), campaigns to attract inward investment and economic 
growth was sparked by Kunshan‟s early move to create an SEZ in 1980s (see 
Chapter 3). A later response was generated from Shanghai Municipal Government 
with their designation of industrial zones such as “auto city” (car manufacturing) in 
Jiading district (Li and Wu, 2012) and One City, Nine Towns in the western suburbs. 
From then on, this area of suburban and peri-urban Shanghai has been caught up 
in competition for economic development and urbanization. This competition has 
shifted from the promotion of manufacturing to a concentration on the higher-order 
service sector, exemplified by Huaqiao International Business Park just across the 
border from Shanghai in Kunshan (see Figure 5.1).This competitive regional 
environment has recently seen elements of cooperation, but only on an ad hoc 
basis, as discussed by Li and Wu (2012). Indeed, one of the key points in this 
chapter is that one of the driving forces behind the idea of the Hongqiao project was 
to compete with Kunshan‟s Huaqiao and put Hongqiao on the regional and global 
map as a CBD for the whole of the Yangtze River Delta and even the whole of 
China, its central location enhanced by the construction of the transport hub. This is 
readily apparent in the case of the underground Line No. 11, which the Shanghai 
government had originally refused to extend the short distance across the provincial 
border to Huaqiao. However, with the coordinated intervention of two top leaders Yu 
Zhengshen, the then-party secretary of Shanghai, and Li Yuanchao, former party 
secretary of Jiangsu province, the line was finally extended in 2013 (Interview 
G2012062101).  
 
This chapter focuses on the vision, planning and design of the Hongqiao twin 
transport and commercial project. The Hongqiao transport hub project came to 
fruition from a blueprint in a very short period of time, while the business zone is 
being built now. Hongqiao will be a new urban centre for Shanghai, and its sheer 
scale has attracted the attention of researchers, public media and planners 
(Interview G2012062101) and made it a suitable topic for my research in the field of 
urban change and growth in Shanghai. This chapter aims to investigate the issues 
behind the construction of the Hongqiao project -- its aims, form, functions and main 
elements, and planning process, as well as the state of play in the construction of 
the business zone. The chapter consists of two themes: an introduction to the 
Hongqiao project and its aims, and the preparation of land for development in the 
core area of the Hongqiao project. 
 
The main empirical concerns relating to the regional context and circumstances 
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under which the Hongqiao project was elaborated were discussed in Chapter 3. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first section, 
the main aims and elements of the Hongqiao project are introduced with an 
examination of the conception, functions and forms of the project to reveal the scale 
of the whole project. This is followed by an account of the process of planning and 
the construction of the Hongqiao transport hub. Lastly, the process of preparing the 
land for development in the core area from an „immature‟ to a „mature‟ state is 
presented, followed by a discussion and conclusion. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 The layout of Hongqiao Airport and its neighbouring cities of Suzhou and 
Kunshan in Jiangsu Province.  
Source: Chen et al., 2010. 
 
5.2 Main aims of the Hongqiao project  
 
This section consists of a discussion of the issues of overall conception of the 
project, the principal elements of the project, Hongqiao‟s overall layout and its form 
and functions. 
 
5.2.1 Overall conception of the project 
 
The Hongqiao project was launched with a series of main aims, which can be 
categorised as promoting economic development, improving urban spatial planning 
and transforming the city‟s industrial structure. Under the heading of promoting 
economic development, the Hongqiao project is an attempt to kick-start the 
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development of the west of Shanghai by providing a new economic growth pole 
through the provision of convenient transport arteries and the development of a 
business zone to form a strong service sector nucleus (SMG, 2007). In terms of 
improving spatial planning, the aim is to create a poly-centred city with a west core 
to rival Pudong and, with this aim in mind, from the perspective of the entire 
Yangtze River Delta, Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub is designed to link 
Shanghai to the YRD (Figure 5.2). This is a project to produce new space in the 
construction of a metropolitan region in the YRD (Shen, 2011). Under the heading 
of transforming the city‟s industrial structure, the Hongqiao project is being 
undertaken in order to promote the development of the service sector as a leading 
component in Shanghai‟s industrial structure. In the process of transforming the 
city‟s industrial structure, a series of strategies were launched by the Shanghai 
Municipal Government starting in 2005 to de-emphasise and relocate the 
manufacturing sector and develop service industry (HBDMC, 2010). The strategy of 
“emptying the old cage and attracting new birds,” as discussed in Chapter 2, was 
adopted in Guangdong Province and the neighbouring cities of Suzhou and 
Kunshan (Chien and Wu, 2011; Chien, 2013). Shanghai is no exception to this 
process, with its four new centres being constructed for service industries including 
Hongqiao, financial and shipping centres in Pudong, and a Special Economic 
Centre Zone in place for the whole of Shanghai (although the significance of this 
latter is as yet unclear). The Hongqiao project has become the leading platform for 
Shanghai‟s transformation into a centre for international trade (SMG, 2010).  
 
The strategic planning of the Hongqiao project in Shanghai is vividly summed up in 
the catchphrase, “One, two, three, four, five and six,” the meaning of which is 
presented in Table 5.1 (Hongqiao Business District, 2013). The Hongqiao project 
comes with ambitious aims and strategic planning, but also with some concerns 
such as traffic congestion and an oversupply of office space; the success of the 
project will not come without its costs and will depend on the cooperation of a 
number of parties (Interview S2012070101). In the sections that follow, the overall 
conceptualization of the project and its aims are examined, with a consideration of 
the principle elements of the project.  
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Table 5.1 The real meaning of catchphrase in poster of Hongqiao business district. 
Catchphrase Meaning of catchphrase 
One One goal of building Hongqiao into a world-renowned business district, in 
an attempt to form a new CBD for the cities of the YRD. 
 
Two Two functional projects: one is the Hongqiao Integrated Transportation Hub, 
which integrates eight transportation modes into one of the biggest 
transportation hubs in China; the other is the National Exhibition Centre 
project, which is planned to become the country‟s biggest exhibition centre. 
These are the two flagship projects in Hongqiao which will form the “heart” 
of Hongqiao business district. 
 
Three Three “integrations”: first is the integration of transportation and business 
functions, relying on the transportation hub to develop the business zone; 
second is the integration of Hongqiao business district with its surrounding 
administrative districts of Minhang, Qingpu and Jiading in an attempt to 
promote the development of West Shanghai; third is the integration of 
Shanghai with the Yangtze River Delta Region and to  large enterprises to 
move their headquarters from other parts of the YRD to Hongqiao. 
 
Four Four functional orientations, which are a focus on a concentrated area for 
modern services; a new platform for international trade; a gathering place 
for corporate headquarters and trade institutions, and a high-end business 
centre serving the Yangtze River Delta Region, the Yangtze River Valley 
and the whole of China. 
 
Five The project is based on the so-called five advantages, which are locational 
advantage, transport advantage, cost advantage, “late-development” 
advantage and policy advantage. The transport and policy advantages are 
most important advantages of the Hongqiao project due to the newly built 
transportation hub and preferential policies from central and local 
government. 
 
Six The six construction concepts: transport hub, trade platform, low-carbon 
experimental area, commercial community, smart city and urban complex, 
which are used to enhance the status of the project. 
 
Source: (Hongqiao Business District, 2010). 
 
5.2.2 Principal elements of the project 
 
The launch of the Hongqiao project was driven largely by an expansion of the old 
Hongqiao Airport, the newly expanded Hongqiao Airport being a key component of 
the Hongqiao transportation hub. When it comes to a review of the principal 
elements of the project, the basic history of the old Hongqiao Airport and its 
surrounding land in the Hongqiao area needs to be discussed first. 
 
Hongqiao Airport is located at the junction of Minhang and Changning districts, 15 
kilometres from the city centre (Figure 5.2). Planning restrictions and aircraft noise 
caused by Hongqiao Airport have restricted development of its surrounding area 
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(Interview G2012072603).  
 
Figure 5.2 Location of Hongqiao Airport in Shanghai. 
Source: Author 
 
Hongqiao had been known for its old Hongqiao International Airport and for the 
Hongqiao Economic and Technology Development Zone for many decades 
(Interview G2012072904). Hongqiao Airport has a long history and has played an 
important role in connecting Shanghai to other cities in China and the rest of the 
world since its establishment in 1921. From 1949 it was used as a military airport 
until 1964, when airline routes were opened between Shanghai and Pakistani cities 
(Wang, 2005). The airport has been expanded and upgraded three times since 
1964.  
 
The expansion of the airport is now complete, and Hongqiao with its two runways 
has become one of China‟s most important international airports. However, the 
airport is only one of the elements of the Hongqiao hub, the others being the high-
speed railway station, five underground lines stations and the coach station, which 
together form China‟s biggest transport hub. 
 
Alongside the transport hub, Hongqiao business district was planned and 
constructed as the other major important component of the Hongqiao project. The 
business zone comprises a series of private-led projects – a shopping mall and 
high-end residential and office towers -- and some government-driven projects -- 
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the National Exhibition Centre, an office tower for local government and state-
owned enterprises. The high-end residential projects have been an important 
selling point for Hongqiao Business District Management Committee in its attempts 
to attract investors. Average prices for apartments are higher than those of real 
estate in city centre as shown in Table 5.2. In addition, there is a medical centre 
planned, green spaces and waterways, which piece together into this mega urban 
project of Hongqiao.   
 
Table 5.2 The high-end residential projects in Hongqiao business district 
Residential project   Average price 
(RMB/ m
2
) 
 Average price in city centre in 2014 
(RMB/ m
2
) 
Fuli Hongqiao   43000   30676   
Vanke Zone  45000   30676   
Xu Hui Hongqiao 
International 
50000   30676   
Source: Hongqiao Business District, 2014. 
 
5.2.3 Hongqiao‟s overall layout 
 
The planning area of Hongqiao business district covers an area of 86 square 
kilometres including parts of four districts -- Minhang, Changning, Qingpu and 
Jiading -- as shown in Figure 5.3 (SMG, 2007). The Shanghai Municipal 
Government emphasises the importance of developing the 26.3 square kilometres 
of the main functional area of Hongqiao by 2015 (zone in red in Figure 5.5) (SMG, 
2007). 
 
The overall layout of the Hongqiao project is referred to in plans for the district as 
"one ring, two axes, three cores, and five areas" (Figure 5.4) (SMG, 2008). One ring 
refers to the ecological green ring, which is a combination of the public green space 
and an artificial waterway; the green area is designed to protect the environment 
while the artificial waterway is advertised as the guarantor of ecological quality for 
the Hongqiao business district (SMG, 2007). The artificial lake, waterfront and 
green space have been used to enhance the appeal of the Hongqiao project. The 
two axes refer to north-south and east-west spatial developmental axes, which are 
intended to provide bases for service industry in Hongqiao business district (SMG, 
2007); along these axes will be situated a number of office towers to attract the 
headquarters of large companies especially those in the service sector. Three cores 
refers to three places which were planned as key development areas in Hongqiao 
business district. 
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Figure 5.3 The layout of Hongqiao business district in 86 sq km 
Source: Hongqiao Business District, 2010 
 
These are the transportation functional area, the core area of Hongqiao business 
district and the airport east area (SMG, 2007), as shown in the three coloured 
circles in Figure 5.4. The five areas are the transportation functional area, the core 
area of Hongqiao business district, the airport east area and the south and north 
part of the core area (SMG, 2007).The overall layout of the project aims to use two 
industrial axes to link the key development zones in order to improve development 
of key areas. 
 
The Hongqiao transport hub was completed in 2010 after a five-year construction 
period (Figure 5.6) (Interview G2012072603). Since then, Shanghai Municipal 
Government‟s focus has been on the core area of the Hongqiao project, the 4.7 
square kilometres which include three parts of the first phase of the project (SMG, 
2008). 
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Figure 5.4 The overall layout of core area of the Hongqiao business district 
Source: Hongqiao Business District, 2010 
 
 
 
                                     
Figure 5.5 The layout of the transportation hub in Hongqiao 
Source: Hongqiao Business District, 2010 
 
Land leasing for the projects in the first phase of the core area was completed in 
2011. Private construction projects are now being undertaken by private investors in 
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the auctioned land, and these will be finished by 2015 if all goes as planned. 
 
5.2.4 Forms and functions 
 
The aims, principal elements and overall layout of the Hongqiao project have been 
reviewed in the previous section. Here we review the forms and function of the 
project in order to better understand its overall positioning. The project is designed 
as an integrated district with a mix of functions, as shown in Figure 5.6. 
 
The aim of Shanghai Municipal Government is to build a new international trade 
centre to create a "trading platform," “business community," "smart Hongqiao," "low-
carbon experimental area" and "urban complex” (Hongqiao Business District, 2013. 
Hongqiao is supposed to become a fusion of city, service industry nucleus and 
high-end community -- quite different from established special economic zones 
(Interview G2012081106). The next paragraphs will consider what is meant by the 
concepts referred to above in the context of the Hongqiao project. 
 
Shanghai Municipal Government has proposed the notion of Smart City 
Demonstration Zone (Zhihui chengshi shifanqu) for Hongqiao. This is characterised 
by digitalization and networking and intelligent operations in the core area of the 
Hongqiao business district. Advanced information technologies will be applied in the 
field of planning design, infrastructure facilities, community management, local 
government services and life support in the Hongqiao business district (Hongqiao 
Business District, 2013). According to one of the planning documents (Hongqiao 
Business District, 2013), the Smart Hongqiao concept is designed to enhance 
Hongqiao‟s image and highlight this as a high-end project.  
 
The Hongqiao project is designed as a multi-functional urban complex (Duo 
gongneng chengshi zongheti) rather than just a business centre, given that 
established business centres already exist in Shanghai and other places. As well as 
business, Hongqiao will include shopping, leisure, culture and entertainment 
facilities. In this sense, Hongqiao business district was planned to be built as a new 
type of urban complex bringing business and leisure together (SMG, 2007). 
 
Hongqiao business district is planned to become Shanghai‟s low-carbon 
experimental area (Ditan shijian qu); this, at any rate, is the project‟s slogan and 
selling point for attracting investors and residents (Interview G2012081309). In 
order to achieve this aim of becoming a low carbon district, a series of energy-
saving and low-carbon measures have been taken. The construction of walkways 
linking various office towers and buildings means that walking will replace vehicle 
travel on the site of the Hongqiao project. As stated on the business district‟s 
website: “Energy-efficient buildings that meet national standards of green build are 
planned and being built in order to reduce energy consumption and increase 
efficiency of energy utilization through the construction of central heating and 
cooling systems for the whole hub”  (Hongqiao Business District, 2013; also 
Interview G2012072904).  
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A waterfront along an artificial lake has become the standard template in the 
construction of new districts and towns in China. Indeed, the creation of an artificial 
lake is almost routine in the wave of construction of new districts and towns across 
China and an important selling point. The Hongqiao business district adopts the 
style of a traditional Jiangnan Water Town. In Jiangnan region, the southern part of 
Jiangsu Province south of the Yangtze River (see Chapter Three), towns were built 
on the banks of rivers and canals; the waterway flowed through and linked the 
whole town, and boats were the main transportation mode. 
 
Apart from importing the concept of a Jiangnan water town, a large area of green 
space in four public green parks has been planned and built in Hongqiao business 
district. Along with the artificial lake and waterway, green parks, small hills and a 
waterfront green belt are being built in an attempt to form a modern urban 
waterfront with the characteristics of a Jiangnan water town. Three artificial hills 
(referring to land) and artificial lakes and water (water and sky connecting in the 
sea) have been created, the hills situated in the artificial lake, which was designed 
in order to symbolize “interaction between heaven and earth” (tian di hu dong). The 
design principle of the core area in Hongqiao business district is to realize a 
combination of tradition and modernity, parks and waterways in the city. 
 
All these designs are supposed to position Hongqiao as a high-end business district 
in China. In order to promote the development of West Shanghai, governments at 
all levels in Shanghai treated the project as the part of their key projects in the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan period. Shanghai Municipal Government has successfully 
persuaded the Ministry of Railways to change the location of Shanghai‟s high-
speed railway station from Qibao to Hongqiao (see below), which was the first time 
that there has been a change in national railway planning. The ambition of 
government at various levels is revealed by the decision taken in 2009 to enlarge 
the scale of the project to 86 square kilometres from 26 square kilometres, a 
decision that was criticised by scholars and some planners who questioned the 
necessity of building such a large business district when there were already 
overcapacity problem for office towers in Shanghai (Interview S2012070101).  
  
Along with one of the biggest high-speed railway station in China, a number of 
government buildings have been built including those of Hongqiao Business District 
Government and Shenhong Company. This has been done, according to local 
officials, to enhance the confidence of investors (Interview G2012072603). Some 
good practice from other cities has been adopted and adapted, including green 
space and waterfront, a high level of planning and government-led projects. On this 
basis, Hongqiao project has been planned as a more ambitious project than the 
new districts in Hangzhou and Nanjing. 
 
5.3 Hongqiao as the transport hub 
5.3.1 A Hub for air and land transport 
 
The project to expand Hongqiao Airport and build a high-speed railway station here 
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was planned and prepared by the authorities in Shanghai before 2005. The two 
projects were prepared separately, but contemporaneously by a constellation of 
multi-level government organisations and did not have the same aims – if anything, 
had competing aims (Interview G2012062102). While the two projects are located 
side by side in Minhang district, they are in different townships -- the high-speed 
railway station in Qibao and the airport in Hongqiao (Interview A2011120803). Even 
as Minhang District Government was preparing land acquisition for the projects, the 
two townships of Qibao and Huacao were competing to be chosen as project site 
because of the large investment this would mean from central and municipal 
governments. Finally, Qibao was chosen as site of the high-speed railway station. 
Since the two projects of the Hongqiao Airport expansion and the construction of 
the high-speed railway station were being built separately, there was an initial 
failure to consider questions of movement of passengers between airport and high-
speed railway station. In light of this, the mayor of Shanghai proposed to combine 
the two projects on 7 March 2005 after a number of meetings and much discussion 
(Interview D2011120602). Through negotiations conducted with the Ministry of 
Railways by Shanghai Municipal Government, the two separate projects were 
finally merged into one Hongqiao transportation hub.   
 
The Hongqiao transportation hub was completed in 2010 with a variety of 
transportation modes integrated into the hub. These include high-speed rail, air 
transport, intercity rail and bus to form a traffic centre for the Yangtze River Delta 
region (SMG, 2007). The Hongqiao hub is the biggest transport hub in China both 
in terms of traffic modes and number of passengers.  
 
Actual passenger flows through the Hongqiao transport hub since completion has 
reached 182 million per person in 2011 increasing to 220 million in 2012 (see Table 
5.3). High-speed railway transportation and air travel are the two main external 
transport modes. As Table 5.3 shows, the number of passengers using high-speed 
rail at Hongqiao transport hub was about 50.1 million in 2011 and grew to 63.14 
million in 2012, while airport passenger traffic kept steady at almost 33 million in 
both 2011 and 2012. Other transportation modes also have an important role to 
play in Shanghai's internal traffic, as shown in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 Flow of passengers in the Hongqiao transport hub. Unit: 1000 passengers. 
Source: (Hongqiao Business District, 2012). Notice: Local transportation includes modes of 
transportation such as mode of subway, bus, taxi and private vehicles.  
 
 2011 
 
2012 
 
Mode of 
Transport 
The number of 
passengers 
Average 
daily 
The number of 
passengers 
Average 
daily 
Airport 33112 91 33080 91 
Railway 50110 138 63149 173 
Coach 1063 3 1697 5 
Local 
transportation 
97732 268 122646 335 
Whole hub 182017 499 220756 603 
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Passenger flows of various transportation modes in Hongqiao are shown in Table 
5.3; they demonstrate the key role played by the Hongqiao hub in terms of linking 
Shanghai with core cities in the YRD and beyond. 
 
  
 
 
Table 5.4 Flow of passengers in the Hongqiao transport hub in 2012. Unit: 1000 passengers. 
 Airport  Average daily Railway  Average daily Coach Average daily Local transportation Average daily Hub Average daily 
1  2595 84 5045 163 121 4 9369 302 17072 551 
2 2420 87 4105 147 101 4 8406 290 15270 527 
3 2818 91 4765 154 12.1 4 9369 302 17072 551 
4 2802 93 5598 187 150 4 10306 344 18856 629 
5 2775 90 5413 174 136 4 10147 327 18471 596 
6 2727 91 5229 174 144 5 9796 327 17895 597 
7 2967 96 5875 190 167 5 11259 363 20266 654 
8 2849 92 5850 189 164 5 11056 357 19920 643 
9 2814 94 5382 179 147 5 10694 357 19037 635 
10 2948 95 6054 195 158 5 11566 373 20729 669 
11 2757 92 4962 165 141 5 10454 349 18314 611 
12 2607 84 4873 157 145 5 10226 330 17855 576 
Total 33080 91 63150 2074 1697 55 122648 4021 220757 7239 
Source: (Hongqiao Business District, 2012). 
Notice: Local transportation which includes modes of transportation such as mode of subway, ground bus, taxi and private vehicles. 
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Since the start of the Hongqiao transportation hub‟s operation, the Hongqiao area 
has become the west gate of Shanghai, forming different traffic radiuses within one, 
two and three hours travel time according to transportation mode (SMG, 2007). 
Intercity rail creates a "one hour radiation circle" centred on Hongqiao business 
district. Long-distance bus transport forms a "two hour radiation circle." Air forms a 
"three hour radiation circle." High-speed rail creates a "four hour radiation circle" 
(HBDMC, 2010). As a result of the construction of Hongqiao transport hub in West 
Shanghai, Shanghai and cities within and beyond the YRD are connected by 
different transportation means which shorten travel time between those cities and 
Shanghai. From this perspective, Shanghai‟s status as regional centre and even 
national centre in China is strengthened. In particular, with the high-speed rail links 
within the YRD,  the principal regional sub-centre cities, Nanjing and Hangzhou, are 
even more closely connected to Shanghai with travel time shortened to less than 
two hour and one hour respectively, reinforcing economic linkages, in line with one 
of the main aims of the Hongqiao transport hub. 
 
5.3.2 Context of expansion the project of Hongqiao Airport 
 
The expansion project of Hongqiao Airport was carried out in the face of a decline in 
its importance resulting from an inability to cope with increased traffic demand, in 
the face of competition from new airports in other parts of the YRD. These issues 
will be reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
 
With the completion and operation of Pudong International Airport in 1999, 
international flight routes to Hongqiao Airport were being gradually transferred to 
Pudong, resulting in a decline in the importance of Hongqiao Airport, which soon 
became an auxiliary airport for Pudong focusing on domestic routes (Interview 
A2011120803). At the same time, fast economic development in the YRD has 
meant increasing demand for air services, which Hongqiao Airport with its one 
runway has not been able to meet (Interview A2011120803). In particular, the 
success of the electronic manufacturing base mainly funded by Taiwanese 
enterprises in Kunshan (Suzhou) (see Chapter 3) depended to some extent on 
convenient international flights to Hongqiao Airport (Interview A2011120803). 
Against this backdrop, Hongqiao Airport was repositioned by Shanghai Municipal 
Government as an international regional hub designed to support the economic 
development of Shanghai and neighbouring cities based on approved strategic 
planning by Shanghai Municipal Government and China Civil Aviation 
Administration in 2004 (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2004).  
 
Facing potential competition for the construction of a new airport in some cities of 
the YRD, Shanghai Municipal Government moved its flights bound for Hong Kong 
and Macao from Hongqiao to Pudong on 27 October 2003. However, this move led 
to inconvenience for enterprises in southern Jiangsu and Zhejiang Province as it 
takes much longer to reach Pudong compared to Hongqiao (Interview 
A2011120803). For instance, for Suzhou IT manufacturers, a two-hour increase in 
transport time meant that freight charges increased by at least 20%, and this has 
brought significant losses for local government in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces in 
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terms of lost investment opportunities (Interview S2012071002). Hongqiao‟s 
location advantages had been repeatedly emphasized when the local governments 
of Suzhou and Wuxi made their pitches to attract investment (Ye, 2006). At that 
time, it took only an hour to travel from Suzhou to Hongqiao Airport, even less than 
from Shanghai city centre to the airport (Interviews S2012071002 and 
A2012080201). 
 
Those neighbouring cities that used to benefit from Hongqiao Airport lost their 
locational advantage when it came to attracting investment. To overcome this 
problem, Wuxi Local Authority was seeking permission to build its own international 
airport (Interview S2012071002), while Hangzhou constructed its own airport in 
Xiaoshan district. According to one informant, a plan to expand Hongqiao Airport 
and construct a second runway had been prepared by Shanghai Airport Group 
(SAG), which was the organisation managing Shanghai‟s airports in early 2003, but 
the plan was not approved by Shanghai Municipal Government. The Shanghai 
Municipal Government argued that there were considerable limits to SAG‟s plans, 
which were only concerned with airport infrastructure and not with the whole picture 
of regional development. It was in this context that Shanghai Municipal Government 
proposed that the expansion project of Hongqiao Airport be combined with the 
project to construct a high-speed railway station at Hongqiao to form a 
transportation hub to solve the above-mentioned problems. 
 
5.3.3 Background to the construction of a high-speed rail station at Hongqiao 
 
Since the construction of the high-speed railway network was first proposed by the 
State Council of China in 2004, the whole of China has experienced a veritable high 
tide in the construction of high-speed rail lines. Shanghai Municipal Government 
attached considerable importance to site selection for a high-speed railway station. 
To this end, three rounds of coordination meetings – the last one being held on 19-
20 February 2004 -- were jointly held by Shanghai Municipal Government and the 
Ministry of Railways on the issue of construction of high-speed rail in Shanghai 
(Interview G2012080305). Qibao Township in Minhang district was chosen as the 
location for Shanghai‟s high-speed rail station (Interview G2012062102). Deputy 
Minister of Railways Lu Dongfu, as representative of the Ministry of Railways, and 
Deputy Mayor Yang Xiong, as representative of Shanghai Municipal Government, 
jointly hosted the meeting, reflecting the importance attached by Shanghai 
Municipal Government and the Ministry of Railways to the construction of a high-
speed railway station in Shanghai (Interview P2012072101).  
 
After those coordination meetings, Shanghai Municipal Government gave a positive 
response to the construction of Qibao high-speed railway station. There then 
followed a series of seminars and preparatory measures, as a result of which in 
March 2005 a new proposal selecting Hongqiao as the high-speed railway station 
forming a transportation hub with the airport was considered a more favourable 
proposal. It was argued that the new proposal to construct a transportation hub 
would not only save a lot of construction land, but also shorten transfer time for 
passengers and, importantly, combine the projects of airport expansion and high-
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speed railway station, thereby reducing investment in transport infrastructure from 
project sites to city centre. Based on this, Shanghai Municipal Government, 
Shanghai Airport Group and the Shanghai Railway Bureau also benefited from the 
new proposal, while the project was moved out of Qibao township.  
 
This new proposal was accepted by Shanghai's leadership in the same month of 
March 2005, and the Shanghai Municipal Government formally proposed that the 
high-speed railway station be moved north from Qibao and merged with Hongqiao 
station in order to be closer to Hongqiao Airport and to become part of the 
Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub on the west side of the airport (Interview 
G2012081308). In order to obtain the consent of the Ministry of Railways for the 
new proposal, Deputy Mayor Yang Xiong went to the Ministry of Railways in Beijing 
to discuss the issue of site selection and construction Hongqiao transport hub on 14 
May 2005 (Interview G2012072603). Finally, agreement was reached between 
Shanghai Municipal Government and the Ministry of Railways. The concept of 
Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub was formally put forward (Interview 
G2012081308). Hongqiao transport hub had now been put on the agenda. We will 
now consider the question of how Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub was 
constructed. 
 
5.3.4 Construction of the Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub  
 
As one of the most important elements, the Hongqiao high-speed railway station 
was given top priority in the work schedules for the Hongqiao hub, Shanghai Airport 
Group having already taken responsibility for the airport expansion project. As the 
responsible parties for the Hongqiao hig-speed station, the Ministry of Railways and 
the Shanghai Municipal Government launched an international design competition 
for the station construction in the second half of 2005 (Interview A2011113002). An 
international planning competition notice was published. Five companies -- 
Shanghai Xiandai Architectural Design (Group) Co., Ltd, the Reconnaissance and 
Design Institute of the Ministry of Railways, AECOM Technology Corporation of 
America, China Urban Planning Institute in Beijing and Landrum & Brown of 
America -- were invited to participate. After expert and public reviews, China Urban 
Planning Institution and a joint entry from Shanghai Xiandai Architectural Design 
(Group) Co., Ltd, and the Reconnaissance and Design Institute of the Ministry of 
Railways won first prize. This joint proposal won the competition on the grounds of 
its treatment of scale, the construction plan, traffic organization and other aspects of 
the rail passenger station (Interview G2012080305). On this basis, Shanghai Urban 
Planning and Design Institute, as a state-owned company, prepared a structure 
plan for the Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub under the orders of Shanghai 
Municipal Government. The plan was reported to the Shanghai Municipal 
Government in January 2006 and approved by the municipal government in 
February 2006. This, then, became the final plan for the Hongqiao high-speed 
railway station (Interview G2012080305). 
 
As work started on the construction of the Hongqiao high-speed railway station, the 
focus of the Shanghai Municipal Government shifted to the transport hub linking 
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airport and station. The question of how to maximize the functions of the transport 
hub and how to achieve a seamless connection of passenger flow among a variety 
of transport modes in the hub became the focus of consideration. Another 
international competition was launched in the spring of 2006 by Shanghai Municipal 
Government, this time for the Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub Structure Plan 
(Interview G2012081106). The competition was inconclusive, and the Shanghai 
Airport Group held a second international competition. This competition was held 
later in the same year. Five planning and design companies were invited to submit 
their plans: AECOM Technology Corporation of the US, the American firm of 
Landrum & Brown, the British company WS Atkins, China Urban and Planning 
Institution in Beijing and the local Shanghai Modern Architectural Design (Group) 
Co., Ltd. Again, an expert panel was formed by academics, planners and officials 
from the Ministry of Railways, Shanghai Municipal Government and China Urban 
Planning Institute, and an academic conference, the 12th Asian Congress of 
Architects (known as the Shanghai Forum), was held to discuss and determine the 
winning scheme (Interview G2012080305). However, the jury was not completely 
satisfied with any one entry. Finally, the first prize was won by a joint project from 
Landrum & Brown and Xiandai. This joint project satisfactorily resolved the problem 
mentioned above of transfer and access through the construction of internal 
corridors (Interview G2012080305).   
 
The construction of the Hongqiao transport hub was finished in 2010, with only the 
proposed maglev lines yet to be constructed. The Maglev Project includes an 
extension project for a “commercial demonstration Line” (a pilot line to test the 
commercial viability and safety of the line), as shown in Figure 5.7, from Longyang 
Road in Pudong to Hongqiao Railway Station (SMG, 2007) as well as a line from 
Hangzhou to Hongqiao, which was opposed by local residents (Southern Weekend, 
2008). From the perspective of the Shanghai Municipal Government, the aim is to 
make the commercial demonstration line profitable, to reduce travel time, to 
enhance convergence between the two important growth poles of Pudong and 
Hongqiao and to facilitate the flow of resources from Pudong and the city centre to 
Hongqiao (Interview G2012081106). Local residents, however, are concerned that 
the planned maglev line passes too close to residential areas resulting in the 
possibility of suffering from magnetic radiation (Nan Fang Metropolis Daily, 2007). In 
order to prevent the construction of the maglev near their houses, local residents 
walked to People‟s Square in 2007 to express their silent protest (Southern Week, 
2008). (This was called “taking a walk” as public processions are not allowed.) As a 
result of these protests, the project was shelved (Nan Fang Metropolis Daily, 2007), 
and the link was now to rely on the existing underground line. This became the first 
ever case in which local government was forced to accept the voice of local 
residents. It contrasts interestingly with the relocation of villagers to make way for 
the Hongqiao project. While Minhang District Government encountered a lot of 
resistance from local people (see Chapter 7), local concerns were not listened to. 
The focus of work gradually shifted to land requisition in Hongqiao and preparation 
of land for construction, issues that will be examined in the section that follows.  
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Figure 5.6 Propose maglev line across residence area. 
Source: Author. 
 
5.4 Preparing land for development in the core area, from „immature‟ to 
„mature‟ 
As mentioned above, the Hongqiao project is located in West Shanghai in a mixed 
urban and rural area. Given that large areas of vacant land were needed for the 
Hongqiao project, the question that this section will address is how land was 
converted from rural into urban functions. The paragraphs that follow will examine 
what measures local government took and how land has been developed. 
 
5.4.1 Purchasing and storage of land by Minhang District Government  
 
The Hongqiao transport hub covers an area of 26 square kilometres, of which 12.9 
square kilometres of land have been transferred from Minhang District Government 
to Shenhong, the company wholly owned by Shanghai Municipal Government, 
overseeing the construction of Hongqiao business district. (See Chapter 6 for an 
explanation of this body.) Shanghai Municipal Government forced Minhang to 
transfer the land at a cheap price of 1.4 million yuan per mu in 2006, and the 
transfer was completed by 2007(15 mu are equivalent of 1 ha) (Interview 
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G2012081309). Once the valuation had been confirmed, all the farm and factory 
buildings were demolished in the planning area and land was restructured for 
development. (For a discussion on displacement of local residents, see Chapter 7.) 
Shenhong Company was appointed to manage the newly converted land and 
provide public infrastructure and facilities. This is the so-called process of „seven 
linkages and one levelling‟ (qitong yiping), a Chinese planning term used to 
describe road construction, water supply, drainage works, electricity supply, gas 
supply, the laying of cables, communication networks and land levelling. Bank loans 
financed the provision of infrastructure and utilities, and the consequent 
transformation of the land from immature to mature (to use the expression current 
in China). With the land conversion process complete, the „mature‟ land was ready 
to be placed on the primary market. The mature land was used as collateral by 
Shenhong Company to get bank loans of 20 billion RMB from four banks including 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank (Interview G2012062101).  
 
Like most other urban development projects in China, the Hongqiao project has 
been fuelled by bank loans. However, a strategy of rolling development (gundong 
fazhan) was used in Hongqiao business district due to a shortage of funding. This 
involves developing one area and then using the income from the development of 
that area to fund construction of a second area. Development of the first phase of 
the Hongqiao core area was started in 2010. At the time of writing, there was still 
much work to be done before the development of the Hongqiao business district is 
complete. 
 
5.4.2 Providing infrastructure and utilities  
 
The provision of infrastructure for the Hongqiao transport hub has been an 
immense undertaking. The hub building includes a high speed railway station, 
airport terminal buildings, airport square as well as a second runway; these were 
managed respectively by the Shanghai Railway Bureau, Shanghai Airport Group 
and Shenhong Company. Meanwhile, the project to construct a network of 15 
underground pedestrian passageways to connect underground space in the core 
area of Hongqiao business district was managed by Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee under the supervision of Shanghai Municipal Government.  
The supporting projects are huge. The passageways total 655 metres in length and 
have a total construction area of 7320.44 square metres; the total investment is 
estimated to be 2.9 billion RMB. In addition, 6 pedestrian bridges were being built 
(construction started in 2012) with a total length of 378 metres and a total 
investment of about 76.93 million RMB. Public green space in the core area of 
Hongqiao business district will account for a total land area of 112,697 square 
metres, at a total cost of about 3.1 billion RMB. Construction of an elevated road to 
link the city centre and Hongqiao business district was completed in 2010. The 
extension of Metro Lines 2 and 10 linking Hongqiao to the city centre is also 
complete (Hongqiao Business District, 2013).  
 
These supporting projects are vital for the construction of Hongqiao business 
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district, but have put Hongqiao Business District Management Committee under 
considerable funding pressure. Land has been a trump card in helping the 
committee to obtain the bank loans to undertake these projects through the leasing 
of plots of land, as we will see in the following section. 
 
5.4.3 Leasing plots of land for development 
 
Revenue from land auctions is an important driving force for the development of 
Hongqiao business district and a pivotal source of funds for rolling development. 
Shanghai Municipal Government and the Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee have had to put a lot of effort into land auctions (Interview 
G2012081309). There have been 13 auctions held for land leasing since 
September 2010, and 18 land plots were leased by March 2013 in the first phase of 
the development of the core area (Figure 5.7). The price of auctioned land leases in 
the core area is lower than in the city centre of Shanghai due to various factors (i.e. 
distance from the city centre, noise pollution); land auction revenue reached a total 
of 24.3 billion RMB, which enhanced the confidence of local leaders relying on land 
auction revenue for development of further parts of Hongqiao business district. The 
vast majority of purchasers of land leases were domestic real estate enterprises, 
but their number included some enterprises from Hong Kong such as Shui On Land 
Limited and Top Victory Investments Limited (Table 5.4). 
 
The mechanism of land auctions in Hongqiao business district involved plots that 
had been planned and prepared so as to control land use. This was a response to 
events in Pudong, where leases for plots were auctioned without plans. As a result, 
many developers did not strictly comply with land use planning in Pudong, leading 
to disorderly use of land in the four themed divisions of the new district (Interview 
P201207210). 
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5.4.3.1 Progress of projects within the core area of 4.7 square kilometres  
 
The construction of the transport hub building and supporting infrastructure such as 
roads, water and energy pipelines was finished in 2010. Attention then shifted to 
development of the core area in Hongqiao business district. Ten projects were 
included in the first phase of the core area, and work was started on the 6th and 8th 
land plots on 26 March 2011 (Figure 5.7). Plot 6 is called “Hongqiao Xintiandi” 
(Hongqiao New Heaven and Earth), covering an area of 62,000 square metres. The 
project is being managed by Shui On Ltd., a Hong Kong company which has a 
good relationship with Shanghai Municipal Government and is the company behind 
the prominent Xintiandi development in central Shanghai (Interview G2012081106). 
Shui On‟s involvement was a gesture of support for the Hongqiao project; the 
company was the first to sign a contract with Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee. The Plot 8 Project is called “Hongqiao Green Valley” and 
is the biggest project in the core area of Hongqiao business district (Table 5.5). 
Construction work is now underway on the other eight projects, and all should be 
finished by 2015.  
 
 
Figure 5.7 The location of land plots in north area of 
the core area of Hongqiao business district 
Source: Author 
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Table 5.5 Land leasing in the north and south areas of the core area of Hongqiao 
business district. 
 
Location  
Land 
plot 
Size of 
land plot 
(m
2
) 
Nature of land 
use 
Land 
leasing 
(million) 
Winner of bid 
Floor price 
(RMB/m
2
 ) 
 
 
Time   
South  02 8130 
Commercial 
office 
140.49 
Shanghai  
Baochuang 
Land 
Company 
Limited 
10801 
August 
1, 2012 
North  11 112863.5 
Commercial, 
residential and 
office 
2032 
China Vanke 
Co., Ltd. 
11395 
August 
1, 2012 
North  14  1632 
Other 
commercial 
services---Gas 
station 
7.92 
China 
Petroleum & 
Chemical 
Corporation 
Shanghai 
Branch  
4852 
July 11, 
2012 
North  12 45516 
Commercial, 
cultural office 
1306.64 
Chongqing 
Xiexin Real 
Estate Co., 
Ltd etc.  
13049 
August 
22, 2012 
South  04 49464 
Other 
commercial 
services 
1320 
King Wei 
Group (China) 
Investment 
Development 
Limited 
20371 
January 
23, 2013 
South 05 15820.7 
Commercial 
office 
273.39 
Shanghai 
Longshi 
Investment 
Limited 
10800 
March 
21, 2013 
Source: Hongqiao Business District, 2013. 
 
A focus of the first phase of work in the core area is the National Exhibition Centre 
project. This is a central government funded project that is on the west side of the 
transport hub, but included in the 4.7 square kilometres and covering an area of 
one square kilometre. This project, which was initiated on 28 July 2012, was 
government-led and funded by the Shanghai Municipal Government (40%) and the 
Ministry of Commerce (60%) with a total investment of 23 billion RMB (Interview 
P2012072101). After several rounds of an international planning competition for the 
centre, held in 2011, the final winners were East China Architectural Design and 
Research Institution and Tsinghua University (Interview P2012072101). Work will be 
finished by 2015 if all goes according to plan (Hongqiao Business District, 2011). 
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5.4.3.2 Government and private projects 
 
The projects in the Hongqiao business district are of two types. One type is built 
and driven by the government, while the other is constructed by the private sector 
(see Table 5.6). Each will be introduced and discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Shanghai Municipal Government and Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee have been the main driving forces behind the Hongqiao project as a 
whole. Government support for the project is mainly reflected in preferential policies 
and financial and taxation support. In addition, a series of government-led projects 
were launched as part of the Hongqiao project. The Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee building, National Exhibition Centre project and transport 
hub were projects led by Shanghai Municipal Government and local district 
government with the aim of creating some landmark buildings and a new city centre 
in the core area of the Hongqiao business district. The Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee building was given the best location in the Hongqiao 
business district next to the Hongqiao transport hub in an attempt to enhance the 
confidence of private investors (Interview P2011010402). The construction of the 
National Exhibition Centre was planned and funded by the central government‟s 
State Council and the Shanghai Municipal Government, embodying thereby support 
from central government to attract investors. These public government buildings are 
indeed nothing less than an attempt to create a new city centre in West Shanghai 
with government investment and support. Their presence is intended to ensure that 
the aim of attracting more private investment will be realised. 
 
Hongqiao business district has invested much in landscaping and greening, in 
particular in the areas around the centre of Hongqiao business district and the 
artificial river waterfront. The riverfront and green space and landscaping in the core 
area relate to the theme of ecological greenbelt and are planned as an attempt to 
mitigate any adverse impact of the transport hub on the environment and try to 
realize the aim of making Hongqiao an „ecological city‟. In addition, three other 
urban green spaces -- Huaxiang, Tianli and Yuxia – are being built in the Hongqiao 
business district. The Yuxia greening project involves a total investment of 645 
million RMB. Three artificial hills and a lake are being designed and built as part of 
this project. These greening projects are supposed to improve the quality of the 
urban environment and realize the aims of creating an ecological and low-carbon 
city. The discourse is a common one in China and tends, as here, to be geared 
more towards economic returns, to attract individual housing investors and 
corporate investors from the public and private sectors (Interview P2011010402). 
However, as Caprotti (2014a) argues, eco-urbanism and eco-cities such as 
Hongqiao are unlikely to benefit those who are most impacted by climate change; 
the new eco-urbanism project was, after all, constructed through land 
dispossession.   
 
These projects are all part of Shanghai„s image enhancement effort to realize its 
aim of becoming a global city and, within this, to promote the strategy of Hongqiao 
as a new centre and an important part of the urban entrepreneurialism of Shanghai 
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Municipal Government. On the one hand, the government-led projects have played 
an important role in the development of Hongqiao business district; on the other 
hand, they have been designed to enhance the confidence of investors by 
encouraging them in the belief that investment returns will be promising precisely 
because the government is showing the lead (Interview G2012081308). With this 
background of promotion and encouragement from government, both domestic and 
international private investors gradually have expressed a positive interest in the 
Hongqiao project and have become the main driving force for construction in the 
core area in Hongqiao business district. There have been 17 land plots leased in 
the first phase of construction of the business zone in the core area of Hongqiao 
business district. The private investors can be divided into three categories based 
on source of capital, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China (Table 5.6). 
 
Table 5.6 Land leasing in the first phase of the core area of Hongqiao business 
district. 
Land 
plot 
Size of land 
plot (m
2
) 
Nature of land use 
Land 
leasing 
(million) 
Winner of bid 
Floor price 
(Yuan/m
2
 ) 
Time 
06 62299.4 
Commercial, 
entertainment and office 
complex 
3188 Shui On Land Limited 13674 
September 
30, 2010 
08 89805.6 
Commercial, 
entertainment and office 
complex 
3217 
Shanghai Land
（Group）Co., Ltd. 
etc. 
 
11308 
September 
30, 2010 
01 45282.1 Commercial services 1441.20 
Lih Pao Consturction 
Co., Ltd etc. 
12100 
March 1, 
2011 
04 27893.8 Commercial services 1550 
Beijing Vantone Real 
Estate Co., Ltd etc. 
15099 
March 31, 
2011 
09 15052.6 
Other commercial 
services 
525 
Shanghai Sanxiang 
(Group) Co., Ltd. etc. 
15658 April 27, 2011 
05 78751.7 Commercial office 3054.22 
Longhu Real Estate 
Co., Ltd etc. 
10503 
August 3, 
2011 
07-01 8203.2 Commercial office 282.85 
Top Victory 
Investments Limited 
etc. 
13000 
August 8, 
2011 
02 92133 Commercial office 3066.66 
Macalline (Group) Co., 
Ltd. etc. 
9095 
August 30, 
2011 
03-
north 
51294.7 Other business service 2380 
Luen Mei （China） 
Investment Co.Ltd etc. 
9789 
November 
15, 2011 
03-
south 
32176.6 
Other commercial 
services 
1480 
China Vanke Co., Ltd. 
etc. 
13398 
November 
15, 2011 
07-2 15461 
Other commercial 
services 
637 
Shanghai Zhaochen 
Real Estate Co., Ltd. 
etc. 
11105 
August 1, 
2012 
Source: Hongqiao Business District, 2012. 
 
5.4.3.3 The main actors in the construction of the Hongqiao business district  
 
Investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China are the main actors in the 
construction of the core area of Hongqiao business district. Some of the bigger 
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investors will be introduced here to consider their background and their role in the 
Hongqiao project. Among the flag-ship projects is Hongqiao Xintiandi owned by 
Shui On Land Limited from Hong Kong. Another project involves the construction of 
new Shanghai head offices by Top Victory Investments Ltd., while the Hongqiao 
Green Valley project was constructed by Shanghai Land (Group) Co., 
Ltd.(Hongqiao Business District, 2011).  
 
As I mentioned above, the role of Shui On Land is of particular significance. At the 
time of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, many property companies were 
reluctant to involve themselves in urban regeneration projects in Shanghai, which at 
that time were mainly driven by municipal and local governments (Interview 
G2012081106). Nevertheless, Shui On Land signed an agreement with Huangpu 
District Government to help the local government realize its aim of transforming 
some old city blocks (He and Wu, 2005; Yang and Chang, 2007). The land use 
rights for an area of 52 hectares within 23 residential blocks were leased to Shui On 
Land in instalments. The contract included some planning gains. In order to 
improve the quality of the project, Shui On Land helped the local district 
government construct Green Park, an artificial lake on the south side of the project, 
which was used to promote the environment and improve the image of the area. In 
return, Shanghai Municipal Government promised that Shui On Land would be 
given use rights to plots of land around the park at a low price in a part of the city 
where the price of land leases had risen many times, not least because of the 
environmental improvements credited to the Green Park. In addition, Huangpu 
District Government changed the terms of the contract for Shui On Land to mitigate 
perceived risk stemming from the Asian financial crisis. Demand for commercial 
office and shop space was declining at that time, and the municipal and local 
governments were even persuaded to change the office and hotel space that 
predominated in the original plan to residential use of space and, as a 
consequence, some blocks were re-designated as residential. In today‟s Shanghai, 
Xintiandi is seen as a flagship project, one of the most important leisure and tourism 
centres in the city (Zheng, 2011). (For a discussion of other aspects of the 
development of Xintiandi, see Chapter 2.8 and 2.9.)  
 
The active participation of Shui On Land in Xintiandi was highly appreciated by 
Shanghai municipal and local district governments. So close became the 
relationship between the company and the municipal and district governments that 
the chairman of Hong Kong Shui On Land, Vincent Lo, was heard joking that he 
should be recognized as the son-in-law of the city based on his contribution to the 
project (Interview G2012081106). Shui On Land was given priority in obtaining 
rights to new land development projects in Shanghai. Luo‟s close relationship with 
leaders of the Shanghai Municipal Government provided him with an important 
resource network and meant that Shui On Land had a virtual carte blanche in 
Shanghai‟s property market. Indeed, after Xintiandi, Shui On Land constructed a 
series of projects in Shanghai, including Shanghai Chuangzhi Square, as well as 
property development in Pudong.   
 
Another main participant in the construction of the Hongqiao business district is Top 
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Victory Investments Limited from Taiwan, which focuses on the development of 
electronic products. This company bid for use rights to a plot of land near the 
building housing the Hongqiao Business District Management Committee. The plot 
is being developed, with the encouragement of the Shanghai Municipal 
Government, as its regional headquarters. Top Victory meets the requirements of 
the Hongqiao Business District authorities, which have been encouraging service 
companies to locate their regional and global headquarters in Hongqiao. Top 
Victory‟s direct investment in Hongqiao business district is, therefore, actively 
supported. 
 
In addition to these private sector investments, Shanghai‟s state-owned companies 
have also been actively involved. One of the main actors, the state-owned 
Shanghai Land (Group) Co., Ltd,, is representative of Shanghai local businesses 
involved in Hongqiao. It is in charge of the flagship Hongqiao Green Valley project, 
located on the opposite side of the transportation hub. 
  
Both private and state-owned investors in Hongqiao have suffered from the impact 
of the slowdown in the Chinese economy. This has affected both government 
enterprises at different levels and private companies involved in the Hongqiao 
project (Interview G2012072904). Although the then-premier and head of the State 
Council, Wen Jiabao, launched a series of stimulus policies to counter the 
slowdown in 2008, the main players involved in Hongqiao have still faced huge 
pressure in terms of funding. Public and private companies involved in Hongqiao 
have been relying on financial support from banks even as banks tightened the 
money supply and made loans hard to obtain, slowing down significantly the speed 
of development in Hongqiao (Interview G2012062102). 
 
Many projects under construction are facing pressure to complete on schedule. 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee has been urging that projects 
be finished according to plan by the end of 2015. Making matters more complicated 
are regulations and controls issued by government at various levels to tackle the 
soaring price of housing in Shanghai and China‟s other main cities. To this end, the 
State Council in Beijing has issued regulations which have ended up inhibiting the 
progress of the project. This has made it hard to sell many of the residential 
projects under construction in Hongqiao. The state and private property companies 
have become less willing to auction land use rights in Hongqiao during the latter 
part of development. This has created a series of chain reactions with land auction 
revenues drastically reduced, meaning that the Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee has been facing pressures in repaying bank loans for 
investment in infrastructure (Interview G2012081309). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
It is widely known that new towns, new districts and new CBDs have been sprouting 
up throughout China since the late 1990s (Chien, 2013), and the trend has been 
fuelled by a large influx of domestic and foreign investment since 2000. The 
Hongqiao project is one major example in the new wave of urban projects. This 
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chapter has introduced the reader to the planning and layout of the Hongqiao 
project, focusing on its regional context, aims, main elements, planning process and 
land preparation. It started by briefly reviewing and analysing Hongqiao within the 
wider context of the western periphery of Shanghai, arguing that the importance of 
the project can be attributed to the need to accelerate the pace of development in 
West Shanghai and bring about industrial and spatial transformation in a context of 
place competition from within and outside Shanghai. Against this background, the 
Hongqiao project, alongside a series of other urban projects in the west of the city, 
aims to kick-start development by providing a new economic growth pole through 
the development of service industries, to integrate Shanghai with the YRD through 
the construction of a transportation hub and to create a poly-centred city by means 
of the development of a business district. 
 
When reviewing the scale and layout, planning and construction of the Hongqiao 
project, it is clear that we are looking at a grand urban project of a scale and 
importance equivalent to the Pudong project. The Shanghai Municipal Government 
has played a leading role in terms of establishing, planning and siting the project 
and preparing land in the process of project development. Through the joint efforts 
of government at different levels, after six years of intensive construction in 
Hongqiao, the Hongqiao transportation hub is complete -- a new landmark in the 
city -- and the Hongqiao business district is currently being built, soon to become a 
new city centre for Shanghai. This raises questions around how this huge project 
was set up in such a short period of time. Further, while there is no doubt that many 
major players have been involved in the process of construction, a series of 
questions are inevitably raised around who they are and what their role and 
responsibility is, as well as how this project is managed and what the relations are 
between these main players. In order to answer these questions, the next chapter 
will focus on how the main players -- government agencies, private corporations 
and other organisations -- have acted and interacted in contributing to the 
development of the Hongqiao project. 
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Chapter 6  
Entrepreneurial governance and land-based urban growth 
coalitions in the development of Hongqiao Business District 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The Hongqiao transport hub -- an important part of the Hongqiao Business District -
- has become the biggest transport hub in China since the inauguration of the high-
speed railway station in 2010. While the Hongqiao business district is undergoing 
intense construction, the first phase of the project is expected to be finished by 
2015. The progress of the whole project has been rapid because of the co-
operation between the main governmental players at various levels, state-owned 
corporations, private investors and other organizations closely involved in the 
project. This chapter focuses on the governance of the project in terms of the 
relationship between public agencies and private corporations and other 
organizations responsible for the development of the project. It seeks to contribute 
to discussions about the nature of growth coalitions in Chinese cities. In particular, 
through rich description of the make-up of the corporate actors involved, it adds a 
new layer of elaboration to these discussions, which have heretofore been 
characterised by a lack of specificity.  
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section, the overall project 
coordination is reviewed. The body coordinating both phases of construction of the 
Hongqiao transport hub and Hongqiao business district is introduced, and the 
transformation of the group leading the project in its different phases is explained. 
In the second section, the role and responsibility of the main players in the project 
are examined, and questions around the governance mechanism, project 
leadership and coordination are discussed. In the third section, the entrepreneurial 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee will be discussed in terms of 
urban growth coalitions. The details of a series of entrepreneurial measures 
adopted by local government will also be reviewed. From there, discussion will 
expand to consider the intra- and inter-urban competition from other business 
districts in the region and what advantage Hongqiao Business District might have in 
becoming a CBD serving the Yangtze River Delta. Finally, this chapter concludes 
that powerful and entrepreneurial local government is the main driving force in the 
overall management of the project and that entrepreneurial government organises 
itself and its tailor-made institutions into urban growth coalitions based around land 
and a faith in its continued rise in value. 
 
6.2 Overall project coordination 
 
Shanghai Municipal Government is the chief policy maker and original proposer of 
the Hongqiao project and, therefore, the overall coordinator for the process of 
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construction. As we have seen in Chapter 5, the whole project includes Hongqiao 
transport hub -- the biggest transport hub in China -- and Hongqiao business 
district, which jointly constitute Hongqiao Business District. Overall construction of 
the Hongqiao project can be divided into two phases of construction: Hongqiao 
transport hub (up to 2010) and Hongqiao business district (from 2010). 
 
A project of this size involves many stakeholders. Participants are drawn from a 
wide range of sectors and cover different areas. They are from the districts of 
Minhang and Changning, from different types of enterprises, small and medium-
sized private companies, state-owned companies, and private companies and 
collectives. The large number of participants increases the difficulty of coordination. 
A feature of this type of mega urban project in China is that new ad hoc state bodies 
are created and tailored to the requirements of individual tasks. As such, in an 
attempt to expedite the progress of the project, Shanghai Municipal Government set 
up a series of government bodies such as Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee (Hongqiao shangwuqu guanweihui) and the state-owned Shenhong 
Company to jointly coordinate the project. Among those newly established 
organizational bodies, the most important are the Shanghai Hongqiao Business 
District Development and Construction Headquarters for the business district and 
the Shanghai Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub Project Construction Leading 
Group (Shanghai Hongqiao zonghe jiaotong shuniu lingdao xiaozu) for the transport 
hub.  
 
Shenhong Company, as implementer of Shanghai Hongqiao Integrated Transport 
Hub Project Construction Leading Group, has authority over Minhang and 
Changning districts, while the Shanghai Airport Group (SAG) and Shanghai 
Construction and Management Company are responsible for the transport hub and 
business district projects respectively. Their specific responsibilities will be 
discussed in section 6.3.  
 
6.2.1 Governance arrangements for the construction of the Hongqiao 
transport hub  
 
Looking at the first phase and the construction of the transport hub, the coordination 
framework of the Hongqiao transport hub is as shown in Figure 6.1. The Shanghai 
Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub Construction Leading Group had a leading role 
to play in the construction of the Hongqiao transport hub. The deputy mayor of 
Shanghai Municipal Government was head of the leading group, which was 
responsible for coordinating the construction of the high-speed rail line and station 
and the integrated transport hub. The Construction Headquarters of the High Speed 
Railway supervised the construction of the high-speed rail line and station, which 
are managed by the Shanghai Railway Bureau. The Shanghai Hongqiao Integrated 
Transport Hub Construction Headquarters is in charge of the whole project apart 
from the high-speed rail line and station. Shenhong Company executed the project 
on its behalf.  
 
It is important to note that in carrying forwards the construction of the Hongqiao 
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transport hub, Shanghai Municipal Government learnt from its experience in 
Pudong New District. Shanghai has more experience now in project-based planning 
and so policy ideas, mechanisms and governance arrangements are transferred 
from one mega project to another. Based on its previous experience in Pudong, 
Shanghai Municipal Government‟s first step was to establish the leading group 
headed by the deputy mayor.  
 
The transport hub construction leading group was established to implement and 
lead the project on behalf of Shanghai Municipal Government (Interview 
G2012081106). Its role is equivalent in function to the Shanghai Pudong 
Development Office. It was in charge of the construction of the two construction 
headquarters, the construction headquarters for the transport hub and that for the 
high-speed railway station (Interview A2012080201). The leading group, chaired by 
Yang Xiong, then deputy and now mayor of Shanghai, coordinated the project. After 
completion of Hongqiao transport project and the establishment of Hongqiao 
business district, the leading group was dissolved and its functions were transferred 
to Shanghai Hongqiao Business District Development and Construction 
Headquarters and Hongqiao Business District Management Committee. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Management set-up of the Hongqiao transport hub 
Source: Interview G2012072603. 
 
The Transport Hub Construction Headquarters, acting under the Integrated 
Transport Hub Construction Leading Group, took charge of the construction of the 
Hongqiao transport hub at the start of the project in 2006. The headquarters 
supervised the activities of Minhang and Changning district governments, Shanghai 
Airport Group, state-owned construction companies and Shenhong Company. 
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Shenhong Company was established specifically for the construction of Hongqiao 
transport hub and, therefore, played a crucial role in the project. The offices of the 
transport hub construction headquarters were located in the Shenhong Company 
building with the result that Shenhong Company undertook a coordinating role on 
behalf of its parent organisation (Interview G2012072904). 
 
With Yang Xiong as its chair, the leading group included the leaders of Minhang and 
Changning district governments, Shenhong Company and Shanghai Airport Group. 
In practical terms, most of the work was coordinated by the head of Shenhong 
Company as shown in Figure 6.1 (Interview G2012072603). The specific tasks and 
responsibilities of the main players will be discussed in section 6.3. 
 
Because of the effective coordination role played by construction headquarters in 
the construction of the transport hub, the area around the hub has been 
transformed from urban fringe to a new urban centre within a short time. A series of 
landmark buildings, including the solar-powered train station building and a new 
airport terminal building, has changed its image. Its success was largely due to co-
operation between all participants under the coordination of transport hub 
construction headquarters (Interview A2011113002).  
 
6.2.2 Governance arrangements for the construction of the Hongqiao 
business district 
 
Since the completion of the transport hub project as well its supporting 
infrastructure projects in 2010, Shanghai Municipal Government has turned its 
attention to the task of developing Hongqiao business district. The construction of 
the Hongqiao business district has become one of the six major tasks of Shanghai 
Municipal Government during the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2010-2015). 1  While 
construction of the Hongqiao transport hub involved principally planning 
implementation, provision of land, construction management and coordination as 
well as disbursement of funds (Interview G2012062101), construction of the 
Hongqiao business district has meant concentrating on policy support from central 
and Shanghai municipal governments and interaction on the economy and planning 
with several surrounding districts -- Minhang, Changning, Qingpu and Jiading. The 
participants here are no longer state-owned enterprises, but administrative entities 
in their own right, and the state-owned Shenhong Company, which was responsible 
for coordinating much of the work on the transport hub, is no longer able to exercise 
the same degree of authority. Shenhong Company, a state-owned company under 
the leadership of the Shanghai Municipal Government, cannot easily reconcile 
power struggles between participants from competitive local district governments 
(Interview G2012072603). Despite its municipal ownership, Shenhong Company is 
neither a government body nor an organisation able to provide leadership for the 
                                            
1 The six major tasks are Hongqiao business district, the Expo site, international tourist 
resort, Riverside area, Front Beach area and the waterfront of Huangpu River. 
- Chapter 6 - 
117 
 
surrounding district governments. In order to manage these tensions, a new 
coordination organization, the Shanghai Hongqiao Business District Development 
and Construction Headquarters (Hongqiao shangwuqu kaifan he jianshe zhihuibu) 
was established in March 2012. 
 
The new governance and management mechanism formed for the construction of 
Hongqiao business district involved Shanghai Municipal Government taking active 
steps to establish new administrative entities at different levels with preferential 
policies for Hongqiao business district. Here we see the state reshaping ad hoc to 
be able to coordinate an urban development project -- what we could call urban 
project-led state restructuring. Preliminary work included the tasks of land 
requisition and the displacement and resettlement of villagers and factories, after 
which the crucial task was to construct Hongqiao business district, and at the same 
time attract investment. In order to contend with intense competition from other 
districts and to better promote the development of Hongqiao, Hongqiao business 
district was established in 2009 along with its management committee, which has 
gradually taken over the role that Shenhong Company had previously played 
(Interview A2012080201). Hongqiao Business District Management Committee 
(Hongqiao Shangwuqu guiweihui) is the acting organization on behalf of Shanghai 
Hongqiao Business District Development and Construction Headquarters (as was 
Shenhong for the transport hub); it negotiates and coordinates with surrounding 
districts to fix a unified policy on attracting investment between Hongqiao business 
and Minhang districts (Interview G2012062102). 
 
Paralleling the role of Shenhong, Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee has become the executive arm for Shanghai Hongqiao Business District 
Development and Construction Headquarters (Hongqiao shangwuqu kaifa jianshe 
zhihuibu). Jiang Ping, who at the time was deputy mayor of Shanghai, was given 
the concurrent post of chair of Hongqiao Business District Management Committee, 
while an acting head was in charge of actual daily work (Interview G2012072603). 
The leaders of Shanghai Municipal Government departments related to the 
construction of Hongqiao business district were appointed deputy chairs of the 
management committee, on which sit officials from the four surrounding districts 
and related state-owned companies. For instance, the heads of Shenhong 
Company and Minhang and Changning district governments, Shanghai Municipal 
Construction and Transportation Commission and Shanghai Commerce 
Commission all sit on the committee (Figure 6.2). With the management committee 
taking over as the driving force behind the business district, the role of Shenhong 
Company has dropped out of the picture, as have Shanghai Airport Group and 
Shanghai Railway Bureau (Interview G2012080305).   
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Figure 6.2 Governance structure of Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee 
Source: Interview G2012072603. 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee (HBDMC) 
Minhang District Government (MDG) 
Changning District Government (CDG) 
Shanghai Municipal Construction and Transportation Commission (SMCTC) 
Shanghai Commerce Committee (SCC) 
Deputy Commander of Airport Construction Headquarters (DCACH) 
 
In the process of constructing Hongqiao business district, there have been calls for 
more coordination between government organizations at different levels. Shanghai 
Commerce Commission was added to the management committee, while Shanghai 
Airport Group left the committee. Coordination by the management committee was 
crucial in dealing with conflicts of interest among local governments and other 
stakeholders. Conflicts of interest exist in terms of attracting investment and 
preferential policies between Hongqiao business district and surrounding districts, 
particularly Minhang district (Interview G2012062102). Local cadres face pressure 
with their promotion dependent on success; each district, therefore, wants to attract 
more investment relying on the Hongqiao project. All this makes it difficult for 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee to negotiate with the main 
stakeholders, and this had been all the more so for Shenhong Company with its 
lack of administrative clout (Interview G2012062101).  
 
6.3 Role and responsibility of main players 
 
In this section we discuss the roles and responsibilities of the main actors, starting 
with Shanghai Municipal Government in its coordinating role and then the other 
bodies lower in the hierarchy. Table 6.1 lays out the role and responsibility of the 
main players. 
  
 
 
Table 6.1 Roles of main players in the project 
Government body responsible 
                                                         
Resettlement 
Transport hub                      Business district 
                                                                                                                             
Policy & long-term planning 
Ministry of Railways  
Approval for construction  of 
Hongqiao transport hub 
  
Ministry of Commerce   Policy and funding support   
Shanghai Municipal 
Government 
 
Project decision-maker 
coordination and supervision 
Coordinating the project Coordinating  and supervision  
Headquarters of construction 
of Hongqiao transport hub 
 
Supervision of process of transport 
hub on behalf of Shanghai 
municipal government 
  
Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee 
  
In charge of land lease and 
attracting business 
Responsible for integrated transport organization and management, 
regional planning and development co-ordination, organization and 
implementation of regional development, guidance and coordination 
of territorial management 
Minhang District Government 
In charge of funding allocations for 
the relocation and resettlement of  
farmers and factories  
Providing land    
Changning District 
Government  
In charge of funding allocations for 
the relocation and resettlement of  
farmers and factories 
Providing land   
Shanghai Airport Group  
In charge of construction of the 
hub facilities 
  
Shanghai Railway Bureau  
In charge of construction of the  
railway station 
  
Shenhong  Investment Ltd. Providing relocation funding Land allocation to project 
In charge of infrastructure and 
facilities construction and 
planning 
 
Huacao street committees 
Carrying out schemes to relocate 
farmers 
   
Xinhong street committees 
Responsible for social issues in 
Aibo community  after relocation 
   
Village committees  
Involved in  schemes to relocate 
villagers  
   
Source: Interviews G2012072603 and D2011120602. 
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6.3.1 The role and responsibility of policy makers: Shanghai Municipal 
Government 
 
As principal policy maker for the construction of Hongqiao transportation hub and 
business district, Shanghai Municipal Government has been in overall charge of the 
whole Hongqiao project. The main role of Shanghai Municipal Government has 
been and remains to provide institutional arrangements and policy support. In 
addition, it has been coordinating the principal participants, Shenhong Company, 
Minhang and Changning districts, Shanghai Airport Group, Shanghai Railway 
Bureau and Hongqiao business district in the period of construction of the transport 
hub and business district. It also set up a series of agencies of Shenhong 
Company, Hongqiao Business District Management Committee and New Hongqiao 
Street Committee (Xinhong jiedao weiyuanhui) to coordinate and supervise the 
whole project from 2006 to 2013. 1  During this period, Shanghai Municipal 
Government experienced three changes of personnel with three deputy mayors, 
Yang Xiong, Shen Jun and Jiang Ping, all acting as heads of Hongqiao business 
district.  
 
6.3.2 Acting coordinator: Hongqiao Business District Management Committee 
and Shenhong Company 
 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee and Shenhong Company, 
under the umbrella of Hongqiao Business District Development and Construction 
Headquarters, coordinate and participate in the planning and construction of 
Hongqiao business district. The former has been focusing on overall project 
planning and coordination of the main players. The main focus of the latter has 
been on land auctions and provision of basic transportation infrastructure. 
 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee was established to take over 
part of the task of coordination and management from Shenhong Company in 
October 2010 when the Hongqiao transport hub was almost completed (Interview 
G2012072904). As an affiliated agency of Shanghai Municipal Government, this 
management committee is not an administrative entity in the way that Minhang and 
Changning districts are. Functionally, it is equivalent to Pudong Development 
Leading Office (Pudong fazhan lingdao bangongshi), which oversaw the early 
stages of development in Pudong (Interview G2012081106). Again, as with the 
creation of Shenhong, here a new separate organization was created – separate 
from the district-level authorities -- to be able to mediate between them. Hongqiao 
Business District Management Committee coordinates regional planning and 
development and is involved in the preparation and improvement of the Hongqiao 
business district and planning of the surrounding area. Its main role is to promote 
                                            
1 Street committees are the lowest tier of local government and are staffed by paid officials. 
They are equivalent in urban areas to the township governments of rural areas. The 
existence of the township government shows how Minhang district (and Shanghai, of which 
the district forms part) have sprawled and grown around rural settlements. 
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the development of modern service industries within the 86 square kilometre project 
area in tandem with the surrounding districts of Minhang and Changning. With 
infrastructure largely in place, the most important thing is to attract investment. 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee has expended a great deal of 
effort to attract capital and investment.  
 
Table 6.2 Investment Division of Shanghai Hongqiao Transport Hub 
Name of facilities Investment and operational management body 
Transport Facilities Airport:  Shanghai Airport (Group) Ltd. 
Metro: Shanghai Shentong Metro Co. Ltd. 
Railway: Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Railway Co. Ltd. 
Maglev: Shanghai Maglev Transportation Development 
Co. Ltd. 
External Roads Shanghai Urban Construction Investment and 
Development Corporation 
Energy Facilities Shanghai Electric Power Company 
Shenneng (Group) Co. Ltd. 
Shanghai Information Investment Incorporation 
The Projects of Supporting 
Construction 
Postal Facilities: Shanghai Post Company 
Fire Station: Shanghai Fire Bureau 
Other Ancillary Projects Corresponding Agencies or Departments 
Source: (Hongqiao Business District, 2010). 
 
Shenhong Company has played a crucial coordinating role in the construction of the 
Hongqiao transport hub as well as Hongqiao business district, although 
decreasingly so in the latter case. Shanghai Shenhong Investment and 
Development Co., Ltd. (Shenhong touzi yu kaifa gongsi; to give Shenhong 
Company its full title) was established by Shanghai Municipal Government in July 
2006 to promote the construction of the Hongqiao transport hub. Shenhong 
Company, as a state-owned diversified investment and development company, was 
capitalized by three companies owned by Shanghai Municipal Government -- 
Shanghai Jiushi Company, Shanghai Airport Group and the Land Reserve Centre of 
Shanghai Municipality (Shanghai tudi chubei zhongxin), as shown in Figure 6.3 
(Interview A2012080201). Of these three, Shanghai Airport Group was the most 
active in the construction of the Hongqiao transport hub. In the phase of 
construction of the Hongqiao transport hub before 2010, Shenhong Company was 
the only authorised representative of the municipal government (Interview 
A2011113002). Under the supervision of Shenhong Company, many state-owned 
companies were involved in constructing the transport hub, in particular in terms of 
its infrastructure. In addition to the airport terminal and high-speed railway station 
building, the construction of many other infrastructure facilities such as energy 
pipelines and road systems was coordinated by other state-owned companies  such 
as Shanghai Urban Construction Investment and Development Corporation 
(Shanghai jianshe touzi he kaifa gongsi) and Shanghai Electric Power Company 
(Shanghai dianli) (Table 6.2). Shenhong Company also oversaw the tasks of 
demolition of buildings and relocation of residents within 26 square kilometres. 
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Figure 6.3 Main structure of investments of Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub 
Source: Interview G2012072603. 
 
Shenhong Company has become the entrusted implementer of preliminary land 
development; it is an important investor in core areas of Hongqiao business district 
and the main investor and builder of supporting public service projects such as the 
projects of green space in Hongqiao business district (Interview G2012072603). 
Since the establishment of the Hongqiao Business District Management Committee 
in 2009, the division of tasks of management and coordination has gradually been 
refined and adjusted between Shenhong Company and Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee. The former has gradually focused on three principal 
business activities: early-stage land development and management, construction of 
public service facilities and operation of Hongqiao transport hub, as shown in Table 
6.2. In particular, early-stage land development has become of crucial importance 
for Shenhong Company because development of Hongqiao business district 
depends largely on the revenue from land leasing in the district. 
 
Shanghai Airport Group, one of the state-owned companies of Shanghai Municipal 
Government, is in charge of the operation of Hongqiao International Airport, as well 
as Pudong International Airport. Given the centrality of Hongqiao Airport to the 
whole project, it is inevitable that Shanghai Airport group has been playing a leading 
role in the process of construction of Hongqiao transport hub. The head of 
Shanghai Airport Group became deputy head of the construction headquarters of 
the transport hub directly under the Shanghai Municipal Government deputy mayor. 
Shanghai Airport Group was in charge of construction of the main buildings of the 
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transport hub and supporting project. With the completion of the transport hub, the 
role of Shanghai Airport Group has moved to operational management of the city‟s 
two international airports.  
 
Finally, in this section, we should mention briefly an organization that is not actually 
under the ownership of the Shanghai Municipal Government. Shanghai Railway 
Bureau, another leading participant in the transport hub, is affiliated to the Ministry 
of Railways, which itself was transformed into the state-owned China Railway 
Corporation in 2013. Shanghai Railway Bureau worked under the direction of the 
Ministry of Railways in building Hongqiao high-speed railway station. With the 
completion of the station, the task of Shanghai Railway Bureau shifted from 
construction to operation in 2010. 
 
6.3.3 Minhang District Government and its related stakeholders 
 
The land for the Hongqiao project was carved out of Minhang and Changning 
districts, with Minhang district in particular providing 98% of the land for the project 
(about 13 square kilometres), while the remaining 2% of project land was taken 
from Changning district as shown in Figure 6.4 (Interview A2012122804). Apart 
from supplying the land, Minhang and Changning district governments were tasked 
with finishing the job of land expropriation, relocating villagers, urban residents and 
small factories and compensating relocatees. Shenhong Company “bought” land 
from Minhang district government at a price of 1.4 million RMB per mu (15 mu are 
equal to 1 hectare), and these funds were used to compensate relocated residents. 
Some of these funds will have been retained by the district government, the 
township government and the village committee (Interview D2012072801). As we 
will see in Chapter 7, compensation funds destined for villagers were held back in 
private accounts specially set up for them by the district government and were only 
released once the villagers have actually moved house.  
 
The important role of the various stakeholders in the funding and disbursement 
model for the Hongqiao project is shown in Figure 6.4. In this figure we can see the 
flow of resources. Under the coordination of Shanghai Municipal Government and 
with funding from banks, Shenhong Company purchased the land for the Hongqiao 
project. Meanwhile, Minhang District Government has been in charge of land 
acquisition and the release of compensation funding (using the funds from 
Shenhong), compensation that eventually reached the hands of relocated residents, 
but as we can see in the figure there were a lot of stakeholders, and this resulted in 
a reduction of the amount of compensation, as shown in Figure 6.5.  
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Figure 6.4 Funding sources and disbursement model for Hongqiao project 
Source: Compiled from interviews. 
 
Minhang District Government has played a coordinating role in the process of 
relocation and compensation of relocated villagers and factories. In particular, it has 
played the leading role in the disbursement of relocation compensation in Minhang 
district. Huacao Township is the specific location in Minhang district from which 
villagers and factories were relocated. Minhang District Government supervises 
Huacao Township and villagers‟ committees in implementing the task of relocation 
and disbursement of relocation funding from Shenhong Company (Interview 
G2012080807). These governance arrangements are further explained in Chapter 
7. Minhang District Government, using some of the proceeds of the land sales to 
Shenhong Company, also undertook the task of constructing resettlement housing 
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in the new Aibo community, which was planned and constructed for relocated 
residents in Hongqiao business district (see Chapter 7).  
 
A series of supporting infrastructure facilities and social and educational facilities 
such as primary and high school have also been built, as well as a hospital and 
market near Aibo community. Minhang District Government expended a great deal 
of effort in the daunting task of relocation in the early stages of the project, and then 
dealing with the aftermath of the demolition, when relocated villagers complained 
and protested about their relocation compensation. Relocatees lodged complaints 
and protested for more follow-up subsidies. Minhang District Government faced 
huge pressure given that the number of protesting villagers has become a “hard 
indicator” used to evaluate officials‟ performance (Interview G2012062102). This 
indicator can lead to a veto on promotion for officials. 
 
With the completion of Hongqiao transport hub, Minhang District Government has 
also been involved with the Business District Management Committee in attracting 
investment and providing assistance for the construction of Hongqiao business 
district. Minhang District Government and Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee have set up a joint Enterprise Service Centre (Lianhe qianye fuwu 
zhongxin) to attract service-oriented enterprises and have offered a series of 
preferential policies to entice companies. (These will be fully examined in section 
6.4.) 
 
Table 6.3 Government bodies and state-owned corporations involved in the 
development of Hongqiao Business District  
Government bodies Aims  Date of 
foundation  
Shanghai Shenhong 
Investment and 
Development Co., Ltd.  
Overall organization and coordination  of 
development and construction and planning, 
design of hub and management  of construction 
building 
July 2006 
Xinhong Street 
Committee 
Responsible for social issues and planning in east 
area of Hongqiao transport project 
January, 23 
2010 
Shanghai Hongqiao 
Business District 
Management 
Committee 
Integrated transport organization and 
management, regional planning and development 
co-ordination, organization and implementation of 
regional development, guidance and coordination 
of territorial management 
July, 17   
2009 
Hongqiao Business 
District Development 
and Construction 
Headquarters 
Development and construction of Hongqiao 
Business District, and  coordination of the main 
players in each district 
March, 9 
2012 
Source: Interview G2012080305 and Hongqiao Business District, 2013. 
 
Huacao Township Government and Xinhong Street Committee (both within 
Minhang District Government) have become leading contributors to the Hongqiao 
project with their work of project preparation. The newly established Hongqiao 
Street Committee under the umbrella of Minhang District Government has also 
become a prominent actor in the project, but it was Huacao Township Government 
that directly faced up to the relocated farmers and factory officials. As there was as 
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yet no street committee under the aegis of Hongqiao Business District, Xinhong 
Street Committee was established in an attempt to deal with social issues in 
Hongqiao Business District. (It should be remembered that Hongqiao Business 
District Management Committee is an agency affiliated to Shanghai Municipal 
Government.) Xinhong Street Committee has undertaken the task of government 
looking after relocated villagers resettled in Aibo community, taking over 
responsibility from Huacao Township Government. It has faced huge pressure from 
protesting relocatees (see Chapter 7.4). In addition, Xinhong Street Committee has 
also undertaken the task of promoting economic development and industrial 
planning in the eastern part of Hongqiao transport hub as related in Chapter 5.3. 
The role of Xinhong Street Committee has become more and more important in the 
construction of Hongqiao Business District in terms of social management. 
 
Village committees, as autonomous organizations of villagers, must also be 
considered in this complicated network of organisations. Based on China's 
administrative system, village committees are in charge of all collective property in 
a local village, so when it comes to compensation, village committees are important 
stakeholders in disbursing funding, with leaders of village committees becoming 
even more important. In theory, leaders of village committees are elected 
representatives; in practice, committee officials are normally the more powerful men 
in the village, people who are accepted by villagers and government and who have 
close party ties or, more likely, are members of the party (Ong, 2014). In the case of 
the Hongqiao project, village committees stood on the side of local government 
while trying to hold out for more compensation for the village committee (Interview 
C2011012201). Village committees have also played an important role in helping in 
the relocation task, in particular by persuading relocated farmers to sign up early to 
relocation contracts with local government. Negotiations conducted by Minhang 
Government with villagers were held in secret and with one household at a time, as 
will be explored in Chapter 7.3. 
 
Huacao Township Government has kept 30% of relocation funding in the process. 
The funding is being used to help relocated farmers who are over 60 years old to 
buy endowments and medical insurance (but the level of medical cover is lower 
when compared to that of urban residents in the centre of Shanghai [Interview 
G2012080807]). Because expropriated land and relocated farmers are under its 
jurisdiction, Huacao Township Government has borne the responsibility for taking 
care of landless villagers. Huacao Township Government undertook the follow-up 
work post demolition until January 2010, when this work was taken over by the new 
established Xinhong Street Committee. 
 
There are three main conclusions that we can extract from the analysis in this 
section. Firstly, the rapid progress of the Hongqiao project is inseparable from 
various parties which have been actively involved, starting with Shanghai Municipal 
Government as acting coordinator. Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee and Shenhong Company have played lead roles directing a number of 
state-owned companies and organizations as shown in Table 6.3. What we see 
here is the making of a relatively flexible network of structures that come in and out 
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or adopt or lose responsibilities as the project moves forward into different phases, 
but all within a clear set of hierarchical relationships. In the next section we will 
discuss these relationships as coalitions. 
  
Secondly, we can see that through a mega-urban project, in this case the 
construction of Hongqiao, the state is actually being reshaped. The one-off nature 
of this project-led urban regeneration process means that ad hoc organisations are 
created for specific purposes. New state bodies emerge which take important 
responsibilities and disappear or are reformed into something else. Beyond the 
specific institutional arrangements, what is also created is a new way of statecraft 
and new relationships between different bodies, agencies and people, which then 
linger on and get subsumed into normal policy-making and politics. This state 
reshaping is particularly relevant in terms of rescaling; some district and municipal 
authorities become more important while others lose out; whole new districts are 
created and populations displaced. We could argue, therefore, that what we are 
seeing here is state restructuring led by urban redevelopment projects, where the 
state itself is reshaped due to urban redevelopment projects.  
 
Another important conclusion from this section is the importance of the flow of 
resources through the network of organisations as shown in Figure 6.5. This is very 
important in understanding the three important elements that characterise this 
project and that we will discuss later: entrepreneurial urban/regional governance, 
land-based urban growth coalitions and financialised urban development. The 
commodification of land and its conversion into money is only possible thanks to 
debt financed by banks and to the dispossession of their land from villagers. The 
pressure is then to keep costs down to be able to compensate villagers and 
minimise their complaints. The pressure is also to raise the value of the land to 
lease it off and pay back the loans.     
 
6.4 Urban growth coalition in the Hongqiao project 
 
As the effects of global financial crisis spread to China, China‟s economy slowed 
down in 2010 and has remained slow by its own standards. Central government 
has shrunk the money supply, and public and private investors are finding it hard to 
get access to credit. This is particularly true for private and small-sized companies, 
who find it even harder. This has suppressed the willingness of investors to invest. 
The Hongqiao project has been greatly affected. One of the most obvious indicators 
of this is that the speed of land auctions has significantly slowed down. 
Furthermore, there is no sign of a rise in the value of auctioned land, and the 
progress of the entire Hongqiao project has been significantly decelerated. In this 
context, local government has faced huge pressure because one of the main tasks 
of Hongqiao Business District Management Committee is to attract investment. 
Indeed, the repositioning of Hongqiao business district as a commercial and 
business centre at the national level, full of enterprises belonging to the modern 
service industry, is a priority target for local government. In particular, they are 
focussing their efforts on attracting regional and global headquarters of service 
companies. Both central and Shanghai municipal governments see the Hongqiao 
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project as a key to strengthening the higher order service sector in Shanghai and 
linking the city to the rest of central China. However, it has been the municipal 
government that has largely been the architect of the urban growth coalition that 
has executed the project. The coalition, property-led and dependent on increases in 
land values, has been made up of local district government and the tailor-made 
government organisations that we have already met in this chapter, under the 
leadership of top Shanghai officials.  
 
6.4.1 The entrepreneurial Hongqiao Business District Management Committee 
 
As we discussed in Chapter 3.4, the case of Kunshan has shown that an 
entrepreneurial city administration has a crucial role to play in boosting economic 
development (Chien, 2013), particularly in terms of offering preferential policies to 
attract investment and also through a process of administrative restructuring and 
upgrading. Many local city authorities have started to learn lessons from the cases 
of Kunshan and Suzhou (the city of which Kunshan forms part) in order to attract 
investment, encourage economic development and be successful in regional 
competition. Shanghai Hongqiao Business District Management Committee, as a 
newly established local authority, has learned the meaning of entrepreneurial 
administration from Kunshan‟s local government (Interview G2012072904). In order 
to better achieve the aim of rapidly developing Hongqiao business district, a series 
of entrepreneurial measures were adopted to promote the urban competitiveness of 
the district among its neighbouring entities in Shanghai and among other cities in 
the YRD. In the following paragraphs, we will look at the institutional arrangements 
and preferential policies, adjustments of administrative bodies, regional cooperation 
and urban entrepreneurialism that were adopted by Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee. 
 
The institutional arrangements and preferential policies for the development of 
Hongqiao business district are shown in Table 6.4. Preferential policies, many of 
which have been used by other local authorities, have played an important role in 
attracting investment. The city governments of Suzhou and Hangzhou have also 
used  tax incentives, management fee waivers and subsidised land prices as a 
means of planning (Qian, 2011, Chien and Wu, 2013). Hongqiao business district is 
no exception, central and Shanghai municipal governments having issued a series 
of institutional arrangements at national, municipality and district levels to 
encourage and support the development of Hongqiao business district as shown in 
Table 6.4. These will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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Table 6.4 Preferential policies for the development of Hongqiao business district 
introduced by different levels of government 
Funding Schemes Aims Amount 
(RMB) 
Funding 
period 
Level 
National 
comprehensive pilot 
of modern service 
industry special 
funds 
Promote the service sector -
-modernization, networking, 
standardization and brand 
development 
2 billion  2012-
2015 
National 
Hongqiao business 
district special 
development funds 
Key support for gathering of 
modern service industry, the 
Hongqiao business district, 
the focus of construction 
international trade platform  
and building it with function 
of smart Hongqiao 
2 billion 2012-
2015 
Shanghai 
Municipal 
Government 
Hongqiao business 
district special funds 
to promote the 
development of 
modern services 
Foster the development of 
modern services and 
promotion agglomeration of 
modern service companies  
300 
million 
2012-
2015 
Hongqiao 
Business 
District 
Management 
Committee  
Hongqiao business 
district special funds 
for resettlement of 
the headquarters  of 
large companies 
Attracting resettlement of  
listed companies and large 
domestic corporations to 
create an agglomeration 
effect  
100 
million 
2012-
2015 
Hongqiao 
Business 
District 
Management 
Committee 
Minhang district 
special funds 
for ”adjustment of 
industrial structure 
and transformation 
of development 
mode” 
Relying on the development 
of Hongqiao business 
district, realize "a 
comprehensive structural 
adjustment, in-depth 
urbanization" process in 
Minhang district, to build the 
main agglomeration area for 
Shanghai International 
Trade Centre 
50 
million 
2013-
2015 
Minhang 
District 
Government  
Source: Hongqiao Business District, 2013 and Interview G2012062102. 
 
At the national level, Hongqiao business district was selected as a pilot area for a 
national modern service industry in 2011. Consequently special funds were 
provided to support the development of a modern service sector in Hongqiao 
business district by the State Council in 2009. Specifically, this policy involved the 
Ministry of Commerce providing funding of 2 billion RMB to assist the development 
of a modern service sector within three years. Its aim was to promote the 
networking and brand development sectors amongst others in the district (Interview 
G2012081309). At the municipality level, in accord with the policy of developing a 
modern service sector in Hongqiao business district, Shanghai Municipal 
Government provided 2 billion RMB towards the development of a pilot area in 
Hongqiao within three years. Shanghai‟s support funding matched central funding. 
(Provincial government matching funding for a pilot area is a mandatory 
requirement.) In this case, Hongqiao Business District Management Committee was 
also required to support the development.  
 
At the district level, Minhang and Hongqiao business district have actively 
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responded to higher level government requests to provide funding to promote the 
development of a modern service sector. In particular, resettled companies in 
Hongqiao business district are supposed to conform to the listed „enterprise‟ 
category of the modern service sector, although in fact not all do (see Section 6.5.2 
below). As we can see from Table 6.5, Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee has provided a full range of support mechanisms to attract investment, 
including subsidies to individuals and enterprises and education opportunities for 
the children of investors to lure entrepreneurs into settling in Hongqiao. In theory, all 
companies receiving funding should conform to the government‟s industrial 
classification as service sector companies. Minhang District Government has also 
set up special funds to support 50 companies in the modern service sector in 
Minhang in an attempt to realize the goal of “a comprehensive structural 
adjustment, deep urbanization process in Minhang District, to build a central 
agglomeration area for the Shanghai International Trade Centre” (Minhang District 
Government Twelfth Five-Year Plan). The main aims are to effect a transformation 
of the industrial structure from manufacturing to the service sector and further 
urbanize Minhang district.  
 
Table 6.5 Inducements for companies locating in Hongqiao 
Categories of reward  Content 
Costs and expenses incurred by relocation  Shanghai Municipal Government will 
disburse according to application and 
provide reasonable compensation.  
Rewards for resettlement of offices of large 
companies renting space 
Annual subsidies will be released to 
resettled companies based at a ratio of 40%, 
30% and 30% over three years. 
Subsidies for companies building or buying 
office space 
Subsidized rent for three years 
Household allowance for senior 
management 
Providing house rent 
Education for senior managers‟ children Providing education opportunities 
Source: Interview D2011120602. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 3, administrative restructuring has become a new way of 
promoting entrepreneurialism amongst low-level administrative tiers of the Chinese 
state (Chien, 2013). A paradigmatic example of this strategy is Kunshan, which has 
shown an impressive transformation from agricultural county to important economic 
hub by means of “flexible implementation of administrative restructuring” (Chien, 
2013: 107), which meant changing city classification from rural to urban as well as 
relations between upper-level authorities and boundary revisions (Chien, 2013). 
The experience of Kunshan has been learnt and transferred across to the Hongqiao 
development (Interview G2012081106). Following on from my point above about 
the importance of state restructuring and rescaling, Shanghai Municipal 
Government has also adopted the tactic of administrative restructuring to cope with 
fierce competition from other cities, principally Suzhou, Nanjing and Hangzhou, in 
terms of construction of central business districts. Thus, the Hongqiao area, which 
started off under the jurisdiction of Minhang District Government, was upgraded 
from township level to prefecture level with the development of Hongqiao transport 
hub and business district in an attempt to lift its administrative level to provide more 
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administrative and economic resources to boost industrial development. Against 
this background, Hongqiao Business District Management Committee was 
established, taking over the administration of the area from Minhang District 
Government. The new administration has greater vetting and approval powers in 
terms of fixing tax and revenue preferential policies. Much more important is that 
local leaders of the management committee have greater administrative and 
economic powers to attract investment (Interview S2012080103). Upgrading of the 
administrative level means promotion of local leaders, giving more promotion 
opportunities to local officials. Shanghai Municipal Government also approved the 
request for the establishment of Xinhong Street Committee (Interview 
G2012072904). In addition to the establishment of government agencies, state-
owned companies dedicated to the Hongqiao project were also established, while 
construction companies such as Hongqiao Development Company were also 
established to provide supporting services, as shown in Table 6.3 (Interview 
G2012062101). 
 
Attracting investment has become a top priority for leaders of the management 
committee; in particular, attracting regional and global headquarters of modern 
service companies has become an important indicator to evaluate the success or 
failure of Hongqiao business district (Interview G2012081106). The management 
committee has tried many means of attracting investment. The most effective has 
been a one-stop enterprise service centre established by Minhang district and 
Hongqiao Business District in an attempt to attract modern service enterprises to 
locate in Hongqiao. This parallels practice elsewhere. On site and one-stop 
administrative services for newly settled enterprises have been adopted by many 
entrepreneurially minded governments. Hangzhou Municipal Government, for 
example, created a one-stop shop for the building of a new central business district. 
This has shortened the time needed for approval of the project (Qian, 2011). The 
joint enterprise service centre of Minhang and Hongqiao business districts has 
brought together different departments involved in approving the relocation of new 
companies and has also consolidated the functions of business consulting, 
registration and approval into one (Interview G2012072603). The slogan of the 
enterprise service centre is “Simple, Coherent, Effective, Transparent,” with the 
stated aim of providing one-stop comprehensive services for companies and 
investors who invest in Hongqiao business district (Hongqiao Business District, 
2011). The enterprise service centre claims to provide preferential policy 
consultation, credit consultation, company registration and permit approval for 
investors in the one building (Interview G2012081309). In this centre, staff from 
Minhang and Hongqiao business districts man three counters – one for consultation 
with interested companies, one for services for investing companies and one for the 
receipt of applications for policy services. 
 
Although fierce competition exists between the two districts in terms of attracting 
modern service companies, the two district governments have cooperated to 
provide joint services to newly settled companies. It is claimed that the time 
required for companies to relocate in Hongqiao has been significantly shortened 
(Interview D2012072801). What is more, the enterprise service centre helps 
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investors apply for preferential policies from municipal and central government and 
provides help to facilitate access to various economic resources (Interview 
D2011120602). Indeed, one could say that the two districts have raided the rule 
book of neo-liberal place promotion for the purposes of attracting FDI.  
 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee has held three marketing 
events in 2011 and 2012 to attract companies from the foreign service sector to 
invest and settle in Hongqiao (Table 6.6). 
 
Table 6.6 A series of matchmaking symposiums to attract foreign investment were 
held by Hongqiao Business District Management Committee 
Matchmaking Symposium for 
attracting foreign investment 
Aims Date Place 
Hongqiao Business District Hong 
Kong Enterprises Seminar 
Attracting foreign 
investment from Hong 
Kong to Hongqiao  
October , 18 
2011 
Hong 
Kong 
Hongqiao Business District 
Japanese Enterprises Seminar  
Attracting Japanese 
enterprise investment in 
Hongqiao  
March, 1 
2012 
Shanghai 
Shanghai Hongqiao Business 
District International Business 
Entrepreneur Advisory Council 
Attracting foreign 
investment in Shanghai 
resettlement in Hongqiao 
September, 
27 2012  
Shanghai 
Source: Source: (Hongqiao Business District, 2013). 
 
Hong Kong was chosen as the site of the first seminar, organised in order to attract 
international foreign investment, particularly from Taiwan and Japan. During the 
planning and construction stage in Pudong, Hong Kong had also been chosen as a 
location for promotion seminars to attract investment; the seminars were successful 
in attracting Japanese investment. Two out of three of the most famous landmark 
buildings in Pudong (Jinmao Tower and Shanghai World) were funded and built by 
Japanese financial groups, contributing to the success of the development of 
Pudong (Interview S2012071002). In addition, Taiwanese companies have also 
made considerable investments in the four industrial parks in Pudong. Hongqiao is 
learning from Pudong‟s successful experience. Seminars and matchmaking 
symposiums to attract investment from Taiwan and Japan were also launched in 
Shanghai, and these were also fruitful. Five international financial groups invested 
in Hongqiao business district in the initial period. Shui On Properties Group, the 
Hong Kong based company behind the Xintiandi development in central Shanghai 
(see Chapter 2.9), became the first enterprise to settle in Hongqiao business 
district. Two Taiwanese companies have also located their regional headquarters in 
Hongqiao (Interview G2012080305). Several others had decided to invest in 
Hongqiao business district as the development entered into the second phase of 
the core area as shown in Table 6.7.  
 
It can be concluded that the entrepreneurial Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee has adopted a series of active steps to realise the place 
marketing of Hongqiao business district. Firstly, Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee has set up a joint centre to attract investment with 
Minhang district; there has been, in other words, both cooperation as well as 
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competition between Minhang and Hongqiao business districts. Secondly, 
matchmaking symposiums and marketing events were held. Thirdly, transfers of 
entrepreneurial practices occurred as Hongqiao learned from practice in Kunshan 
and Pudong. 
 
Table 6.7 New influx of investment in Hongqiao Business District 
Investors      Capital Properties 
Xuan Hongkong Limited     Private  
Shanghai New Changning Group   Shanghai State-owned 
Zhengrong Group     State-owned 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Shanghai Branch State-owned 
Shanghai Wanshu Property Group   Private  
Beijing Chuan Fu Holdings Limited   Private  
New Hualian Real Estate    Beijing State-owned 
Source: Source: (Hongqiao Business District, 2013) and Interview G2012062102. 
 
6.4.2 The creation of land-based urban growth coalitions 
 
Rapid progress in the Hongqiao project within a short time can be attributed to the 
successful work of the land-based urban growth coalition that has been guiding the 
project. While many stakeholders have been involved in the coalition, land has 
been at its central focus. All the participants prioritised land at every step of the way, 
entailing inevitably a strong degree of speculation -- speculation, that is, that the 
value that can be derived from land would continue increasing -- but also requiring 
debt financing to cover the gap between payment of compensation and eventual 
payback. The paragraphs that follow detail the membership of the land-based urban 
growth coalition that has driven the Hongqiao project. Chapter 8 discusses issues 
raised by the slower growth rate in property prices in 2011 to 2013; it also provides 
a further refinement to the coalition concept by attempting to shed light on its 
various parts and capture its dynamic nature. 
 
Over the last 35 years of economic reform, central government has gradually 
reduced its role in specific urban development projects (Zhang, 2002), and local 
municipal government has gradually replaced it. Shanghai Municipal Government 
has played a crucial role in orchestrating the Hongqiao project and, in particular, in 
supervising land quotas and giving direction to the project. What is more, Shanghai 
government has promoted important ad hoc administrative reforms and 
arrangements (such as the creation of Hongqiao business district and the state-
owned Shenhong Company as well as the Integrated Transport Hub Project 
Construction Headquarters). These newly established organizations have played a 
crucial role in progressing the project; my interviews with officials confirm that they 
are at the heart of this land-based urban growth coalition.  
 
Shenhong Company was in charge of project planning and land reserves in the 
early stage of the project and was particularly responsible for the development of 
land for the project. It relied on start-up capital to implement land acquisition from 
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Minhang District Government based on the policy of “dabaogan” (see Chapter 7.1). 
The converted land was used as collateral to get bank loans from Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank and China Agricultural Bank under the guarantee of local 
government. With the support of bank loans, rural land was appropriated and 
exploited based on the principle of seven connections and one levelling (qitong 
yiping; the supply of water, gas, telephone lines, the Internet etc and land levelling).  
  
As the project progressed, Hongqiao Business District Management Committee 
became the main player in the urban growth coalition. It has organized and 
implemented the project relying on the leverage exercised by the state-owned 
Shenhong Company to realize its goal of land exploitation in Hongqiao. The 
auctioning off of the „mature‟ urban land (on which the seven connections and one 
levelling had been completed) was undertaken by Shenhong Company under the 
direction of Hongqiao Business District Management Committee. Land revenues 
were used to finish infrastructure facilities and develop post-project land as well as 
repay bank loans, based on the conventional strategy of rolling development. (.See 
5.4.1) In this way, banks, investors from the public and private sector as well as 
Minhang District Government all benefited from the land leasing. The Hongqiao 
Business District Management Committee, pilot of the Hongqiao project, is made up 
of about 75 staff, who have been seconded from Shanghai Municipal Government, 
from Minhang District Government and, in a few cases, from other district 
governments.  
 
Private investors clearly benefit as one of the main participants in the urban growth 
coalition. Investors from the private sector, alongside developers from the public 
sector, are leasing land to build office towers in Hongqiao. When the office towers 
are built, they rent out office space or sell the property to private investors, who 
become owners either of whole buildings or of properties within them. They get 
profits from rising prices for property and from office rentals.  
 
Local government also benefits from the improved image of the city and lucrative 
land leases, this being the main driving force for local governments that actively 
organise and participate in urban growth coalitions. However, I also see that some 
local authorities benefit more than others. Minhang district, for example, has had to 
supply a lot of land to the project and carry out difficult tasks of coordination in the 
process of relocating villagers. Because of difficulties in negotiations with villagers 
and resulting complications, the position of some local government officials has 
been put in question. The clear losers from the project are the relocatees and the 
local communities who in effect make their own contribution in providing land for the 
Hongqiao project and other similar developments. Local residents are forced to 
relocate to make room for the development project, but they are not consulted and 
their interests are taken for granted, resulting in serious complaints (see Chapter 7). 
Therefore, clearly not all partners are equal in the delivery and results of this mega 
urban project. Organisations and politicians and officials higher up in the hierarchy 
are set to benefit the most while those lower down have to shoulder criticism or find 
themselves deprived of their land. There are also enormous environmental costs 
from the demolition and construction work as well as from the generation of new 
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travel to the area. These issues however are never considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 The main participants involved in the land-based urban growth coalition in 
the Hongqiao project. 
Source: Interviews D2011120602 
 
The first element to bear in mind from this discussion of the Hongqiao land-based 
urban growth coalition is that land has given the coalition a sharp focus, and 
converting this fixed asset into the maximum rent has become the chief aim of the 
project with other aims dependent on this. A second important feature is the uneven 
nature of the coalition, where not all actors benefit equally and, in fact, the success 
of the overall project is based on the unequal nature of roles and returns. It can be 
seen from Figure 6.6 that the main participants in the urban growth coalition -- the 
Shanghai Municipal Government, Shenhong Company and Hongqiao Business 
District Management Committee -- are closely associated with land development 
and the conversion of rural land to urban land. Land development and place-making 
in the west of Shanghai is the motivation for governments at various levels to form 
this coalition, and they are the ones set to gain the most; banks and investors on 
the edge of the coalition have shared aims with governments and have benefited 
from the projects through land development. However, for Minhang District 
Government and Xinhong Township Government, the coalition is a mixed blessing; 
Minhang District Government has given up much land, which has then been turned 
over to the jurisdiction of Hongqiao Business District, while newly established 
Xinhong Township Government shouldered the responsibility for taking care of 
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landless villagers. Neighbouring districts have also benefited from rising land 
values, government investment in transportation and investment opportunity 
brought on by the project.  
 
6.5 Intra- and inter-urban competition and the creation of a new CBD for the 
Yangtze River Delta 
 
Shanghai Municipal Government has placed great expectations on the Hongqiao 
project. From a regional perspective, the Hongqiao project was designed to become 
the new CBD for the Yangtze River Delta. From a local perspective, the project was 
expected to lead development in the surrounding districts. The Hongqiao project 
has brought large amounts of investment, not least because it offered preferential 
measures, which was a key factor behind the influx of investment. Meanwhile, the 
project has also brought much financial support from the central and Shanghai 
municipal governments. Alongside the landmark buildings already mentioned in this 
thesis, another such project is the Convention and Exhibition Centre, which is 
intended to lift the image of western Shanghai and serve as a focus for business in 
the YRD. All the time, Shanghai Municipal Government is attempting to learn the 
lessons of Pudong, just as Hangzhou Municipal Government did in planning its new 
CBD (Qian, 2011). Such large-scale projects have brought great opportunity to 
other areas not only in the west of Shanghai, but also in other cities of the Yangtze 
River Delta. Districts surrounding Hongqiao aim to take a slice from the 
opportunities afforded by the Hongqiao development. This will inevitably lead to 
intense competition between these districts in terms of attracting investment. In 
addition, the functional orientation of Hongqiao business district is to become the 
regional centre for the modern service industry. This has led to similar plans being 
drawn up by nearby cities such as Hangzhou, Nanjing and Suzhou, and in 
particular, Huaqiao business district in nearby Kunshan. As a result, Hongqiao 
business district is facing fierce competition from within and beyond the region, and 
this will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
6.5.1 Competition from core cities of the YRD 
 
Shanghai has been facing regional competition from the core cities in the YRD, 
particularly since the start of the period of reform. The cities surrounding Shanghai 
relied on Shanghai‟s skilled labour and flows of capital and information through the 
city to develop manufacturing industries in the 1980s. Suzhou is an example, with 
the development of its manufacturing sector being hastened through the 
employment of retired engineers from Shanghai on part-time contracts (Interview 
G2012062101). With a deepening of reform, these cities competed with increasing 
intensity to attract global investments in the field of manufacturing relying on 
preferential policies and cheaper land compared to Shanghai. Shanghai was 
somewhat powerless when it came to competing with these cities for investment 
due to the limited amount of undeveloped land. This competitive relationship 
reached a peak in 2005 when the classic 173 project was launched by Shanghai 
Municipal Government in the face of intense competition to attract FDI (see Chapter 
3.4). Since then, Shanghai Municipal Government has implemented a new 
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industrial policy of withdrawal from the low-end manufacturing sector and promotion 
of tertiary industries (tui er jin san) in an attempt to upgrade its industrial level. 
Competition in the manufacturing sector has become less important, and 
competition has gradually given way to cooperation between Shanghai and the 
cities of the YRD (Li and Wu, 2012). Meanwhile, other core cities in the YRD are 
facing pressure to upgrade, and the development of modern service industry has 
become the favoured policy, intensifying regional competition in this sector.  
  
Nanjing and Hangzhou have not missed the opportunity to develop their central 
business districts to promote the development of service industries. Nanjing 
Government had been planning to establish and build its own city region. This was 
promoted by Li Yuanchao, former party secretary of Jiangs Province and now state 
vice president (Luo et al., 2010).  A new district called Hexi was established, its 
location equivalent to that of Hongqiao business district, and its function also being 
to develop a modern service sector. The same situation exists in Hangzhou. 
Hangzhou has expended much effort to attract company headquarters to settle in 
the newly planned Binjiang district as shown in Table 6.8. This competitive urbanism 
has been stoked by the involvement of several tiers of local government. 
 
Table 6.8 Competition from core cities in the YRD. 
Cities Positioning  
Huaqiao International 
Business District in Suzhou 
Aim was to construct an international service industrial park 
and become service centre for areas in and around the west 
of Shanghai 
Nanjing Hexi New District Development of central business district in Nanjing city region 
Hangzhou New District Forming a central business district to attract companies to 
locate there 
Source: Interview G2012062101. 
 
6.5.2 Competition from surrounding districts in Shanghai 
 
The establishment and development of Hongqiao business district has been treated 
both as a threat and an opportunity by surrounding districts in the west of Shanghai. 
Even before construction started on the Hongqiao project, Jiading district was 
already facing pressure from Huaqiao in Kunshan in terms of attracting investment. 
This competitive pressure was sharply increased when Hongqiao business district 
was established in 2009. Equally, surrounding districts have seen it as a 
development opportunity not only by improving transportation infrastructure, but 
also by bringing in capital investment and preferential policies (Interview 
G2012062101). The implementation of the “tui er jin san” industrial policies 
discussed in the previous section is treated as a “hard index“ to evaluate the 
economic and political performance of the head of each district (Interview 
G2012062101). This helps to explain the intense round of construction of business 
districts in and around Shanghai. Each administrative district appears intent on 
developing its own business district. There were already six business districts with 
the same functional orientation in Shanghai when Hongqiao business district was 
established, as shown in Table 6.9 and Figure 6.7. This has resulted in fierce 
competition among these business districts in terms of attracting investment. The 
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aims and functions of Hongqiao Foreign Business Zone in Changning, Putuo 
District Changfeng Ecological Business Zone and Minhang Qibao Ecological 
Business Zone are almost identical to that of Hongqiao Business District. To take 
the example of Changning‟s Hongqiao Foreign Business Zone, Changning District 
Government has been taking advantage of Hongqiao transport hub to develop 2.7 
square kilometres in the west of the district near Hongqiao business district. To this 
end, the head of Changning district has been coordinating a joint development 
strategy with Hongqiao business district while attempting to focus on Changning‟s 
own interests (Interview G2012072904). All are competing to attract companies in 
the services sector. 
 
In addition, more intense competition for Hongqiao comes also from Pudong New 
District and, in particular, Lujiazui in the centre of Pudong. The functional orientation 
of Lujiazui is as a financial centre, but since planning controls were not strictly 
enforced in the process of construction, like the rest of Pudong it now has a variety 
of functions (Olds, 1997). Based on conditions today, the functional repositioning of 
Pudong New District means that the Hongqiao project more or less aligns itself to 
Pudong, with large numbers of office towers built in each district to attract modern 
service companies. In particular, an area of 26 square kilometres in Pudong New 
District is planned to become the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. Central government 
has issued a series of preferential policies to support the development of the free 
trade zone in an attempt to attract modern service corporations. Special funds as 
part of a national comprehensive pilot scheme for the modern service sector were 
also available for Pudong. In summary, Hongqiao business district has been facing 
fierce competition from surrounding districts and beyond.  
 
The district that stands to lose most is Minhang. Minhang district has provided 12.8 
square kilometres for the construction of Hongqiao business district, and, as we 
have seen, this has resulted in the loss of a lot of development space and land 
resources for the district itself. Minhang has been excluded from the preferential 
policies and support afforded to Hongqiao and so, inevitably, Minhang district has 
not been able to compete in terms of attracting investment and business (Interview 
D2011120602). Although new planned areas in Minhang district next to Hongqiao 
business district (including Minhang Qibao Ecological Business Zone) have not yet 
ushered in much development, given its current limit of 27 square kilometres of 
development land, it is inevitable that Hongqiao business district will expand. This 
expansion is anticipated by Minhang District Government, whose officials fear that it 
will suffer the fate of “losing its wife as well as losing its soldiers” (pei le fu ren you 
zhe bing) (Interview G2012062101). More specifically, Minhang district is concerned 
that it will be merged with and swallowed up by Hongqiao business district as 
happened to Nanhui district, which was merged into and swallowed up by the more 
powerful Pudong New District in 2009. Minhang‟s concern and fear of being merged 
has led to intense competition between Hongqiao and Minhang districts. As a result, 
Minhang District Government has itself adopted a series of preferential policies 
such as providing special funds for “the adjustment of industrial structure [and] 
transformation of development mode” (Minhang District Government, 2012) in an 
attempt to attract company headquarters. 
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Table 6.9 Competition from surrounding business-oriented districts 
Established and newly 
planned business centres 
Function and positioning  Companies sought 
Hongqiao 
Foreign-related 
Business Zone 
in Changning  
Hongqiao 
Foreign 
Business 
Centre 
Functional orientation 
highlights the following 
characteristics: "international, 
business, culture." 
Business enterprises and 
Multinational procurement 
headquarters  
Zhongshan 
Park 
Business 
Centre 
Commercial, leisure and e-
commerce  
Commercial enterprises, media 
companies 
Hongqiao 
Airport 
Economic 
Zone, 
Changning 
District 
Modern service sector Company headquarters, logistics 
enterprises, information services 
and other high-tech enterprises 
Minhang Qibao Ecological 
Business Zone 
International Ecological 
Business Park with emphasis 
on cultural and creative 
industries 
Cultural and creative enterprises, 
company headquarters  
Xincheng International 
Ecological Business District, 
Songjiang District 
"Eco-business" as the 
dominant function, alongside 
an urban complex with 
functions of financial and 
cultural entertainment, 
business services and other 
functions  
Business, finance, culture and 
entertainment 
West Hongqiao commerce and 
business gathering area, 
Qingpu District 
Convention and exhibitions as 
the focus, business dominated 
Convention and Exhibition 
service industry, distribution 
service industry headquarters 
economy, modern financial 
services industry as well as 
creative industries for the five 
leading industries  
West Shanghai Business Zone 
in Jiangqiao, Jiading Distrist 
Productive service gathering 
area 
Regional headquarters of 
multinational corporations, 
domestic enterprises R & D 
institutions and purchasing 
centre 
Putuo District Changfeng 
Ecological Business Zone 
Modern service gathering area Corporate headquarters, regional 
headquarters  
Source: (Hongqiao Business District, 2013). 
 
The paragraphs above can only begin to give a sense of the intensity of competition 
among the various districts within the west of Shanghai and administrative entities 
on the Jiangsu side of the provincial border, such as Kunshan in Suzhou, and 
further afield, Nanjing and Hangzhou, capital of Zhejiang Province. There is, one 
might say, an epidemic of construction of CBDs in the YRD (Gaubatz, 2005). 
Significant, too, is the fact that central and municipal government plans for Pudong 
and Hongqiao are treated in a somewhat cavalier fashion by the relevant district 
governments that appear prepared to attract companies regardless of whether they 
belong to the requisite sector. Thus, just as Pudong New District was happy to 
accept companies to locate in Lujiazui Finance Zone regardless of whether they 
were in finance, so Hongqiao Business District Management Committee has 
solicited companies from any and all sectors, not just the higher order service 
sector. Finally, it is worth observing too that, as with Changning District Government 
and its Hongqiao Foreign Business Zone, attempts are made to hide the 
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competitive urbanism behind a semblance of cooperation. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Location of established and newly planned business districts in Shanghai. 
Source: Author. 
 
6.6 Conclusion: Powerful and entrepreneurial local government as the main 
driving force behind the project 
 
This chapter has examined the governance mechanism and structure and, in 
particular, the relationship among public agencies, private corporations and 
organisations responsible for the process of the construction of the Hongqiao 
project within what I have called the land-based urban growth coalition. As I have 
shown, the official management organization known as Shanghai Hongqiao 
Integrated Transport Hub Project Construction Headquarters and the state-owned 
Shenhong Company played a crucial role in the early stages of the project, while 
the other official organizations, especially the Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee, have come to play the predominant role in the process of 
construction of Hongqiao business district. In the two phases of construction of the 
Hongqiao project, although different governing bodies have been in charge of the 
project, it is evident that powerful and entrepreneurial local government has been 
and remains the driving force. 
 
One interesting conclusion is that I can actually observe more than one coalition 
being formed and it could be more accurate to talk about shifting coalition alliances 
as the requirements of the project change. So at different phases I have seen 
different constellations of actors coming together. Thus I can talk of a land-
assembly coalition, a funding coalition, a displacement and relocation coalition, a 
policy and planning coalition and an investment attraction and promotion coalition. I 
can see these as different shapes of a fluid and malleable coalition which has land 
at its centre and Shanghai government at the top of the coordinating hierarchy. This 
concept is examined in more detail in Chapter 8. 
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The Hongqiao development model is centred on land development, which relies on 
appreciation in the value of the land. What is critical for entrepreneurial government 
is to achieve an appreciation in land value in the process of land transformation 
from rural land to urban land. Meanwhile, the main players in the urban pro-growth 
coalition -- local government, developers, banks and local officials – 
have all achieved their aims in the process of transformation of land use, but 
relocated residents and villagers have lost out. Local government in the form of 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee gets converted land that can 
be leased to potential developers, which is the most reliable source of revenue. As 
we have seen in Chapter 5, there were 17 plots of land to be leased in the first 
phase of development of the core area of Hongqiao business district which have 
brought land premiums of more than 20 billion RMB for Hongqiao business district. 
More importantly, the Hongqiao project has transformed the image of the west of 
Shanghai, which is a significant political and economic achievement for leaders of 
the Shanghai municipal and Hongqiao district governments.  
 
The land premiums have allowed Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee to have money to pay interest on bank loans, and, most importantly, the 
revenue from land leases has enabled the rolling development model to function 
successfully. In addition, property developers have also benefited from the 
Hongqiao project, having obtained auctioned land and built on it office towers and 
luxury property in the spring tide of rising property prices. Even though there was a 
slowdown in property price rises between 2010 and 2012, the trend of rapid growth 
resumed in 2013. Banks, as providers of funds, also take a slice from the 
construction wave in the new district, maintaining high financial returns through 
incoming interest payments. Shenhong Company, as the established governing 
body in the process of construction of the Hongqiao project, uses the converted 
land as collateral to get loans from five banks. Banks have a high level of 
willingness to grant loans to Shenhong Company because the loans are 
guaranteed by local government in the shape of Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee. This is despite the fact that the management committee 
faced some difficulties in paying interest on bank loans on time in 2012 because 
high land prices and rising housing prices in previous years had inhibited the 
willingness of investors and local residents to buy housing. The ripple effect was 
caused by property developers hesitating to buy leases for new plots, which curbed 
growth in land revenues for local government (Interview G2012072904).  
 
The higher price of leases led to soaring property prices for housing in Shanghai. 
Commodified housing has become increasingly unaffordable for Shanghai 
residents, which has resulted in regulation and control policies issued by central 
government. These regulations and policies have led to restrictions on the sale of 
housing in Hongqiao, affecting land lease auctions on the primary land market, 
which ultimately affects local government's fiscal revenues. As a result of the 
financial crisis and regulation policies from central government, Hongqiao Business 
District Management Committee has had to face the pressure that stems from a 
reduction in financial revenue. These pressures have been considerable given the 
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size of the investment in infrastructure in Hongqiao. Government policy on these 
matters is a hotly debated issue, not least because of the local government debt 
crisis it is engendering. This has given rise to debate about how to achieve 
sustainability in this kind of development model. With rising prices for housing, 
normal residents cannot afford housing, and it is more difficult for local government 
to lease converted land to developers. The Hongqiao project continues to face 
funding pressures, and this has slowed down the pace of construction.  
 
The Hongqiao project has faced criticism from three perspectives. Firstly, the whole 
position of Hongqiao Business District has been criticised because the project 
involves the construction of a central business district with large scale office towers 
and luxury properties being built, resulting in the same landscape and orientation as 
Pudong and its central business district of Lujiazui. Given the amount of surplus 
office space that exists in Shanghai, it is questionable as to whether it was 
necessary to construct a new CBD in Hongqiao (Interview S2012070101). 
Secondly, with two existing railway stations in Shanghai, and particularly in view of 
the fact that Shanghai South railway station was just finished in 2006 (the other 
being Shanghai‟s central station), it has been argued that the capacity of the two 
railway stations was sufficient to meet the needs of economic growth. The new 
Hongqiao high-speed railway station has also exacerbated traffic congestion 
between the city centre and the west of Shanghai (Interview S2012070101). Finally, 
the Hongqiao project has been criticized as a vanity project planned as a result of a 
lack of investment-driven projects for Shanghai Municipal Government once the 
development of Pudong was complete. With urban regeneration, public 
infrastructure facilities and Shanghai Expo in place, Hongqiao has been seen as the 
engine for economic growth.  
 
Nevertheless, the Hongqiao project has made rapid progress so far even in the face 
of criticism and funding constraints. Entrepreneurial leadership and urban planning 
have played an active role not only in the construction of Hongqiao, but also in 
Pudong and other developments in and beyond the west of Shanghai. Local 
government has been the driving force behind the Hongqiao project, not least 
through the greater role it has played in marketing. Because the Hongqiao project is 
led by local government and state-owned companies, the voice and interest of the 
main players in this urban growth coalition has been given priority, but those who 
contributed most to the project have been ignored by local government. The 
relocated local residents were a vulnerable group among the players involved in the 
Hongqiao project; the power of the state in its various forms perhaps made it 
inevitable that the voice of local people was not heard, and their interests ignored in 
the process of relocation. As a result, relocated residents have been complaining, 
and this has created concerns for the authorities. The questions of what the 
relocation and compensation mechanism is, what relocated residents got and lost in 
the process of relocation, and what their expectations and concerns were before 
and after relocation will be fully examined in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7  
Displacement and relocation for Hongqiao‟s local residents 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The Hongqiao transport hub has become a landmark set of buildings standing in 
the heart of Shanghai‟s newly planned urban centre and has witnessed huge 
passenger flows with 182.01 million in 2011 using the transport hub since its 
inauguration in 2010. During this period, Hongqiao business zone has been in the 
process of intensive construction. The project has had a profound impact on the 
west of Shanghai – on its landscape, economic development and urban spatial 
structure. The project is a huge national project, as mentioned in Chapter 5, which 
has also affected a large number of local villagers, urban residents and small and 
medium-sized factories and companies, which have been forced to make room for 
the project. The Hongqiao project involved the acquisition of 17.7 square kilometres 
and the demolition of all that stood on this land, including a total of 11 villages made 
up of 76 smaller communities, involving more than 11,000 residents, 4000 
households and over 1700 enterprises as shown in Figure 7.1. This represented a 
new demolition and relocation record for Shanghai (Interview A2012122804). In 
addition, 7 schools located in the affected area were moved, which resulted in 5800 
students having to change schools. In particular, the greatest sacrifice has been 
made in the early stage of construction by local residents who have been forced to 
relocate to make way for the project. Compensation too is a vital factor, not only for 
relocated villagers, factories and other relocatees, but also for the local government. 
It is important to note that two types of compensation exist in China – one for 
permanent residents with an urban hukou (household registration system) and a 
lower level of compensation for those with a rural hukou. Although the area of 
Hongqiao in which they lived was becoming increasingly urbanised, the local 
residents retained their rural hukou. This will be discussed in more detail in section 
7.2.  
 
As for the relocatees, their future lives hinge upon compensation to a large extent. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that relocated villagers and local residents have been 
hugely concerned about the compensation mechanism and have had both deep 
fears and high expectations for the relocation. Meanwhile, local government has 
been trying to find ways to reduce the cost of relocation and resettlement of 
residents. Because the project budget is fixed and compensation is deducted from 
the budget for the whole project, the amount of compensation payments directly 
determines the funds available for the project thereby affecting its progress. 
Compensation, therefore, has become the principal concern of local government. 
 
Due to the importance of compensation payments in the project, disbursement of 
compensation funding has involved various stakeholders. Relocated villagers are 
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the most vulnerable group and at the bottom of the compensation distribution 
mechanism. As they are contributing land for the project, the compensation 
mechanism and disbursement of compensation funding is a crucial step in the 
preparation land for the project. These are, therefore, important elements within the 
project, and a study of compensation mechanisms forms an important part of the 
current research.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Original site of relocated villages 
Source: Author. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 6, Shanghai Municipal Government is the main supervisor in 
the project, directing the work of Minhang and Changning districts, which, along 
with Shenhong Company, have shouldered the specific practical task of 
disbursement of compensation funding (Interview G2012062101). Under the 
supervision of Shanghai Municipal Government, an agreement was reached 
between Shenhong Company and Minhang and Changning districts; the core of the 
agreement is chaiqian dabaogan (literally, to take overall responsibility for land 
expropriation), an approach which has been commonly used in other cases of 
relocation (Interview G2012072904). Under chaiqian dabaogan, Shenhong 
Company pays compensation for collective land at a price of 1.4 million yuan per 
mu to Minhang and Changning district governments and, in return, obtains the 
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converted land. The district governments are responsible for the completion of land 
acquisition for Hongqiao project and the process of relocation, and for issues of 
compensation and resettlement after relocation, in particular, helping relocated 
villagers in terms of arranging job opportunities, pensions and medical insurance for 
relocated villagers (Interview G2012080807). The role of the district governments 
here on the western outskirts of Shanghai is the normal role that district or 
municipal governments play in relocation projects, reflecting the practice of land 
expropriation, relocation and compensation that has become the conventional 
approach throughout the country.  
 
The Hongqiao project is located in contiguous areas of Minhang and Changning 
districts. Most of the area from which residents were removed is located in Huacao 
township within Minhang district, which provided 98 percent of the land, with the 
rest provided by Changning district.  As the local district government of Minhang 
has been in charge of the operation of compensation funding, compensation 
payments were allocated to the bank account of Minhang District Government, then 
were used to provide resettlement housing, pensions and medical insurance and 
compensation for relocated villagers. The compensation payments were allocated 
at a ratio of 3:3:4 among the main players -- Minhang District Government, Huacao 
Township Government and the villagers, who thus obtained 40% of all 
compensation funding (Interview G2012080305). The relocatees were removed to a 
set of new apartment blocks in the brand new settlement of Aibo Community (see 
Chapter 6), expressly built for the relocatees.1 Aibo Community is located not in 
Huacao township, but in Xinhong township, which is a newly established sub-district 
government organization, also in Minhang district, and is responsible for relocated 
villagers who resettled in Aibo Community (Table 7.1). The actual work of relocation 
was undertaken by a number of state-owned companies specialising in relocation 
projects, as explained in more detail in section 7.4.  
 
In my interviews with villagers, relocated villagers were concerned that 
compensation payment would be withheld from them by the different tiers of local 
government. They were worried that their interests would be ignored and that they 
would be embezzled, reflecting concerns that were voiced by villagers interviewed 
by Lynette Ong in Anhui Province (Ong 2014). These concerns lie at the heart of 
the questions that this chapter will examine -- the relocation and compensation of 
existing residents in the Hongqiao area, what was lost in the process of relocation 
and what they received through compensation. In particular, the chapter will report 
the results of interviews with relocatees and reflect on a comparison of their lives 
before and after relocation. The material in this chapter is derived from the 
interviews I undertook in Hongqiao (see Chapter 4), as well as the questionnaire 
survey (see Appendix) undertaken by myself and a team of students from East 
                                            
1  Aibo literally means “I like World Exposition,” in reference to the World Expo held 
Shanghai in 2010, in time for which the Hongqiao transport project was completed.  
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China Normal University in Shanghai. Full details of the research methods were 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Before going on to discuss details concerning the relocation, the chapter begins 
with a brief introduction to the key players in the Hongqiao project: Shanghai 
municipality, Minhang District Government, Huacao Township Government, local 
officials, relocated villagers and village leaders. While migrants were severely 
affected, their voice and interests were ignored, and so they cannot be considered 
key players. From the perspective of Shanghai Municipal Government, the project 
was planned as the biggest transportation hub in China with a central business 
district that would transform Shanghai‟s spatial and economic structure.  
 
While Minhang District Government and Huacao Government are the principal 
players in the project, the attitude of their officials towards the project differs. 
Officials of Minhang District Government have been facing huge pressures both 
from Shanghai Municipal Government and from local affected villagers and factory 
workers. Minhang district has had, unwillingly, to provide 12.8 square kilometres of 
land for the project involving hugely expensive land purchases for which they did 
not get any grants (Interview G2012062102); and it is also undertaking the 
expensive task of disbursing compensation for relocatees, who have remained in 
the jurisdiction of Minhang after relocation. Huacao Township Government is 
directly in charge of the relocation process under the supervision of Minhang 
District Government; they have faced huge pressure from higher tiers of 
government as well as relocatees. Relocated villagers delivered any complaints to 
Huacao Township Government officials, who thus had to handle procedures and 
rebut complaints on behalf of Minhang District Government (Interview 
G2012080305). The local township officials teamed up with village leaders to 
supervise the process of relocation, assess the value of new housing, conduct 
negotiations over compensation and encourage villagers to move. It is important to 
note that some local officials and, of course, the village leaders were among the 
relocatees and were themselves recipients of compensation. Some of them 
admitted to me that they benefited most from the relocation not only because their 
jobs were enhanced, but also because they are enjoying the benefits of housing 
compensation (Interview A2012122804). In addition, the project has given them a 
good opportunity to be promoted.  
 
Both the interviews and the questionnaire survey focused on officials from Minhang 
district and Huacao Township Government and villagers. This is because it would 
not have been easy for me to track relocated factories and migrant workers, many 
of whom moved to other cities and even other provinces because they were without 
a local hukou. Relocation compensation was mainly focused on local relocated 
residents and villagers, and it is to them, for the most part, that my research was 
directed. However, this tactic did mean that the voices of a number of other 
protagonists were not heard. Neither the spouses of villagers and migrant workers, 
in particular, nor the owners and managers of industrial and commercial 
establishments were consulted. Some of the migrant workers who rented rooms in 
the area were themselves employees of the local factories, but they could only lose 
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from the project as they were not in line to be offered any compensation at all, 
whether monetary or in kind.  
 
Indeed, the interests of migrant workers have been ignored in the demolition and 
relocation of urban villages throughout peri-urban China. No affordable and 
convenient housing has been provided for them, not to mention relocation 
compensation (Wu et al., 2013). Next to the migrant workers, relocated villagers are 
the most vulnerable groups in the process of relocation. They get compensation for 
their housing and land, but even though many of them were given more than one 
apartment in Aibo Community and often as many as three apartments, they did not 
see this as full compensation for their loss. What they gained and what they lost will 
be fully discussed in section 7.4. Even local officials have admitted that villagers 
have sacrificed a lot for the project and their interests have been ignored by local 
government (Interview C2012072902). Relocated factories owners have had 
difficulty even in winning some monetary compensation in the process of relocation. 
Since many factory owners rent the factory buildings from local villagers and village 
committees, the owners of relocated factories were not able to sign contracts to get 
compensation. 
 
It is clear that the project has become an opportunity for Shanghai Municipal 
Government and village leaders rather than Minhang district and Huacao Township 
Government, let alone the relocated villagers, who have suffered most among 
players in the project. 
 
This chapter follows a temporal logic. Section 7.2 reviews the conditions under 
which people lived before relocation. This is followed in section 7.3 by a discussion 
of the displacement process: negotiating compensation and relocation between the 
state and residents. Diverse views and expectations on the relocation process are 
explained in section 7.4. The chapter moves to an appraisal of the extent and 
nature of the impact of the Hongqiao project on surrounding areas. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the project‟s balance sheet. 
 
7.2 Life before Hongqiao project in Minhang: Huacao‟s environment and 
villagers‟ lives  
 
Before discussing the impact of the project on relocated villagers, a review is 
needed of the conditions that displaced villagers had enjoyed previously. It is 
important to understand the lives of former residents in Hongqiao before their 
relocation and the arrival of the Hongqiao mega project. We can do this by looking 
at three perspectives: the environment for everyday life, living conditions and their 
income situation prior to relocation. All people displaced by the Hongqiao project 
came from Minhang district, most of them from Huacao township. They were all are 
compensated and resettled in Aibo Community.  
 
Before the development of the Hongqiao project, Minhang district in the far west of 
Shanghai had been peripheral to the economic development of the city; it was a 
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suburban area with a low rate of urbanisation. Huacao, as one of 12 townships 
within the jurisdiction of Minhang district, was semi-rural and semi-urban, 
characterised by a mix of a large number of small- sized collectively owned 
factories and scattered settlements, urban villages on the fringe of Shanghai. There 
were two main reasons for the relative under-urbanisation of this area. Firstly, the 
presence since 2003 of Hongqiao Airport restricted the urbanisation of the 
surrounding area due to a height limit on buildings, noise pollution and poor 
transportation around the airport (Interview G2012062101). Secondly, due to these 
unfavourable circumstances, investment from public and private sectors and 
preferential policies of government at various levels did not reach this relatively 
isolated area in the spring tide of construction and development in Shanghai in the 
years since 1980 (Interview G2012080305).  
 
These unfavourable factors severely constrained urbanisation in the area. This is 
mirrored in the category of household registration of the residents I surveyed. The 
overwhelming majority of residents held rural hukou (as can be seen in Table 7.1), 
with only a minority of 6% holding urban hukou before relocation, although it should 
be noted that relocatees were given urban hukou after relocation. Therefore, we 
have to see the requisitioned area in Huacao township before the strategic mega 
project of Hongqiao as semi-rural, with many small private and collectively owned 
factories scattered around in villages.  
 
Table 7.1 What is the category of your household registration? 
Hukou categories Frequency  Percentage % 
Rural Hukou 324 94.2 
Urban Hukou 20 5.8 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
In other words, Huacao contained a number of urban villages 
(chengzhongcun).These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.4.2, but it is 
important to recall that urban villages of this nature are characterised by a mixture 
of land use: factories, farmland and scattered villages as shown in Figure 7.2, which 
gives some impression of what Hongqiao looked like, with a mixture of farms and 
small-sized enterprises. The factories had originally been relocated to Hongqiao as 
a result of inner-city regeneration in Shanghai around the year 2000 when a large 
number of factories were moved out from the city centre to peri-urban areas. In this 
way, Hongqiao gradually became a resettlement site for small and medium 
enterprises. According to what local people told me, Huacao township was seen by 
relocated factories as favourable compared with other suburban and peri-urban 
districts because of cheaper land prices and rents and the advantage of relative 
proximity to the city centre. With the increasing number of factories moving to 
Hongqiao, Huacao township can be considered to have been a typical Shanghai 
village-in-the-city, somewhat different from equivalents in the Pearl River Delta and 
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in Beijing. These differences stem from its location on the outskirts of the city rather 
than in the inner city and from the fact that rather than requisitioning farmland and 
leaving the housing intact, the Shanghai authorities demolished the housing and 
expropriated the farmland. Parts of the local rural land were rented by several 
village committees to private factories for the construction of factory buildings, while 
other parts were used for vegetable farming by local villagers (Interview 
C2012072902). Their land, whether used for farming or factories, boosted the 
income of local villagers and was their main source of income. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Urban villages of this nature are characterised by a mixture of land use: 
factories, farmland and scattered villages. The buildings in this photograph 
were demolished as part of the Hongqiao redevelopment 
          Source: Huacao Township Government. 
 
The living environment in the requisitioned areas of Hongqiao can be characterised 
as a chaotic environment with a high population density, poor education and 
healthcare facilities, narrow streets and deficient public space. One important 
aspect, which had repercussions for the compensation process, was the 
densification of the area due to the building of “extra-legal” housing in the 
compounds (zhaijidi) of villagers‟ housing for the accommodation of the floating 
population of migrant workers attracted by the arrival of factories, as shown in 
Figure 7.3 (Chung, 2010). As explained above, the increasing number of factories 
in Huacao township provoked an influx of floating workers attracted by new job 
opportunities and demand for rooms to rent increased dramatically. The lack of 
planning or response from the local state to provide housing was gradually filled by 
the local villagers who started to build or expand housing (generally upwards) on 
their own farmland without land-use planning and government permission. This was 
confirmed by my interviews with villagers, with almost 90% of local villagers relating 
that they had built extra housing for rent by the time of relocation, and with some 
families earning more than 10,000 RMB each month (Interview C2011012201). 
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What is more, the fact that these were recognized as illegal buildings by Minhang 
District Government caused considerable controversy in the process of relocation in 
terms of compensation (Interview G2012080807) (see Wu, 2004, for a discussion of 
these issues). Importantly, the building of this extra housing on the villagers‟ own 
land became crucial in generating income to support villagers‟ living cost. Indeed, in 
this they have been successful in the sense that many have received more than 
one apartment in Aibo Community (Interview G2012080807).   
 
 
Figure 7.3 The white house visible in the middle ground of this photograph, rented 
out to migrants, was built in the courtyard of the red brick house on the left 
          Source: Huacao Township Government. 
 
Interviews with villagers confirmed that their houses had been the most important 
thing for them. The condition of their houses directly reflected their economic and 
social status in the village, which not only gained them respect, but also enhanced 
their children‟s marriage prospects; if they had nice houses, it would be much 
easier for their children to get married favourably. Many houses were multi-storied 
and well decorated, which, as our survey showed, accounted for a large part of the 
household income.  
 
According to our survey, over 90% of respondents had houses with more than two 
storeys, and 31% of all respondents had built houses that had more than four 
storeys (Table 7.2). Houses had been a large part of their household wealth, an 
important source of income for them through rents. The houses in which they 
actually lived were large, some of them very large; 77% of interviewees had a total 
floor space of more than 200 square metres (Interview P2012072101) (Table 7.3). 
This is larger than the size of an average Shanghai family house – average per 
capita living space in Shanghai is 15.5 square metres according to 2003 data 
(Interview G2012081106). 
 
These densely populated buildings have not only produced considerable income, 
but have also generated a series of problems as a result of diminished public space, 
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narrowed roads and lack of proper drainage and waste disposal systems, resulting 
in a living environment that is dirty, chaotic and unhygienic as shown in Figure 7.4 
(Interview P2011011003). Although the living environment had dramatically 
deteriorated as a result of the many small rooms built by villagers in their 
compounds for renting, local residents were reluctant to be relocated and resettled, 
as we will see.  
 
 
Figure 7.4 The messy environment of a requisitioned area. 
Source: Huacao Township Government. 
 
Table 7.2 Size of housing belonging to families in Huacao town before relocation. 
Categories         Frequency Percentage 
Bungalow       4 
 
1.20 
Two-storey building 126 
 
36.60 
Three-storey building                                 74 
 
21.50 
Four-storey building 106 
 
30.80 
Private housing  8 
 
2.30 
Other     26 
 
7.60 
Total     344 
 
100.00 
                               Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
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Table 7.3 Size of floor space in houses belonging to families who faced relocation. 
Size of housing 
m2
 
Frequency Percentage 
＜100  14 
 
4.10 
100-150  20 
 
5.80 
150-200  46 
 
13.40 
＞200 264 
 
76.70 
Total  344 
 
100.00 
                                 Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
In our survey, we asked villagers about their main source of income prior to 
relocation. Answers revealed that the main source of income for villagers was from 
farm production and house renting. Table 7.4 reveals that for 62% of respondents, 
agricultural produce was the top income-generating activity, followed by housing 
rental, which was the top income source for 48%.2 Factory work was the main 
source of income for 45% of respondents. These answers show that Huacao used 
to have a rural profile, but with many residents earning considerable income from 
renting housing built on their farmland and working as accountants and lower-tier 
white-collar employees in factories. The younger generation was more likely to be 
working in factories; the older generation in farming. According to my interviews 
with villagers, when it comes to gender, women were more likely to be working in 
factories compared to men. In addition, 15% of respondents in the survey chose as 
their main source of income land dividends, yearly payments from the village 
committee to villagers whose land was rented out and had factories built on it 
(Table 7.4). Our survey shows that these four were the main income sources, well 
above the others, and this was confirmed by the results of my interviews with 
villagers and local village leaders.  
 
 
 
                                            
2  Based on my observation and conversations with local officials and villagers, I would 
suggest that these data, while broadly correct, are not totally reliable. I suspect that some 
villagers were inflating their income and floor space in the hope that I would pass on 
information to government so that they could get more compensation.   
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Table 7.4 What was the main income source for your household prior to relocation? 
Factor 
  
Frequency Percentage 
Farm production 214 
 
62 
Factory work 156 
 
45 
Professional activities 4 
 
1 
Land dividends 50 
 
15 
Business 
  
26 
 
8 
Self-employed business 20 
 
6 
Housing rental 164 
 
48 
Other 
  
8 
 
2 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
Planting and selling vegetables and housing rental were the main income sources 
for many villager households in Huacao township. Gradually, farming made way for 
renting land for factory buildings; with increasing numbers of small and medium-
sized factories appearing, more and more agricultural land was transformed into 
industrial usage, which in turn brought large numbers of migrant workers to 
Hongqiao who themselves needed rental accommodation. Due to their relatively 
low salaries, migrant workers could not afford the high price of commercial housing 
and housing rented from villagers became their only choice. In this, Huacao was no 
different from any other village-in-the-city (Wang et al., 2009). This accommodation 
had the further advantage of being conveniently located. Villagers‟ households, with 
their many spare rooms and „self-built‟ houses (zijianfang) and factories, were living 
a lifestyle for which they were referred to as landlord ladies, a literal translation of 
the Chinese baozupo, a term that vividly displays the nature of local villagers‟ lives 
(Interview C2012072902).  
 
Villagers who lived in Huacao township not only enjoyed some of the benefits of 
urban residents in Shanghai, but also benefited from their villagers‟ status before 
relocation (Interview C2012072902). Shanghai Municipal Government provided 
various subsidies for agricultural production. In addition, the influx of small and 
medium-sized factories from the city centre to Hongqiao brought job opportunities, 
flows of capital and migrant workers (Interview C2011012201), and this had all led 
to a dramatic boost in the incomes of many villagers before relocation, as was 
shown by the results of my interviews and answers  to questions concerning annual 
household income. The result of the survey reveals that 21% of households had 
incomes exceeding 50,000 RMB (Table 7.5). In particular, some villagers had 
monthly incomes from rental activity exceeding 100,000 RMB, a very substantial 
sum of money. 
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Table 7.5 How much was the total annual income of your whole household prior to 
relocation? 
Income standard (RMB) Frequency Percentage 
0-10,000 68 
 
19.77 
10,000-20,000 92 
 
26.74 
20,000-40,000 82 
 
23.84 
40,000-50,000 30 
 
8.72 
≥50,000 72 
 
20.93 
Total  344 
 
100.00 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
Based on the evidence given in interviews and questionnaires, it can be concluded 
that former villagers had a prosperous life, but in overcrowded poor living conditions 
in Hongqiao. It can be well-imagined that former villagers were reluctant to move 
when they had become accustomed to this way of life, but they were still in a 
vulnerable position when it came to facing compulsory relocation. In the following 
section we deal with the start of the process of compensation and relocation. 
 
7.3. The displacement process: Negotiating compensation and relocation 
between the state and residents 
 
7.3.1. The displaced / relocatees 
 
Despite their reluctance to move, the relocatees had no other choice but relocation 
to make room for the Hongqiao project. The relocatees were settled in five villages 
of the new Aibo community which go by the name of Aibo village 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
(Interview D2012072801). In terms of the compensation and relocation process, we 
can think of all these displaced people in terms of four groups according to the 
category and origin of their hukou and whether they are residents or own a 
commercial business.  
 
The following describes each category that was affected differently by the 
compensation mechanisms:  
 
1. Villagers (by far the majority) who have rural hukou and „owned‟ their land 
(or, to be more precise, had a 30-year contract to farm the land) and houses 
2. Urban residents who have an urban hukou of Shanghai and who did not 
own land, but might have been living in houses bought on the open market  
3. Migrants who did not have a Shanghai hukou and migrated in from 
elsewhere and lived in precarious accommodation offered by the villagers 
and, for the main part, worked in local factories  
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4. Factory and business owners who might or might not have been local, but 
who rented the premises from the village committee 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, the first group (villagers) is the most important as it 
is the most numerous (around 11,000), and these villagers are the ones who stood 
to lose the most. The second category, urban residents, is much smaller, and the 
compensation mechanism for these residents is standardised across Shanghai. For 
the floating population (group 3), as explained in Chapter 4, it is difficult to track the 
numbers and migrants‟ situations; they did not get any compensation as, indeed, is 
the case with migrants generally in China. The authorities were less concerned 
about factory workers as many were migrants without local hukou registration in 
Shanghai. As for the factory/business owners (group 4), they were given financial 
compensation for relocation, but their factories were not expected to be relocated 
into the Hongqiao area (because of its service-oriented function). As for the land 
where their businesses were located, compensation was negotiated between the 
village committee and the relocation companies (see below for an explanation). 
 
7.3.2. Negotiating compensation 
 
Displacing, compensating and relocating over 11,000 residents and workers is a 
hugely complex process undertaken by various arms and branches of the state. 
The diagram below is a way of showing the different state agencies and other 
actors involved in the process. It also shows the flow of resources and money and 
the purchase of land (see Figure 7.5). The main actors in this process were: 
Minhang District Government, Huacao Township Government, Hongqiao project 
headquarters, a series of relocation and negotiation “arms-length” bodies set up by 
Minhang District Government, village committees, and Xinhong street committee, 
which, as we saw in Chapter 6, was responsible for social issues in the Aibo 
Community after relocation. In the following paragraphs we explain the different 
activities and functions that all these state actors undertook.  
 
We can think of these actors involved in the complex process of relocation in 
various phases. First came a sort of consultation phase, involving the diffusion of 
information and propaganda trying to convince villagers to move. This was followed 
in order by measuring up land and housing size, negotiation and bargaining, 
agreeing compensation, relocation to temporary housing, start of construction, 
choice of house type, and finally the first moves to new Aibo Community in July 
2009. 
 
In order to promote the relocation scheme, a series of preparatory tasks was 
undertaken by Minhang district and Huacao township governments. The relocation 
headquarters for Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub were established by Minhang 
District Government on 11 April 2006. This was made the command centre for the 
relocation and displacement of local villagers and factories. A relocation team with 
650 officials from various departments of Minhang district and village “leaders” was 
established and divided into 12 groups, with each group allotted to one of the 
villages to be displaced (with one group working on two villages). These were called 
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“relocation working groups” (chaiqian gongzuo xiaozu). Each group was in charge 
of collecting land and housing information from the affected villagers‟ families and 
companies. This involved the controversial process of measuring up and agreeing 
on the size and dimensions of the land and properties of the villagers and factory 
owners so that a compensation fee could be agreed. The relocation working groups 
were established with two aims. The first aim was for the state to duplicate itself, 
create branches and arms-length bodies to handle the complex task of demolition. 
The second aim was for this to act as a “shield” or cushion to deal with the 
problems of the villagers and protect officials at higher levels.  
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Figure 7.5 Relocation agencies of Hongqiao project 
Source: Author. 
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When relocation decisions are made by Shanghai municipality, despite the fact that 
they are core stakeholders, local residents generally are not allowed to participate 
in the process of decision-making. There was, however, initially a process of 
diffusion of information and propaganda. The process of displacement started with 
a reaching out by the state towards the affected residents, informing them of the 
situation and trying to negotiate. In order to promote the benefits of relocation, three 
open letters were sent, one each for affected local villagers, factory owners and 
migrant workers, in order to encourage them to leave. The letters to local villagers 
stressed the benefits of becoming urban residents in the new modern living 
quarters and public facilities of Aibo.   
 
After four months of preparation, collecting information and persuasion, Minhang 
District Government officials started the relocation project.  A mobilization meeting 
was held by Minhang District Government on 18 August 2006. Shen Jun, Deputy 
Mayor of Shanghai Municipal Government, attended the meeting, indicating the 
importance that the city‟s government placed on the task of relocation; the meeting 
marked the establishment of the relocation headquarters of Hongqiao Integrated 
Transport Hub. In the meeting, Party Committee Secretary of Minhang district was 
nominated as head of the relocation headquarters, of Huacao Township 
Government as well as of the 12 relocation groups. Members of these various 
offices and groups were seconded from Minhang District Government, from Huacao 
Township Government and from village committees. Minhang District Government, 
as the authority most directly responsible for the relocation project, was in charge of 
relocation. However, the brunt of the relocation project was gradually shifted from 
Minhang to the relocation headquarters of Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub, with 
Huacao Township Government undertaking the major task of relocation under the 
aegis of the relocation headquarters. 
 
The first working meeting of the relocation headquarters was held on 24 August 
2006 to mobilise villagers. One of the 12 relocation groups was assigned to each of 
the relocated villages. Public propaganda meetings were then held in each village 
to introduce the process of negotiation around displacement, compensation and 
relocation. In addition, some promotional materials about the benefits of demolition 
and relocation were distributed in the villages to persuade villagers to leave. After 
those public meetings, relocation group teams negotiated with relocated villagers 
on a household level with each household head and factory owner.  
 
In the process of relocation, Minhang District Government adapted a strategy of 
“divide and rule” (see Huang Xuan‟s work [2014] on social welfare reform in China 
for a similar appraisal). Relocation working groups negotiated with household heads 
on a private basis rather than negotiating publicly with the villages as a whole. The 
amount of compensation for each family was kept confidential; villagers were not 
allowed to publicise their compensation payments.  Relocation working groups had 
households due for relocation sign secret deals. In addition, “relocation rewards” 
were promised to families who moved early to private housing -- before, that is, the 
new Aibo settlement was completed. Families, therefore, faced pressure to sign 
relocation contracts early. In this way, relocation working groups completed the 
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demolition tasks, and any resistance from households to be relocated was 
weakened. This process makes clear how families were „dispossessed‟, allowing 
the state and its agents to „accumulate‟ the land which they were then able to 
translate into a massive urban development that they fully expected to be profit-
making. 
  
The urgency of the relocation task was driven by the need to have the Hongqiao 
transport hub operating in time for the opening of Shanghai Expo on 1 May 2010. 
The relocation had to be finished within the prescribed period in 2009, so the initial 
moves to win villagers over, undertaken by Minhang District Government shortly 
before it handed over duties to Huacao Township Government, were of particular 
importance. Great play was made of the fact that local villagers would be resettled 
in the purpose-built  Aibo Community, which had the important advantage of being 
very near to the Hongqiao hub, thus assuaging villagers‟ concerns that they might 
be relocated far away from their former homes as has frequently happened in 
Shanghai (Interview G2012062102). Secondly, Minhang Government published the 
community planning provisions, which portrayed the internal structure of the 
resettlement housing in order to let relocatees have a real image of their new 
housing. This step played a significant role in convincing villagers to accept the 
relocation (Interview G2012080807).   
 
Local officials in Huacao township told me that, in order to dispel the doubts of 
those families who took up its offer early on, Minhang District Government promised 
that compensation levels would not be increased for those who relocated later on. 
After this series of active steps had been adopted by Minhang District Government, 
the task of relocation was finished within four years from the start of relocation in 
August 2006 (Interview G2012072904). All relocatees who signed a contract 
obtained their resettlement flats before or during 2010. In addition, eight households 
refused to sign a contract because they were dissatisfied with the relocation 
compensation. Those eight household have been protesting for their compensation 
and appealing to Shanhgai Municipal Government and even central government. 
So far, there is no agreement between them and Minhang District Government 
(Interview C2012072902). The project of displacement and relocation was 
managed by different state actors in different ways and assuming different roles. 
While the responsibility for the relocation project stayed at the top of the hierarchy 
(Minhang District Government), the actual „dirty‟ work of communicating with 
residents and negotiating compensations was passed down the chain to purposely 
created arms-length agencies, with Huacao Township Government inserted into the 
relocation headquarters of Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub, which was the main 
arms-length agency. These purposely created agencies effectively acted as buffer 
zones or cushions softening any conflicts or complaints from residents vis-à-vis the 
more senior officers in Minhang district.  
 
In the following section we present the results of my findings regarding expectations 
and concerns of villagers. 
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7.4 Villagers‟ expectations for the relocation process 
 
Once local residents got to know that they were to be relocated, they harboured 
expectations as well as many concerns. Villagers strongly desired to be settled near 
the project site and to receive full compensation. Mainly based on my survey 
questionnaire, this section examines these issues, firstly, in terms of their general 
expectations and secondly, in terms of their expectations more specifically for the 
compensation.  
 
7.4.1 Diverse views and expectations towards the relocation process   
 
The process and decisions on relocation were inherently conflictive with different 
state actors involved in the project having one set of views and local residents 
holding different expectations. In this section we discuss these varied views and 
expectations to show the complicated negotiating process. 
 
In our fieldwork all surveyed residents said that they would have preferred to stay at 
home rather than be relocated even to a better living environment. However, given 
the lack of choice, our survey showed that the greatest desire of relocated villagers 
was to be settled near the project site so that they could enjoy the benefits of 
redevelopment, and this is what they expected. Throughout the process, however, 
they felt that their interests were in danger of being ignored due to their weak 
position. In my interviews, local villagers complained that their voice was not being 
taken seriously by Minhang District Government. 
 
The issue of where to relocate the local residents displaced by the mega project 
was one that generated controversies between different state actors, clearly 
showing that the state does not act with one voice. Planners from Minhang district 
and Shenhong Company did not necessarily share the villagers‟ views as to where 
they should be relocated. For these planners, it was better if relocated villagers 
could be resettled far away from Hongqiao for the following reasons. Firstly, the aim 
of the Hongqiao project is to develop a service-dominated economy and attract 
high-end urban elites and regional headquarters of large corporations. The 
resettlement of villagers in the vicinity would not match the aims of the project for 
the repositioning of the area. Secondly, the construction of a resettlement 
community would occupy large tracts of land and this would affect government 
revenue from land leasing. Finally, construction of resettlement housing would not 
fit with the planned of construction of luxury property in the business district 
(Interview G2012062101). 
 
However, based on the views from higher up the ladder, Minhang officials in the 
relocation working group who were in charge of the task of relocation decided that 
the relocatees should be resettled nearby the Hongqiao project for two main 
reasons. First of all, the desires of villagers to be relocated nearby should be 
respected as many of the relocatees had been living in the district for generations. 
They stood to lose too much, officials felt, if they were relocated far away (Interview 
G2012080807). Linked to this, it would be more difficult to finish the task of 
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relocation in the limited time available if villagers' main desires were rejected as 
they might resist. Secondly, concern was stated by local officials in internal 
discussions that relocating them far away in suburban districts would lead to a loss 
of compensation funding for township governments and local village committees in 
the area of Hongqiao as these funds would go to the “host” township government 
and local officials in that area. Local officials in Huacao township, while expecting 
compensation benefits from their management of the relocation, instead found 
themselves with the prospect of unexpected trouble in the form of complaints and 
protests from relocatees (Interview G2012080807) unhappy about moving far away. 
In the end, after a lobbying campaign, their views were accepted by officials of 
Minhang district.  
 
Here we can see therefore that there were conflicting opinions from different state 
actors about where the displaced residents should be relocated. Ultimately, officials 
higher in the hierarchy managed to impose their views and although the residents‟ 
views were respected this was mainly to appease local officials and keep up the 
strict timescales of the project. Another important factor was to avoid those high 
officials‟ reputation being tainted by residents‟ complaints. 
 
Once it became clear that there was no choice other than to move out, the villagers‟ 
next step was to try to get as much compensation as possible. In the following 
section, we explain the complex process of compensation, and then we go on to 
discuss the negotiation process and the expectations and fairness issues. 
 
7.4.2. The compensation mechanism and villagers‟ concerns about their 
future 
 
7.4.2.1 Compensation mechanism and negotiations 
 
We have already discussed the relocation process and the role of various agencies. 
Compensation is a crucial incentive encouraging residents to relocate. In the 
following text, this will be discussed from the perspective of types and standards of 
compensation; this relates to the different types of relocatees that we have 
identified in section 7.2. It is worth stressing here that the whole relocation project 
had to be kept below the figure of 1.4 million RMB per mu that the dedicated state 
agency Shenhong Company had given Minhang district. Therefore, officials from 
the relocation working group had to try to keep relocation costs down, and 
compensation to villagers was the main “cost” that was open to being cut.  
 
In the case of the Hongqiao project, compensation was divided into two categories 
that villagers could choose from: monetary compensation (cash) and “in-kind” 
replacement accommodation in the purpose-built compound of Aibo. Our survey 
shows that the vast majority of villagers (91%; Table 7.9) chose housing 
compensation over cash compensation for the following reasons.  Firstly, this was 
the choice strongly encouraged by the state. Minhang District Government 
encouraged relocatees to choose “in-kind” housing relocation (over cash) because 
they feared that it would become a burden to the government if compensation 
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payments were squandered by relocatees, causing social instability and public 
order problems; to convince them, through the compensation mechanism, Minhang 
government offered them reduced housing prices to buy more space in the 
resettled community (Interview D2012072801). Secondly, Shanghai‟s house prices 
were rising year on year (and still are at the time of writing). Villagers could expect 
their assets to continue rising in value. Furthermore, the price of a resettlement flat 
was much lower than the price of a private flat in the surrounding area, and this was 
one of the biggest motivations for relocatees to choose in-kind compensation rather 
than monetary compensation. Lastly, and most importantly, because of the way 
compensation was calculated, many villagers actually received more than one 
property in the new Aibo resettlement community. This was a crucial incentive as 
they could be sure their new housing would bring them a steady stream of rental 
income, which would compensate for their loss of housing rental due to demolition 
and relocation.  
 
Relocatees received either urban or rural levels of compensation for their housing 
depending on their hukou status. The area affected by the project was a mixed 
urban-rural area, which included rural residential housing, factory buildings and 
some urban housing. When it came to demolition and relocation, relocatees 
obtained compensation according to their hukou registration. The vast majority of 
relocatees were villagers and received compensation for their land and house 
based on the rural compensation standard; a minority of relocatees were urban 
residents and only received house compensation based on the urban standard. 
 
Compensation for relocated companies and manufacturing establishments came in 
monetary form. Companies had almost no bargaining power with which to negotiate 
with the local government, which is why commercial outlets and factories were 
relocated in the first stage, with Minhang District Government helping companies to 
find new locations.  
 
Compensation for villagers was by far the most important and difficult issue to 
calculate and negotiate. Even though most of the compensation was in fact in the 
form of a new home in the resettlement community in Aibo, there were complicated 
calculations to work out including exactly how much space villagers would be given 
in their new homes, which as we said normally resulted in more than one flat being 
allocated. Shanghai Municipal Government‟s compensation standards are relatively 
low, so in order to encourage villagers to relocate, the incentive mechanism 
mentioned earlier in this chapter was used by district government. There were, as is 
normal in Shanghai, two different mechanisms for calculating house and land 
compensation, with the incentives representing a third (including, that is, the 
incentives): house compensation (assessment at a unit price) and assessment 
according to type of land using land expropriation compensation standards. We 
explain these in more detail below and in Table 7.6. 
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Table 7.6 Compensation mechanism of relocation in Hongqiao project 
Mechanisms for 
compensation 
Itemisation 
House compensation  Compensation for housing for a certified area; compensation for 
household decorations and appendages; compensation for the 
replacement of equipment, incentive fees and costs of 
transportation 
Land expropriation 
compensation 
standards                                                                                                   
Paddy fields, dry land, vegetable fields, ponds and homesteads 
Assessment Unit Price 
of villagers‟ housing 
Depending on whether steel and concrete composite structure, 
brick and concrete structure, or brick and wood structure 
Resettlement housing 
“quota” 
Based on the following indicators: the size of the original dwelling, 
the size of the household, and the demographic structure of the 
household 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
1. House compensation. This breaks down into four different areas: compensation 
for housing for a certified area (in other words, excluding extra-legal additions 
of floor space), compensation for household decorations and appendages and 
compensation for the replacement of equipment (such as farming equipment). 
Housing compensation was calculated through the following formula: 
Assessment Unit Price + 1480 RMB (Minhang District land use rights base 
price) + 761 RMB (price subsidies) × certified construction area of the 
demolished houses (Interview G2012062102). The Assessment Unit Price is 
an important factor affecting housing compensation; it is assessed according to 
housing type, for which housing is divided into three categories, and further 
sub-categories are formed based on the quality of housing and its architectural 
structure as shown in Table 7.7 (Interview C2011012201).  
 
Table 7.7  Assessment Unit Price of villagers‟ housing in Hongqiao project 
Housing categories Compensation standard 
Steel-concrete composite structure 510 
Brick and concrete 
structure 
Level 1 383 
Level 2 340 
Level 3 298 
Brick and wood structure 
Level 1 272 
Level 2 238 
Level 3 205 
Unit: RMB per square metre 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
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2. Types of land compensation. In the Hongqiao project, the relocation subsidy 
was based on the relocation regulations drawn up by Minhang district and 
Shanghai municipal governments. Land was divided into five categories 
(Interview D2012072801): paddy fields, dry land, vegetable fields, ponds and 
homesteads (land used for building housing). Relocated villagers received land 
compensation according to the categories in which their land fell but only taking 
into consideration legally built land. The land compensation standard for paddy 
fields, dry land, vegetable fields, ponds and homesteads was set at 24,544, 
15,619, 34,213, 24,685 and 22,581 RMB per mu respectively as shown in 
Table 7.8 (Interview D2012072801). Compensation levels for land 
expropriation were low and failed to reflect the future value of the land for the 
time when the land would be put on the market (Table 7.8). Compensation, 
here, was calculated on the basis of rural land. However, after rural land was 
converted to urban land, the value of the land increased hugely to at least 100 
million RMB. This provoked frequent complaints from relocated villagers, who, 
in order to get more compensation, gathered in front of the offices of Huacao 
and Minhang governments to protest. In order to put pressure on local 
government, relocated villagers protested in Hongqiao Airport terminal for their 
less compensation in 2012. 
 
3. Incentive fees to relocate. Relocated villagers complained to me in 
conversations that the level of house and land compensation based on the land 
and housing compensation standards shown in Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 was 
too low. It was, indeed, clearly the case that compensation standards were low 
compared with market property prices of 7000 RMB per square metre in 2007. 
In order to encourage relocated villagers to move, Minhang District 
Government offered some relocation subsidies and rewards (for example for 
agreeing to move earlier) and costs of transportation to lure villagers into 
relocation (Interview D2012072801). 
 
Once villagers had signed the contract agreement for relocation, compensation 
payments were sent to a bank account jointly set up by Minhang district and 
relocated villagers. The relocatees were then able to buy their quota (in terms of 
square metres) of resettlement housing at the preferential price of 3000 RMB per 
square metre using compensation payments. The quota itself was derived from an 
assessment made by the demolition company based on the following indicators: the 
size of the original dwelling, the size of the household and the demographic 
structure of the family member. The bigger the size of the housing and the greater 
the size of the household, the larger the quota of resettlement housing families 
were able to purchase. My interviews with village leaders and villagers revealed 
that relocated villagers tried to get as many flats as they could.  The quota for some 
relocated families was less than 260 square metres, but they nevertheless bought 
additional floor space at a higher price of 4200 RMB per square metre (Interview 
C2011012201). According to my survey of villagers, 90% of interviewees ended up 
with three flats from local government.  Any remaining money in villagers‟ accounts 
was returned to them as cash; local government officials were keen to ensure that 
relocated villagers did not use up all their compensation funds before buying their 
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new house (Interview D2011122303). 
 
Table 7.8 Land expropriation compensation standards 
Land 
categories 
Compensation standards 
Sum Remark Compensation 
fee for land 
Resettlement 
fees 
Subtotal 
Compensation 
fee for crops 
Paddy field 11220 12623 23843 701 24544 
annual 
output 
value of 
1402.5 
Dry land 7140 8033 15173 446 15619 
annual 
output 
value of 
892.5 
Vegetable 
field 
15640 17595 33235 978 34213 
annual 
output 
value of 
1955 
Pond 11220 12623 23843 842 24685  
Homestead 
(land used 
for building a 
rural house ) 
11220 11361 22581 / 22581  
Unit: RMB 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
Table 7.9 Choice of compensation method 
   Frequency  Percentage 
Monetary compensation                                    30 8.72  
Off-site housing compensation 314 91.28  
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
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7.4.2.2 Compensation negotiations and questions of fairness 
 
Compensation was the most vexed issue in the process of relocation for villagers, 
and monetary and housing compensation were the most important part of the whole 
compensation package, directly affecting their future lives. According  to local 
officials and village leaders, the question that villagers most frequently asked 
Minhang District Government officials was “how much compensation funding can 
my family get based on the compensation standard” (Interview D2011122303). In 
addition, local villagers had been worrying about how many flats they could get from 
relocation and were confused by the evaluation process employed by local 
government. When I interviewed local villagers, they told me that the evaluation 
form was so complicated that they were totally confused and remained so even 
after receiving explanations from local officials. As for housing compensation, the 
number of flats they could expect to get was the most practical problem when it 
came to the complicated evaluation standards. 
 
In my survey, villagers were asked what they expected most from the relocation. 
They were asked to pick factors of pre-eminent importance from a list. 
Compensation before and after relocation and future income resources were the 
top two choices, reflecting villagers‟ expectations. 80% of interviewees chose 
compensation before and after relocation as being of pre-eminent importance, while 
67% chose income as the item of pre-eminent importance from among the other 
factors as shown in Table 7.10. As we have seen in the section above the 
compensation mechanisms and levels were very complex. The attempt of relocated 
villagers to obtain higher compensation levels was countered by local government 
and relocation agencies wishing to reduce the cost of relocation compensation. 
While relocates clearly harboured a variety of expectations, others paled beside 
their concerns over future income and job opportunities. 
 
 
Relocated villagers were also concerned by issues of fairness around 
compensation; they tried to compare the compensation payments that they 
received with those of their neighbours. This was stressed to me by my 
interviewees and was confirmed by the results of the questionnaire. As can be seen 
from Table 7.11, 82% of my interviewees chose fairness of compensation when 
asked the question: “What factors affect your evaluation of the work by officials in 
the process of relocation?” The level of relocation compensation was chosen by 
170 interviewees, while 138 out of 344 interviewees chose the attitude of 
government officials working on the project, directly reflecting relocatees‟ concerns 
over relocation. Because the resettlement site was fixed and announced before 
relocation, the distance between resettlement housing and original house and the 
assessment of house value were of less concern to relocatees and were only 
chosen by 16 and 72 interviewees out of 344 respectively. 
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Table 7.10 Relocatees‟ expectations for the results of relocation: The most important 
factors  
Factor    Frequency Percentage 
Compensation  274 79.66 
Job opportunities  120 34.88 
Income    232 67.44 
Housing    104 30.23 
Living environment  60 17.44 
Purchase power   72 20.93 
Infrastructure  48 13.95 
Relations with neighbours  30 8.7 
Healthcare  126 36.62 
Education  70 20.34 
Welfare for the elderly 142 41.27 
Other   20 0.58 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
Table 7.11 What factors affect your evaluation of the work by officials in the process 
of relocation? 
Factors      Frequency Percentage 
Attitude of government officials working on the project  138  40.11  
Fairness of compensation    282  81.98  
Level of relocation compensation standard 170  49.41  
The distance between resettlement housing and original house 16  4.65  
Assessment of house value  72  20.93  
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
  
Because of the lack of transparency and the individualistic way in which the 
compensation was negotiated, there were further worries from villagers around the 
timing of when to finally agree to sign the compensation contracts.  Villagers 
worried that the earlier they signed their contract, the less compensation they would 
receive and so they held back. This wait-and-see attitude was countered by 
Minhang and Huacao governments, which initiated their incentive policy. Relocated 
villagers signing a contract within a fixed period of approximately two years were 
able to bank on obtaining relocation subsidies and rewards; villagers who waited 
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lost out on the reward. This proved to be a device that successfully nudged villagers 
towards signing (Interview C2011012201). Relocated villagers also complained to 
me of unfair compensation treatment because, they claimed, those local officials 
from Huacao township government and villager leaders who were also relocatees 
won more compensation. In particular, they criticised village leaders for getting a 
greater number of flats through relocation.  
 
Another point of discontent was how much of the compensation would be actually 
left after paying for the new housing and resettlement. When I interviewed local 
villagers, more than 60% of interviewees told me that they received between 0.9 
and 1.1 million RMB in their special bank account for relocation compensation. 
They claimed that after payment for their new dwellings, there was not much money 
left over. Villagers also found that a lot of money was needed for resettlement in 
Aibo Community. Decorating their new flats accounted for a large proportion of 
compensation funds, as shown in the results of my survey.  Table 7.12 shows that 
63% of survey respondents regarded “apartment furnishing” as the principal use of 
their compensation funds among a selection of other factors, including establishing 
a business, saving for the future, marriage ceremony for their children, buying a car 
and other consumption items. 
 
Table 7.12 Principal investments methods of relocated villagers with compensation 
funds 
Response   Frequency % 
Apartment furnishings                  216  62.79 
Establishing business  0  0 
Saving for the future                          18  5.23 
Marriage ceremony for your children                      12  3.49 
Buying car and other consumer goods                  10  2.9 
Other    88  25.58 
Total     344  100 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
After spending on decorating their flats, many families found that there was not 
much money left. What they obtained was only newly decorated flats. That is why 
many relocated villagers complained that relocation had brought nothing for them 
but a new urban house of the type that can be seen in Figure 7.6, while they had 
lost their old house, which was a source of income (Interview D2011122303). 
 
The level of compensation for land was determined by many factors and hinged on 
location, quality and category of the land to be expropriated, and the level of local 
economic development. The area where the villagers came from was a rural area 
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with, therefore, rural collective land; the compensation standards applying to rural 
land were applied, lower than for urban land.  
 
At the heart of my investigation was the question of the extent to which villagers felt 
they had lost out from this relocation process or whether, alternatively, they felt they 
had gained something. The answer to this question, of course, depended on 
expectations and diverse views from the displaced residents themselves and state 
officials, based on the kind of compensation mechanism used. Officials in Shanghai 
have tended to argue that many relocatees in cases of big urban projects can get 
well paid in cases of private-led development and relocation, and indeed that 
private development and relocation has been treated as an opportunity to get rich 
by many local residents (Interview D2011120602). This can be seen, for example, 
in the property-led redevelopment project in Taipingqiao, central Shanghai (He and 
Wu, 2005). My fieldwork aimed at establishing this point by surveying local 
residents and analysing the compensation mechanism.  
 
When I interviewed villagers, the question “Is relocation an opportunity to get rich?” 
elicited a very different picture from that painted by the officials. Villagers told me 
that they had lost out through the process of relocation as they had lost a good 
standard of living due to the income they derived from rent and land dividends. 
They had lost their source of income when they were relocated; relocation was, 
therefore, not an opportunity but a big loss. This view is confirmed in Table 7.13, 
which shows 88% disagreeing with the statement that relocation is an opportunity to 
become prosperous. 
 
Table 7.13 Is relocation an opportunity to become prosperous from your perspective 
and in your experience? 
  Yes No No response Total 
Frequency 26 302 16 344 
Percentage 7.6 88 4.4 100 
Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
An important point to bear in mind in contrasting this sense of loss stated by our 
surveyed villagers to views expressed by officials is that compensation levels were 
lower because the relocatees had been occupying rural land. In interviews with 
villagers it was clear that they regarded the compensation and relocation process 
as less beneficial than the one that normally takes places when residents are 
compelled to move out of inner-city areas. In densely populated urban areas, after 
compensation residents are often able to move away from very crowded housing 
conditions towards better housing options in the periphery because of higher 
compensation rates. This gap in compensation rates has been even larger in 
projects such as Xintiandi, the renowned commercial gentrification project 
discussed in Chapter 2 (He and Wu, 2005). The differences between the 
displacement and relocation process in urban and rural areas are clear. Firstly, as 
holders of rural hukou, villagers had their own house, bigger and more comfortable 
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than that of urban residents in inner city areas, who often live in cramped back alley 
houses or flats. Secondly, unlike for relocated villagers, urban residents can 
generally retain their jobs, and even where they cannot, they are covered by the 
urban social security system. For relocated villagers, their house and collective land 
is their crucial source of livelihood. It is not surprising, then, that 81% of local 
villagers in the survey chose to answer „no‟ when asked the question: “Did you wish 
to be relocated.” This explains why villagers in the Hongqiao project area were far 
less willing to move than those in the city centre regeneration projects. 
 
Having dealt with expectations and problems in terms of compensation for villagers, 
it is also worth exploring the situation for factory workers and owners. Factories and 
shops were relocated in the first stage of relocation. Factory owners and 
shopkeepers had similar concerns about where would they be relocated and how 
much they would receive in compensation funds. While agreeing on a 
compensation rate created difficulties, the real concerns were around new sites for 
these factories and compensation for the time they could not work during the 
relocation. However, the process of forcibly relocating them was easier because the 
government could put pressure as a result of their illegal land status and sometimes 
of previous incidences of tax evasion (Interview G2012080807). The relocation 
process was individually negotiated and the factories were dispersed across 
various townships in Minhang and other Shanghai districts, but none of them were 
relocated to the Honqiao business zone because they did not fit the high profile of 
this project. Most of the smaller shopkeepers lost their businesses. Relocated 
small-sized enterprises were encouraged by Minhang district to move to other 
townships in the district rather than other districts in order that Minhang could retain 
its tax revenue base. Some relocated migrant workers left for other places to find 
jobs, while others followed the move of their factories, but by definition it is hard to 
track their movements. Some students were incorporated into other schools in 
Minhang district, while the children of migrant workers went elsewhere following 
their parents. 
 
7.4.3 Living in the new Aibo Community 
 
7.4.3.1 The new urban living environment 
 
After signing contracts for compensation and relocation, most villagers had to find 
temporary housing in the open market with part of the financial compensation they 
received. The elderly were given state accommodation provided by Minhang District 
Government. The temporary accommodation lasted at least three years. Because 
resettlement housing in the Aibo Community was at least three years off completion, 
in the course of construction relocated villagers were forced to rent house and get 
income to support their families (Interview D2012072801). Once the housing was 
complete, relocated villagers and their families returned to a place close to where 
they had been living, but without land and a source of income -- and in a completely 
different environment. 
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Figure 7.6 The blocks of flats of Aibo Community 
Source: Author. 
 
We have discussed what villagers won and lost from an individual and family 
perspective, above. Here we will discuss it from the perspective of the whole 
community. Since the first batch of relocatees settled in 2009, Aibo Community has 
become fully equipped with physical  and social infrastructure and is now a newly 
built modern residential community that appeared in the north-west corner of 
Hongqiao business district. There are more than one hundred 13- storey buildings 
in the five villages of the Aibo Community. Most of them are organised more or less 
in the same way as the former villages so that villagers still live next door to their 
former neighbours. Based on the results of interviews and my survey in the Aibo 
Community, a majority of relocated villagers admitted that their living environment 
had improved compared to what it had been, and they were satisfied with their new 
flats. The Aibo Community is equipped with various facilities which are normally 
only to be found in gated communities in urban areas. Fitness facilities and green 
spaces have been provided by local government, and an activity centre was built for 
relocatees for weddings and other ceremonies. 
 
These and other facilities were also designed to attract other, non-relocatee 
residents to the Aibo Community. Initially the first phase of the Aibo Community was 
built to house the relocatees. As we know, villagers got more than one flat so many 
of them started to sell and rent their secondary dwellings on the open market, 
bringing new people attracted by new employment opportunities in Honqiao project.  
A second phase was designed and started in 2013 to attract new urban residents 
with higher incomes and educational backgrounds to create a mixed community 
(Interview P2011011003). First, a new good-quality high school affiliated to 
Shanghai Foreign Language University was moved to Aibo Community, greatly 
improving the quality of educational provision in the surrounding area. Second, due 
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to a relatively high proportion of elderly people, a nursing home was built to cater 
for senior citizens, as well as a market and some hotels. In addition, a number of 
public government agencies were located in Aibo Community. For instance, a 
building for the new Hongqiao Township Government was built here, as well as a 
police station and hospital, which were moved from the surrounding area. In terms 
of transportation, a bus service linking Aibo to the city centre and other townships of 
Minhang district was established and the Hongqiao transportation hub was built. All 
in all, I was left in no doubt both by relocated villagers and village leaders that the 
living environment in Aibo Community was superior to that which had been left 
behind. 
 
7.4.3.2 Nice flats but no jobs  
 
In this section, the impact of the Hongqiao project on the life of relocatees will be 
examined in terms of income, living standards, housing and the living environment. 
The biggest changes from before relocation can be characterised as reduced 
income, more convenient transportation, improved living environment, and fewer 
job opportunities. Each of these factors will be discussed separately in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
In my survey, we asked the question “What is the biggest change brought by 
relocation for you?”, providing factors for respondents to choose from. The most 
common positive answer was convenient transportation, followed by improvement 
in living environment. However, over half gave reduced income as an answer.  The 
figures in Table 7.14 show a majority of positive answers over those who saw the 
negative consequence of reduced income, but not by much (approximately 6%), 
and this probably is simply a reflection of the choices that were listed.   
 
Table 7.14 The biggest change brought on by relocation. 
Response    Frequency  % 
Convenient transportation               122 35.47 
Improvement in living environment 82 23.89 
More job opportunities                    0 0 
Increased income   10 2.9 
Reduced income                             192 55.81 
Other      48 13.96 
                          Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
Interviewees tended to respond that they could live without advanced facilities, but 
not without jobs and rental income. When comparing their lives before and after 
relocation, villagers maintained that they were more concerned about their income 
- - Chapter 7- 
173 
 
and job opportunities as sources of livelihood rather than about improving the living 
environment. 
 
In order to find out what respondents thought had changed for the better and for the 
worse, a question was included in our survey allowing respondents to choose 12 
factors from different perspectives. Respondents were asked to choose between 
the  categories  “much better,” “better,” “same,” “worse” and “much worse” when 
compared with conditions before relocation. No one answered “much better” for 
their income after relocation; although the most important improved factor was 
infrastructure, in general few factors were highlighted. Table 7.15 shows the results 
for respondents choosing “much better,” “better” and “worse” among these factors. 
The view expressed by local officials in interviews, not surprisingly, was rather 
different. They argued that Shanghai Municipal Government and Hongqiao 
Business District Management Committee spent a lot of effort and money on 
investing in transport infrastructure to create convenient connections between 
Hongqiao hub and the city centre by underground and highways (Interviews 
P2012072101). At the current time of writing, there are two underground lines 
linking Hongqiao to the city centre with a further two planned, and two highways 
have been completed since the inauguration of the transport hub in 2010.  
 
While there is no denying that great progress has been made in Hongqiao in terms 
of transport infrastructure, there are a number of reasons why relocated villagers do 
not feel the progress in terms of better transport links. First, Aibo Community was 
planned and built in the northwest of Hongqiao hub some distance from the 
underground stations and the highways (see Figure 7.1). Second, a majority of 
relocated villagers still choose bus as their means of transport, and their choice for 
shopping is neighbouring Huacao township rather than the city centre. As for the 
choice of “better” after relocation, some 41% of respondents chose infrastructure as 
the highest ranking, followed by welfare, environment for daily life and education, 
which were chosen by 40 %, 38%, and 34% of respondents respectively, as shown 
in Table 7.15. 
 
When relocatees were asked what factors were worse after relocation, the number 
one factor (51%) was the compensation subsidy, followed by income and job 
opportunities, with 40% and 27% respectively, findings that were confirmed in my 
interviews with local villagers. We can conclude that relocated villagers were keen 
to receive more compensation to support their lives. The level of compensation was 
their biggest concern before and after relocation, even more than having a good 
living environment after relocation. 
 
After relocation, relocated villagers lost their land and housing, which means they 
lost their source of income. When asked the question “What is the greatest difficulty 
for your household after relocation?”, it can be seen from Table 7.16 that 68.6% of 
the surveyed respondents chose “less income” as their greatest problem after 
relocation, followed by “worse standard of living” and “fewer job opportunities,” with 
percentages of 22.09 and 16.86 respectively. 
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Table 7.15 The percentage of respondents answering "much better," “better” and 
“much worse” among the selected factors 
(N=334) 
Factor  Much better   Better Much worse   
Compensation subsidy after relocation  0 5.23 50.58  
Job 0.58 3.49 26.74  
Income  0 9.89 40.12  
Housing 2.33 21.51 13.95  
Environment for daily life 1.16 37.8 7.56  
Level of consumption 2.33 15.12 17.44  
Infrastructure 5.88 44.77 3.45  
Relations with neighbours 1.16 11.63 9.88  
Healthcare 0.58 21.51 2.9  
Children‟s education 1.16 33.72 1.74  
Welfare 0 39.53 15.7  
Other 0 2.9 4.65  
 Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
Table 7.16 What is the biggest problem in your present life? 
Response   Frequency % 
Less income                                    236 68.6 
Worse standard of living 76 22.09 
Inconvenient life  32 9.3 
Fewer job opportunities  58 16.86 
                               Source: Author‟s survey, 2012. 
 
Based both on the answers of interviewed respondents and survey respondents, it 
can be concluded that the greatest problem faced by relocated villagers is a lack of 
opportunity to make money to support their households. The main conclusion is, 
therefore, that while they were indeed enjoying a better living environment, villagers 
felt this did not compensate for the lack of job opportunities. Due to low skill levels 
and lack of qualifications, relocated villagers found there were not enough suitable 
job opportunities for them. Among the few jobs available were as security staff in 
Hongqiao business district. At the time of my last field visit, only 1000 job 
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opportunities had been created in the whole of Xinhong Township, in which Aibo 
Community is located (Interview G2012062102). In particular, younger relocatees 
had difficulties finding a job. Since the inauguration of Hongqiao hub, more and 
more younger people have moved towards the city centre to find job opportunities 
(Interview V20120712). 
 
A series of social problems have arisen since relocation due to the fewer job 
opportunities. After resettlement in Aibo Community, there was a lot of work done 
furnishing the new apartments. Just about every family had at least one new flat to 
furnish, which cost a considerable part of their compensation funds. In addition, 
officials claimed in interviews that some relocated families had unrealistic 
expectations of the possible rewards from their compensation, claiming that some 
relocatees had been eager to buy a new car, and indeed local officials even 
claimed that despite the shortage of good job opportunities, relocated villagers were 
reluctant to take on manual labour and some villagers had even become addicted 
to gambling (Interview C2012072902).  
 
A variety of social problems have occurred after other relocation settlement projects 
both in Shanghai and other parts of China and, in the case of Hongqiao, this 
presented local officials with a tough problem (Interview C2011012201). How 
relocated villagers earn their living after relocation has become an urgent problem 
for local governments in Shanghai and, indeed, throughout China. China's massive 
urbanization has resulted in 40 million landless peasants, and this has become a 
serious social problem. Relocated villagers affected have become landless 
peasants in Chinese large-scale urbanization in the past three decades. For 
relocated villagers who with non-farming skills, there is no way to make a living 
once they run out of compensation funds, and this has gradually become a serious 
social problem.   
 
7.5 Impact on neighbouring areas and their residents 
 
The question of the impact of the Hongqiao project and how it is affecting those 
who live in surrounding settlements will be addressed in the following paragraphs. 
This section introduces issues that have affected the residents of Shamao, a 
community like Aibo constructed some years earlier before the Hongqiao project 
was begun. It does, therefore, act as a signpost to the sort of issues that might arise 
in Aibo in the future. Because the relocation to Aibo is so recent, it is hard to predict 
what issues might arise. In this sense, Shamao can be considered as a sort of 
proxy for Aibo, and it is in this context that it will be briefly introduced in the 
paragraphs that follow.  
 
There is no doubt that Hongqiao has brought opportunities to the surrounding local 
governments, and local officials have been treating the project as a driving force for 
economic development (Interview G2012080807). The Hongqiao project has, 
indeed, attracted a large number of investments to the surrounding area, 
investments in the field of transportation and infrastructure, along with construction. 
In addition, the price of leaseholds at auction in the Hongqiao area has increased 
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from 10,000 RMB to 20,000 RMB in the past two years (Interview 
G2012072904).This has had a knock-on effect on prices in surrounding areas, in 
particular in Minhang district, and this has brought large revenue for local 
government.  Because limited development land is available in Hongqiao business 
district, Minhang District Government has been attempting to attract more 
corporations and companies to invest in the area surrounding Minhang district. All 
in all, the benefits for local government of surrounding areas can be characterised 
as increased revenue from land auctions, job opportunities and tax revenue.  
 
 
Figure 7.7 The Shamao community is surrounded by viaducts and airport slip roads 
Source: Author. 
 
The project has also affected residents living in neighbouring areas. One of the 
most significant changes for residents of neighbouring areas has been the 
increasing value of their houses. The construction of Hongqiao business district has 
brought many bonuses to the surrounding area, including new roads with which it is 
easier to access the city centre, and education and health resources. In addition, 
the improved image of the area has brought investment and job opportunities as 
enterprises have located in the surrounding area (Interview G2012072603). 
 
Shamao Community is located just to the northwest of Hongqiao Airport under the 
flight path. It was constructed for villagers relocated by Minhang District 
Government before the Hongqiao project was begun at a time when Hongqiao 
Airport was a regional airport without a second runway, when aircraft noise was not 
a serious problem. With the expansion of Hongqiao Airport, local villagers in 
surrounding areas were relocated, and Shamao was left an isolated community 
surrounded by the chaotic environment created by the construction of the Hongqiao 
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project. Shamao Community is surrounded by overhead roads as shown in Figure 
7.7 and lies under the flight path, which has resulted in serious issues of noise 
pollution for local residents. Local residents in Shamao Community have been 
complaining and protesting about these issues and especially the noise pollution. In 
order to catch the attention of government officials, local residents painted slogans 
complaining about bad planning and aircraft noise on the main community gate, as 
shown in Figure7.8.  
 
Shamao Community, with a population of about 1000 people in 300 households 
(Interview G2012080807), is too big to be demolished and relocated by Minhang 
District Government due to a shortage of compensation funding (Interview 
G2012062102). Because it is located outside the Hongqiao Business District 
Planning Area, Shamao Community was not planned as a relocation project by 
Shanghai Municipal Government, which means there was no compensation funding 
allocated to Minhang district for the project. Indeed, I was told that the 
compensation funding would be a big economic burden for Minhang District 
Government if Shamao community were to be relocated (Interview G2012062102).  
 
 
Figure7.8 Residents of Shamao Community expressed their complaints about noise 
environment and bad planning in slogans painted on the entrance archway 
          Source: Author. 
 
As the task of relocation of Shamao Community has been too arduous for Minhang 
District Government to implement, it has become a tricky problem without an 
obvious solution for government (Interview G2012062102). After rising protests and 
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complaints by local residents, some small amounts of monetary compensation were 
allocated. However, the protests and complaints were thought likely to reappear 
after a while (Interview G2012080807). Both local officials and residents wished 
that the problem of Shamao Community would be dealt with by Shanghai Municipal 
Government. The frequent petitions from residents in Shamao Community have 
become a major headache for local officials (Interview G2012080807), and this is 
not to mention the disturbance to local residents caused by the aircraft noise.  
 
Finally, residents of Shamao and of other nearby areas have been adversely 
affected by increasing congestion. The improvement in the transport infrastructure 
in the Hongqiao area and the growth in investments has led to an increase in the 
number of migrant workers living in the area surrounding Hongqiao and a 
deterioration in traffic congestion from Minhang to the city centre in the morning 
rush hour and from the city centre back to Minhang in the afternoon. The greater 
attention paid to transport links with the city centre has meant that less emphasis 
was put on transportation within the Hongqiao area, and the many overhead roads 
constructed to link Hongqiao hub with the city centre have complicated the road 
network in the surrounding area (Interview G2012062102).  
 
7.6 Conclusion: Better living environment but worse life in Hongqiao 
 
In this conclusion, I will return to the evidence given by villagers in the questionnaire 
survey and in interviews to argue that there is a very clear distinction to be made in 
the way that the former villagers have reacted to their relocation. On the one hand, 
they say their new living environment is a great improvement, but on the other, they 
have grave concerns about their future livelihoods.  
 
Section 7.2 focused on the context of the villagers‟ lives in Hongqiao. The affected 
area in Hongqiao had been semi-rural and semi-urban, with a mix of a large 
number of small-sized factories in private and collective ownership and villagers 
living in scattered dwellings. While this landscape bore some of the characteristics 
of an urban village, it was different from the classic urban villages found in southern 
cities such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The biggest difference is that the area 
affected by the project in Hongqiao was not surrounded by a built-up urban 
landscape. Secondly, the area was located in the western outskirts close to 
Hongqiao Airport and because of air and noise pollution as well as building height 
restrictions, this had limited the possibilities for development in surrounding areas. 
That the area earmarked for development was rural was confirmed by the result of 
our survey, in which 94% of those questioned had rural household registration 
before relocation (but converted to urban hukou after the move). As we explained 
the Hongqiao area suffered from a lack of social and public infrastructures, as well 
as from noise pollution, inconvenient transportation, less capital investment and 
shortage of policy support.  
 
The former villagers of Hongqiao shared features of their daily life with other urban 
villagers in their living environment, living conditions and main source of income. 
The affected area in Hongqiao was built without unified planning with households 
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scattered in villages with mixed land use functions of factories and farmland. The 
lack of unified planning generated a series of problems in terms of squeezed public 
space, narrow roads, lack of proper drainage and waste disposal systems resulting 
in a chaotic environment. Due to the influx of migrant workers in the Hongqiao area, 
local villagers built multi-story housing in their compounds so as to be able to rent 
out rooms to rural migrants. The condition of their houses reflected their economic 
and social status in the village. Their houses were built as high as possible and 
were well decorated even in the poor environment of the villages. From the 
perspective of income, farm production, rents from housing, factory work and 
collective land dividends were the main income sources for local villagers. The 
money that could be easily made through renting out accommodation made 
villagers extremely unwilling to be relocated. 
 
In section 7.3 I discussed the displacement process: negotiating compensation and 
relocation between the state and residents in the Hongqiao project. It is worth 
noting the expectations and concerns of relocatees and, in particular, local villagers 
as the largest group among relocatees. The expectation of villagers was to be 
resettled near the Hongqiao project so that they could enjoy the benefits of the 
development project. This would contrast with other urban relocation projects in 
Shanghai in which relocatees were moved out of city centre and inner city areas to 
distant suburbs.  However, local villagers regarded the Hongqiao project as a big 
loss for them rather than a good opportunity to get rich. When the decision to 
relocate was made by the government, the villagers were aware that they had no 
choice but to move so they were keen to get as much compensation as possible in 
relocation subsidies and monetary and housing compensation. Villagers were 
concerned about their future after relocation as they realised they would lose their 
source of livelihood in the form of housing rental and land dividends. Their primary 
expectation therefore was to get compensation before relocation in the hope of 
being able to tide them over. 
 
The relocation project was a tough and urgent task for the local district government. 
In sections 7.3 and 7.4, I examined the relocation process and its results. Since the 
decision to undertake the Hongqiao project was made by Shanghai Municipal 
Government in December 2005, a series of steps were taken to expedite the 
relocation. These included posting open letters, holding group meetings, providing 
rewards for those relocating early, publishing plans of the new community and 
choosing a nearby site for the resettled community. Despite the preparatory work 
undertaken by Minhang district and Huacao township governments, local villagers 
were still reluctant to move because of their concerns for their future lives, which 
they feared would be without health and pension insurance after relocation and 
without a stable source of income. Local residents were relocated to the new blocks 
of flats built nearby and known as Aibo Community, but local factories were 
encouraged to move to other townships and districts. The compensation was 
divided into two categories: monetary and off-site housing compensation. Most 
relocated villagers chose housing compensation whist most owners of relocated 
factories chose monetary compensation in the process of relocation. Rural 
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compensation standards were applied in the case of Hongqiao as the area was still 
categorised as rural. Compensation levels were therefore lower than those for 
urban areas, and this elicited complaints from local villagers. Villagers received new 
flats in Aibo Community, but at the cost of their house and land. The biggest 
change can be summarised as more convenient transportation and an improved 
living environment but a reduced income and fewer job opportunities for relocated 
villagers. 
 
Section 7.5 reviewed the impact of the Hongqiao project on neighbouring areas and 
their residents. It was inevitable that the project influenced neighbouring areas and 
their residents not only in terms of economic development opportunities, but also in 
the form of the lived environment. There is no doubt that the project has brought 
opportunities to surrounding areas from the perspective of economic development. 
A series of institutional arrangements and preferential policies were issued resulting 
in an influx of capital investment projects promoting economic development in 
Hongqiao business district and surrounding areas. It was inevitable that residents 
and local governments in surrounding areas would benefit in some way from the 
public and private investment brought by the project. The investment has increased 
land lease revenue and tax revenue for local government, but has also lifted house 
prices for residents. An improved transport infrastructure including an upgraded 
road network was built to replace the old narrow roads which had characterised the 
area previously. Meanwhile, there is no doubt that negative impacts resulted too. 
The relocated community of Shamao have been badly affected by noise pollution, 
giving rise to complaints and protests. In addition, the living environment has been 
damaged due to the number of overhead roads extending in all directions, and an 
increase in traffic volume has exacerbated traffic congestion in the surrounding 
area. 
 
The main conclusion that I wish to draw from this chapter concerns the local 
residents. They were given no voice in the whole procedure. While various local 
government officials went out of their way to explain the relocation and support the 
relocatees, they themselves were at no point given any choice in the matter, other 
than whether they wished to receive compensation in the form of new housing or in 
monetary form. On the contrary, the state in its several forms, took away the land 
and housing that formed the basis of their household living in order to convert the 
land into a platform from which it could extract maximum profit as part of the project 
to construct at Hongqiao a new CBD for Shanghai. While this can be considered as 
one type of accumulation by dispossession, it should at the same time be 
differentiated in its detail, if not in its overall approach, from similar urban 
restructuring projects in and around Beijing, Guangzhou and other large Chinese 
cities. A discussion of these differences, while alluded to here and there in this 
chapter, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Chapter 8  
Discussion and conclusion: Accumulation by dispossession 
by land-based urban growth coalitions in the context of a 
fiercely competitive urban environment 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation is a detailed examination of the planning and construction of 
Hongqiao and of its impact on local residents. In brief, the broad aim of my research 
has been to investigate the process of planning and development of Hongqiao 
transport and business zone; to examine its relationship with urban development 
and spatial restructuring in Shanghai; and thereby to comment on and critique the 
nature of urban change in contemporary China, which I have characterised here as 
property-led and infrastructure-led. This chapter summarises the thesis by 
presenting key points from previous chapters and discussing the main findings of 
the thesis. The main arguments that appear in previous chapters are critically 
reviewed with reference to the thesis aims and objectives. A summary of key points 
from each chapter is presented in section 8.2. This is followed by a discussion of 
the three main arguments of the thesis around competitive urbanism, accumulation 
by dispossession and land-based urban growth coalitions in section 8.3. The last 
section suggests possibilities and directions for further research. 
 
8.2 Summary of key points from previous chapters 
 
The introductory chapter presented the background to my research, introducing the 
Hongqiao project and indicating its importance and probable impact on regional 
development in west Shanghai and beyond it, in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD). 
The bulk of Chapter 1 was taken up by an introductory discussion of the theoretical 
issues that surround the three main threads that hold this thesis together: 
entrepreneurial urbanism and mega urban projects, accumulation by dispossession 
and its relevance to Hongqiao and Chinese urban growth coalitions and their 
manifestation in Hongqiao. It was suggested here that it is through the bringing 
together of land-based urban growth coalitions that projects of the size and nature 
of Hongqiao can be realised. 
 
In the second chapter, the literature on Chinese urbanisation and Shanghai‟s 
transformation in the past three decades was reviewed. This chapter highlighted the 
changes that have occurred in China‟s urbanisation policy, the process and 
consequences of urbanisation, the government‟s role in urban change and the 
several transformations that Shanghai has undergone, culminating in the 
development of the massive Pudong project on the east bank of the Huangpu. The 
chapter went on to show how Shanghai Municipal Government has restructured its 
city centre and inner city areas through urban regeneration projects. These projects 
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have, in its own eyes, helped it address the problem of urban slums, many of which 
have been transformed into luxurious property and commercial real estate; they 
have changed the city's image into that of a prosperous business centre. The 
chapter discussed how they have raised revenue through land leasing for district 
governments, which are thus able to have a long-term source of tax revenue to use 
for further projects both in inner city areas and in the development of the urban 
fringe. In Chapter 3, the regional context was highlighted; the chapter positioned 
Hongqiao within the wider context of the western peripheries of Shanghai. 
Hongqiao faces fierce competition from the neighbouring city of Kunshan as well as 
other neighbouring districts in the west of Shanghai. On a more general level, the 
chapter noted that the failure to create a more robust regional architecture can be 
attributed to urban competition leading to a reluctance to cooperate on a regional 
basis in the YRD. 
 
In Chapter 4, the study area of Hongqiao was introduced, as was the research 
methodology used.  Hongqiao‟s mixture of urban and rural, so characteristic of peri-
urban China, was described in some detail. The primary research was conducted 
during two periods of fieldwork, during which extensive semi-structured and in-
depth interviews were conducted, and a questionnaire survey was also undertaken. 
This was followed up by interviews with relocated villagers. Leading officials 
responsible for the Hongqiao project were interviewed in both periods of fieldwork, 
and published and unpublished policy documents were obtained. Others 
interviewed included planners, academics, real estate developers, the owners of 
relocated businesses and villager leaders. 
 
The following three chapters presented the core findings of the primary research 
conducted in Hongqiao. Chapter 5 investigated the planning and layout of the 
Hongqiao project, focusing on its aims, main elements, planning process and land 
preparation. In the chapter, I argued that the importance of the project can be 
attributed to the need to accelerate the pace of development in the west of 
Shanghai and bring about industrial and spatial transformation in the context of 
place competition from within and outside Shanghai. The purpose of the whole 
project was to kick-start development by providing a new economic growth pole 
through the development of service industries, to integrate Shanghai with the 
Yangtze River Delta through the construction of a transportation hub and to create a 
poly-centred city by means of the development of a business district. The chapter 
showed that Shanghai Municipal Government has played a leading role in the 
Hongqiao project in terms of the establishment, planning and siting of the project 
and preparing of land in the process of project development. Through the joint 
efforts of government at different levels, after 6 years of intensive construction, the 
Hongqiao transportation hub is complete, a new landmark in Shanghai, and the 
Hongqiao business zone is currently being built. After completion of the Hongqiao 
project, the development land will have been converted from immature to mature 
status, allowing local (i.e., district) government to reap substantial rewards from the 
project. The chapter showed how the construction of mega urban projects has been 
central to Chinese-style competitive urbanism.  
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In Chapter 6, I highlighted the governance mechanisms behind the Hongqiao 
project and argued that they could best be understood as forming a land-based 
urban growth coalition. This chapter looked at the way in which different new 
organisations exercised power as part of the project. The consequences on district 
administrations were particularly severe in the case of the business zone, where the 
district government found itself handing power and responsibility over to what is de 
facto a new district government. This reflected a shifting of power within the 
coalition, even as the Shanghai Municipal Government continued to exercise 
overall authority through the placing of prominent municipal officials to leading 
positions in key committees. While interpreting urban change in Hongqiao in terms 
of a land-based urban growth coalition, this chapter drew attention to the fluidity and 
malleability at the centre of the coalition. 
 
Chapter 7, the last of these three chapters discussing results of the research, 
began with an introduction to the lives of local villagers before they had been 
displaced by the Hongqiao project. The business of compensation is a highly 
complex one for a number of reasons, as I show in this chapter. This complexity 
derives in large part both from the dual urban/rural land system that leads to the 
existence of urban villages within urban districts, but also from the informal status of 
much of the housing in the urban villages. As a result, households stand to lose a 
lot more than is officially recognised by the authorities as they lose the income they 
gained from the renting out of informal dwellings and extra floors built without 
permits on their residences. The upshot of these problems is that villagers felt they 
had been poorly compensated for their relocation to new apartment blocks built for 
them in the Hongqiao project area, having received compensation levels for rural 
not urban residents. Alongside this, however, they expressed positive feelings 
towards the new accommodation to which they had been allocated. While this 
complicated mixture of feelings is captured in the survey and interviews that I 
conducted, in this chapter I conclude that for many residents, the overwhelming 
consequences have been negative as a result of their reduced potential for gaining 
an income. The chapter ends with a brief examination of the problems faced by 
another group of relocatees, who were moved some years ago and whose longer 
experience of new conditions can be regarded as a proxy for those of the recently 
relocated residents I surveyed. Significantly enough, they have been protesting 
against aircraft noise from Hongqiao Airport.  
 
8.3 Reflections on urban coalitions, the state and its marginalised citizenry 
 
8.3.1 Dispossession and inadequate compensation for relocatees 
 
I have used conceptual constructs -- accumulation by dispossession, competitive 
urbanism and land-based urban growth coalitions -- emanating largely from the 
„Western‟ academy to interpret my findings in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, hoping thereby 
both to contribute to the insertion of Chinese urban and social change into this body 
of theory-making, but also to test the robustness of these concepts and, indeed, to 
extend their range of applicability.  In this section, I will draw on my findings and 
relate them to these conceptual underpinnings. 
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The process of state-led urban restructuring in China has led to widespread 
displacement of local residents while the state uses the consequent profits to 
reinvest in the construction of infrastructure and public consumption facilities, a 
process that Hyung Bang Shin (2014) characterises cogently as accumulation by 
dispossession. Residents in the Hongqiao area have been no exception to this 
process, having been displaced and resettled in a corner of the newly established 
Hongqiao Business District. As I argued in Chapter 7, compensation has become 
the most important issue in the process of relocation both before and after 
resettlement; in this context, one must remember that relocated Hongqiao residents 
were resettled near their original home (although the whole landscape has been 
transformed), and this differs significantly from resettlement far away from the 
location of the original home when compensation fails to cover for the social and 
economic impact of the distant relocation site (Wu et al., 2007). Compared with 
relocatees who are moved a long distance away from their former homes and who 
lose out substantially, one might almost say that Hongqiao relocatees got off lightly, 
and a few managed to gain from the process (Wu et al., 2013). It should be noted 
that many relocated villagers obtained two flats in place of their old house and land 
and some even purchased a third, and they were therefore able to rent out two 
flats, providing an income that compensated for lost rental income in their former 
residence. The most prominent concern among Hongqiao relocatees was the 
securing of a livelihood, and this appears to have been only partially addressed by 
the provision of several flats per household. However, perhaps their concerns -- and 
this is something I was not aiming to capture in my survey -- were centred 
subconsciously around the psychological loss involved in the destruction of their old 
home environment and their enforced move into a completely new one. In this 
sense, they were indeed dispossessed.  
 
The difficulties and uncertainties faced by relocatees have rebounded onto local 
government. Relocated former villagers have been putting pressure on Hongqiao 
Business District Management Committee on a number of different fronts, including 
the speedy disbursement of compensation payments. They have lost their land and 
houses, their basic elements of survival, but with what many of them feel is 
inadequate compensation. The Hongqiao project, like so many other urban 
development projects in China, is based on land provided by relocated villagers, but 
the voice of these villagers and their interests have not received attention. This is, in 
short, urban restructuring based on accumulation by dispossession -- the concept 
stands up well in the Chinese context. 
 
8.3.2 Competitive urbanism and the role of the state 
 
As we saw in the empirical account of the development of the Hongqiao project in 
Chapter 5, the project was planned by Shanghai Municipal Government and driven 
forward by Hongqiao Business District Management Committee. The wider context 
within which the Hongqiao project was initiated is one of entrepreneurial and 
competitive urbanism in China. In particular, the whole area in the west of Shanghai 
around Hongqiao has experienced fierce competition amongst neighbouring cities 
and districts within and beyond Shanghai, as each has tried to cap the other with 
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new projects and administrative reforms designed to attract inward investment, 
boost local economies and improve the chances of promotion for local government 
leaders. It is against this background that Hongqiao has been built as a new CBD 
for Shanghai and for the wider Yangtze River Delta. The constant manoeuvring in 
the face of competitive pressures makes it clear that the role of the state is 
paramount in the development of mega urban projects such as Hongqiao. However, 
the question then is, which branch of the state? The discussions in Chapters 5 and 
6 have shown that central government plays a quite withdrawn role, setting the 
wider parameters for action, but that these are sometimes ignored or even 
contravened. The municipal government has been the main architect and promoter 
of the project, retaining overview and control in large part through placing top 
officials on boards and committees. However, the everyday running of the project, 
as well as the coordination and implementation, have been effected by two types of 
organisation. One type is local government, both the district government and the 
equivalent organisation set up to administer the newly developed area (the 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee). Beneath them, one should 
note, too, the role of the street committees (Huacao and Xinhong). The second is a 
number of organisations specially established by the municipal government to 
undertake the project -- the Integrated Transport Hub Project Construction 
Headquarters and the Shenhong Company.  
 
The following paragraphs set out some more detailed conclusions on the role of 
central and municipal governments. Central government has been a primary source 
of support for Shanghai, which, as one of the four municipalities, reports directly to 
the State Council. This support has come not only in terms of funding, but also at a 
policy level. In Shanghai, Pudong's development has been largely dependent on 
the support of preferential policies from central government. In particular, Shanghai 
has historically been the pilot city for new policies in China, and this has played a 
crucial role in Shanghai‟s development as Pudong New District bears evidence. In 
order to achieve the goal of promoting Pudong‟s development, a series of pilot 
policies have been implemented in Pudong since the 1980s, all of them mandated 
by central government. These included special permission for foreign banks to 
locate there, supporting the development of the service sector in Pudong, a 
measure not replicated anywhere else in China. With the support of these policies, 
Pudong New District and Shanghai achieved huge progress in terms of 
development. In the case of the Hongqiao project, central government has also set 
up a series of preferential policies. The Ministry of Commerce is funding the 
construction of an International Convention and Exhibition Centre, and a series of 
policies has been issued by central government to support development of a 
modern service industry in Hongqiao. Special funds for a national comprehensive 
pilot scheme for modern service industry were provided by central government, 
enabling many companies to settle there. Policy support from central government 
has therefore actively boosted the development of Hongqiao business district.  
 
That is not to say, however, that the role of central government has ever been a 
particularly visible one. On the contrary, its influence is exercised behind the 
scenes. Moreover, it needs to be recognised that central government policies and 
- - Chapter 8- 
186 
 
directives are not always followed and are sometimes directly contravened. In the 
case of Hongqiao, central government, along with Shanghai Municipal Government, 
envisaged Hongqiao as becoming a centre for higher-order service companies, but 
the Business District Management Committee has been intent primarily on leasing 
the floor space to the highest bidder in order for the project to be a fund-raising 
success and has been much less concerned as to whether the companies who 
invest there are in the service sector (Interview G2012062102). 
 
Shanghai Municipal Government has played a crucial role in the planning, design 
and execution of the project. It is the prime mover, promoter and overseer, whose 
influence and imprint is everywhere traceable. We will see in the paragraphs below 
how Shanghai‟s role played itself out specifically in the context of the coalition that 
oversaw the Hongqiao project, but a word here is needed on Shanghai‟s economic 
strength, without which the Hongqiao project could never have happened. 
Shanghai‟s economic policies have been a powerful factor in Hongqiao‟s 
development. Shanghai has been the economic centre of China since 1840. Even 
in the period of the Cultural Revolution, Shanghai was the country‟s industrial 
centre (Wu, 1999). With the development of Pudong in 1990s, Shanghai has 
become the so-called dragon head of the YRD, and its total GDP reached RMB 2 
trillion by 2012. In addition, Shanghai's proportion of tertiary industry exceeded 60% 
for the first time in that year, indicating that Shanghai has become a service-based 
economy and has reached its goal of being the centre of economic, financial, 
shipping and trading life in China. Due to Shanghai‟s privileged place in the 
Chinese economy, it is hardly surprising that many companies are keen to locate 
their headquarters in the city.  
 
Shanghai also promoted the construction of Hongqiao Business District because it 
wished to reap the benefits of the transport hub, the successful completion of which 
has enhanced the city‟s centrality within the YRD and China as a whole.  As a 
result, travel time from Shanghai has been reduced to 50 minutes for Hangzhou 
and 2 hours for Nanjing. Journey times between Shanghai and all other major cities 
in the YRD have been reduced due to the construction of high-speed railways and 
motorway networks, consolidating Shanghai's status as the central city in the YRD. 
In addition, the integration of the airport and high-speed railway station within the 
Hongqiao transport hub has shortened transportation time for export cargos from 
the cities of the YRD. Because of the Hongqiao transport hub, Shanghai‟s status as 
the biggest economic centre in China has been vastly strengthened.   
 
All of this serves to remind us that the arguments advanced so convincingly for 
Tokyo and Seoul by Hill and Kim (2000) about state-centred global cities in contrast 
to the market-centred regimes of Western cities like New York and London apply 
also, in fair measure, to Shanghai. One of the principal differences with a city like 
Tokyo probably resides in the extent of the role of the local state in Shanghai, as in 
other large Chinese cities. The analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 make it clear to what 
extent district and municipal governments have been driving the Hongqiao project, 
albeit with general support from Beijing. This aspect differs from the case of Tokyo, 
where local (district) governments are sometimes less enthusiastic about urban 
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restructuring projects than the metropolitan and national governments, who are 
often closely allied in support of urban projects that promote the interests of the 
country‟s large corporations (Waley, 2007).  
 
8.3.3 Land-based urban growth coalitions and the effects of speculative 
urbanism 
 
Alongside accumulation by dispossession and competitive urbanism, this thesis has 
identified land-based urban growth coalitions as a key characteristic of urban 
restructuring in China. These coalitions are formed based on the principle that 
participants can benefit from rising land values through land development projects, 
but participants in the urban growth coalition in Hongqiao benefited unevenly from 
land development with the most powerful organisations benefiting the most while 
those authorities lower down the hierarchy such as Minhang District experienced 
some costs and the displaced villagers were marginalised. 
 
As a result of the discussion in Chapter 6, it has become clear that more emphasis 
needs to be placed on the way that coalitions are formed and how their 
membership shifts. On the evidence provided in that chapter, it seems reasonable 
to develop and refine the idea of land-based urban growth coalitions by identifying 
their contingent parts; they can be read, I would suggest, as being made up of a 
number of different coalitions (sub-coalitions, one might say), whose participants 
vary at different times, but whose aims remain more or less the same: to extract 
maximum profit from land development projects. These sub-coalitions might be 
read as follows: a policy and planning coalition, a displacement and relocation 
coalition, a funding coalition and an investment attraction and promotion coalition. 
We can see these as different shapes of a fluid and malleable coalition which has 
land development for profit at its centre, and we can identify each of them in 
Hongqiao. Shanghai Municipal Government stands at the top of the coordinating 
hierarchy, while the entrepreneurial local government of the Hongqiao Business 
District Management Committee has played a vital role as a key part of the sub-
coalitions mentioned above. It needs to be stressed, however, that these coalitions 
are all interpretive constructs of informal groupings -- they reside only in the realm 
of conceptualisation.  
 
In the initial stage of the Hongqiao project, a policy and planning coalition was 
formed by different stakeholders -- Shanghai Municipal Government, Shanghai 
Railway Bureau, the Planning Bureau of the municipal government and Shanghai 
Airport Group have built Hongqiao project from a high-speed railway station into a 
huge mega urban project. The Hongqiao area was planned as a new city centre 
and CBD for Shanghai and beyond as part of an attempt to realise industrial 
upgrading by developing a service centre in Hongqiao. In the policy and planning 
coalition, the municipal government was in charge of the coalition, while planners 
became more powerful in the policy and planning coalition. Meanwhile, local district 
government stood outside the policy and planning coalition, its fate controlled by 
higher levels of government. Local district government could do little more than 
persuade municipal government to ensure that new plans cover their territory as 
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this brings more preferential policies and public investment. 
The displacement and relocation coalition was formed to prepare the land, which 
was a precondition for the successful launching of the Hongqiao project. In the early 
stages of the project, Shanghai Municipal Government, as project coordinator, 
supervised the formation of this coalition, which consisted of Minhang District 
Government, Shenhong Company, Shanghai Municipal Government, relocation 
companies, the Relocation Headquarters of the Hongqiao Transport Hub and 
relocated villagers. Under the direction of Shanghai Municipal Government, 
Minhang District Government was in charge of land expropriation and transferred 
the land to Shenhong Company at a price of RMB 1.4 million per mu. The 
Relocation Headquarters of the Hongqiao Transport Hub was in charge of 
relocation and compensation on behalf of Minhang District Government. . 
 
Funding is crucial for any mega urban project, particularly so for the Hongqiao 
project because of its sheer scale. The Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee has shouldered the role of fund raiser for the project. The funding 
coalition for the Hongqiao project was formed by the Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee, Shenhong Company, banks and property developers. 
Hongqiao Business District Management Committee was at its centre. The 
mechanism in place to raise funding involved local district government and 
Shenhong Company using urban land as collateral for bank loans guaranteed by 
the municipal and local district government. The bank loans were released to 
Shenhong Company to promote land development and infrastructure investment. 
Once the land is prepared and ready for construction (the process known as the 
conversion of immature to mature land), it is leased to property developers on the 
land market. The funds raised through the leasing go to reinvestment in developing 
another plot of land and payment of interest on the bank loans.  
 
Attracting inward investment has been the top priority of local government, in 
Hongqiao as elsewhere in the country. Transforming Hongqiao Business District 
from rural land to a modern built-up area on such a scale has needed huge 
investment. Against this background, something that we can call an investment 
attraction and promotion coalition was formed in Hongqiao, led by Hongqiao 
Business District Management Committee. Its main players include Shanghai 
Municipal Government, central government, Shenhong Compay and property 
developers from the public and private sectors. Central and Shanghai municipal 
governments are involved in this coalition through the provision of preferential 
policy support; local district government is the most active stakeholder in terms of 
doing the work to attract investment. The core task of this coalition is to realise the 
land leasing and the sale of new property as well renting out and selling of space in 
new office blocks and other constructions under the umbrella of the construction of 
Hongqiao business district. Local district government and property developers 
share the same interest in getting returns on their investments. District government 
leaders are heavily involved in place marketing to enhance economic performance 
during their term in office. 
 
This examination of the constituent parts of the land-based urban growth coalition 
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shows that the coalition can be characterised as being led by local district 
government, with land sitting at its core. Land-based urban growth coalitions are 
formed based on the principle that participants can benefit from rising land values 
through land development by government-led coalitions. In particular, local district 
governments tend to be enthusiastic advocates of land-based urban growth 
coalitions as the coalitions help to coordinate the development projects that provide 
local governments with important sources of revenue. All the stakeholders are 
focused on land development; land is the key element in land-based urban growth 
coalitions, as the stakeholders benefit from increasing land values. 
 
My extended case study of Hongqiao shows that entrepreneurial local district 
government has been the most active participant in this land-based urban growth 
coalition, sharing the same interests with investors from the public and private 
sectors in an attempt to realise growth. Central government, however, has not 
always been aligned to this coalition. In the first instance, as we have seen, central 
government alongside municipal government played a key role supporting the 
Hongqiao project with preferential policies. Central government created the 
regulatory and administrative framework that pushed local districts to become 
entrepreneurial. However, fearing a property bubble crisis, Beijing has become 
more cautious in recent years. Its recent, more restrictive policies have put the land-
based urban growth coalition at serious risk, affecting thereby the economic 
environment. Local district governments have faced huge pressure as a result of 
government debt, and the availability of finance for land-based urban growth 
coalitions has become a serious problem in the Hongqiao project and beyond. It is 
as if local and central government have been involved in a game in their pursuit of 
urban growth in China. On the one hand, local government has gone helter-skelter 
in promoting urban and economic growth to raise revenues; on the other hand, 
central government has been desperate in the last few years to curb excessive 
urban growth because of its inflationary impact especially on house prices and 
because of the potentially severe consequences of excessive speculative urban 
growth.  
 
The role of debt and finance is an important issue in these land-based urban growth 
coalitions. Based on a local government debt report released by central 
government, many city governments are on the brink of bankruptcy (National Audit, 
2014). Even Shanghai Municipal Government has a debt of RMB 500 billion, 44% 
of which is supposed to be covered by revenue from the sale of land leases. The 
situation of many other smaller cities is proportionately much worse. Local 
government debt has, therefore, become a serious problem as a result, ironically, of 
the success of earlier rounds of speculative land development organised by land-
based urban growth coalitions to extract profit.  
 
With the price of real estate and land having soared dramatically in Shanghai and 
much of China resulting in a property bubble, the central government in Beijing 
decided to take measures in 2010, and again in 2012, to slow down the growth in 
property prices. Beijing launched a series of active steps to limit the money supply 
and impose restrictions on lending to developers, crucially affecting land-based 
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urban growth coalitions in Shanghai and elsewhere. An important aim of these 
measures has been to curb exorbitant house prices, which restrict the purchasing 
power of citizens, impacting inevitably on urban restructuring projects.  
 
The Hongqiao project has faced huge pressures of debt as a result (it should be 
stressed) of the smooth running of the coalition and its success in driving the 
Hongqiao project forwards. However, this piling up of debt can only be repaid 
through revenue derived from the sale of land leases in a booming property market 
in Hongqiao. The current slowdown has affected the confidence of potential 
property investors and buyers; housing market transactions are, at the time of 
writing, in a state of near-stagnation in Shanghai. Progress in the construction of 
Hongqiao business dstrict has been held back considerably, much to the 
annoyance of local government in Hongqiao, which has found itself hamstrung as a 
consequence. 
 
It can be seen, therefore, that the land-based urban growth coalition is affected by 
the policies of central government. Therefore, while the central government creates 
a framework which compels local authorities to become entrepreneurial, it also 
intervenes to cool down urban speculation and property bubbles. Land-based urban 
growth coalitions need to take this into account. At least their success in doing this, 
in part, stems from their fluidity and malleability, characteristics that have been 
described above. It is hoped that the discussion above has made it clear how a 
more nuanced examination of these coalitions brings a greater level of 
understanding and makes these concepts more relevant to the Chinese urban 
terrain.  
 
8.4 Further research and concluding remarks 
 
This thesis investigated the process of planning and development of Hongqiao 
transport and business districts; examined their relationship to urban development 
and spatial restructuring in Shanghai; and thereby commented on and critiqued the 
nature of urban change in contemporary China. It characterised this as property-led 
and infrastructure-led, and suggested that the Hongqiao project, which formed the 
basis of the investigation, might best be conceptualised in terms of competitive 
urbanism, urban growth coalitions and accumulation by dispossession. The 
research attempted to represent the extreme complexity of urban change in China, 
particularly in the case of the Hongqiao project, with its mix of land expropriation, 
displaced villagers and factories, compensation mechanisms, resettlement issues, 
construction plans and processes and institutional arrangements. The task of 
investigating such a huge project involving the construction of a new CBD with only 
partial research funding proved rather onerous. 
 
In this thesis, progress has been made in understanding the nature of competitive 
urbanism and the main features of the land-based urban growth coalition formed in 
Hongqiao. This was done through the presentation of a detailed picture of the 
Hongqiao project and the consequences on local residents in terms of impact on 
their livelihoods from the perspective of accumulation by dispossession. Meanwhile, 
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this huge project has been the centre of a dynamic process in which each factor 
impacting on the construction of Hongqiao business district has been in continual 
flux. During the course of the research, policies issued by central government have 
been changing, and this has influenced the construction of the Hongqiao business 
district, particularly in the field of project funding sources and land sales, which 
directly affect the progress of the project. Obviously this thesis is not the final word 
on the issues raised by the Hongqiao project, but it provides a basis for further 
research.  
 
In future, more effort might go into bridging the gap between the rich literature and 
theoretical insights in the Western context with urban change in China. A more 
complete picture of the sustainability of land-based urban growth coalitions 
associated with mega urban projects might result, adding considerably to our 
understanding of urban change in China. In particular, further research might 
extend the concept of land-based urban growth coalitions, for example, by looking 
at the impact of local government debt and the effect the local government debt 
crisis is having on urban growth coalitions. With the local government debt crisis 
becoming increasingly serious, research will be needed on how entrepreneurial 
local governments cope with debt and on the issues of sustainability of land-based 
urban growth that arise. 
 
The voices and interests of relocated villagers have been largely ignored in the 
decision-making that drives the restructuring projects undertaken by urban growth 
coalitions. Relocated residents lose their housing and land, but get inadequate 
compensation, while powerful players in local government realise the profits from 
accumulation by dispossession. More research should be directed towards how 
relocated villagers can realise win-win situations, introducing issues of fairness into 
the process of relocation. Research could thereby provide useful suggestions for 
local government. 
 
Entrepreneurial local governments have stoked up a highly competitive urban 
environment. A final line of further research might aim to come up with proposals 
that reduce the level of interurban competition and enhance regional integration and 
cooperation in the context of a new type of urbanisation in China. 
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List of Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Name 
  
BRR Bohai Rim Region 
CBD Central Business District 
CDG Changning District Government 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
DCACH Deputy Commander of Airport Construction Headquarters 
ETDZ Economic and Technological Development Zone 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HBDMC Hongqiao Business District Management Committee 
MDG Minhang District Government 
PRC People‟s Republic of China 
PRD Pearl Region Delta 
SEZ Special Economic Zone 
SWC Suzhou, Wuxi Changzhou 
SAG Shanghai Airport Group 
SMEC Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 
SCC Shanghai Commerce Committee 
SOE State-owned Enterprises 
SMCTC Shanghai Municipal Construction and Transportation 
Commission 
TVEs Township and Village Enterprises 
WTO World Trade Organization 
Expo World Expo in Shanghai 
YRD Yangtze River Delta 
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Glossary of Chinese terms 
Chinese in Pinyin                            Chinese   English 
Aibo  爱博 Aibo Community 
Baozupo   包租婆       Landlord ladies -- make a living through rental 
housing 
Chaiqian 
dabaogan                       
拆迁大包干 To take overall responsibility for land 
expropriation 
Chaiqian gongzuo 
xiaozu       
拆迁工作小组 Relocation working groups 
Chengzhongcun         城中村                       Urban villages 
Chengzhenhua 城镇化 Urbanization of small cities and counties 
Chengshihua   城市化 Urbanization 
Daqing     大庆             One mining city of Heilongjiang Province 
Dajiao 大脚 Successful economic performance 
Ditan shijian qu 低碳实践区 Low-carbon experimental area 
Di yige wunian 
jihua 
第一个五年计划 First Five-Year Plan 
Duo gongneng 
chengshi zongheti 
多功能城市综合
体 
Multi-functional urban complex 
Fazhan Pudong, 
zhenxing 
Shanghai, fuwu 
quanguo 
mianxiang shijie  
发展浦东 振兴
上海 服务全国 
面向世界 
Develop Pudong, revitalize Shanghai, serve the 
entire country and face the world 
Hukou     户口   Household registration system 
Hongqiao 
shangwuqu 
guanweihui 
虹桥商务区管委
会 
Hongqiao Business District Management 
Committee 
Hongqiao 
shangwuqu kaifa 
jianshe zhihuibu 
虹桥商务区开发
建设指挥部 
Shanghai Hongqiao Business District 
Development and Construction Headquarters 
Gundong fazhan 滚动发展 Rolling development 
Ganying chaomei                      赶英超美 Catch up with Britain and surpass the United 
States 
Gudao 孤岛 Isolated place out of city centre 
Jianchengqu 建成区 Built-up area    
Jian she yong di 建设用地 Construction land 
Jiangnan 江南 The southern part of Jiangsu Province 
Jinnainiu 金奶牛 A steady stream of supply of cash like cows 
Jiucheng gaizao 旧城改造 Urban renewal in the inner city 
Long tou 龙头 Dragon head 
Lilong 里弄 Backstreet alleys with red-brick terrace housing 
built by landlords to house rural migrants in 
Shanghai the city in the first half of the twentieth 
century 
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Lianhe qianye 
fuwu zhongxin 
联合企业服务中
心 
Joint enterprise service centre 
Pei le fu ren you 
zhe bing 
赔了夫人又折兵 Losing  one’s wife as well as losing one’s soldiers 
Pudong fazhan 
lingdao 
bangongshi 
浦东发展领导办
公室 
Pudong Development Leading Office 
Qitong yiping                              七通一平    The supply of water, gas, telephone lines, the 
Internet etc. and land levelling 
San xian                   三线 Third-front 
Shili yangchang 十里洋场 Ten Miles Foreign Market 
Shanghai 
Hongqiao zonghe 
jiaotong shuniu 
lingdao xiaozu 
上海虹桥交通综
合枢纽领导小组 
Shanghai Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub 
Project Construction Leading Group 
Shenhong touzi yu 
kaifa gongsi 
申虹投资开发公
司 
Shenhong Investment and Development Co., Ltd 
Shanghai tudi 
chubei zhongxin 
上海土地储备中
心 
Land Reserve Centre of Shanghai Municipality 
Shanghai jianshe 
touzi he kaifa 
gongsi 
上海建设投资开
发公司 
Shanghai Urban Construction Investment and 
Development Corporation 
Shanghai dianli 上海电力 Shanghai Electric Power Company 
Sunan 苏南 Parts of Jiangsu Province south of the Yangtze 
Subei 苏北 Parts of Jiangsu Province north of the Yangtze 
Tian di hu dong 天地互动 Interaction between heaven and earth, 
harmonizing relationships. 
Tui er jin san 退二进三 New industrial policy of withdrawal from the low-
end manufacturing sector and promotion of 
tertiary industries 
Urban hukou 
holders              
城市居民 Urban residents 
Xinhong     新虹桥 New Hongqiao 
Xintiandi                                        新天地 Place named as new heaven and earth in 
Hongqiao 
Xiaxiang 下乡 Urban youth were forced to go to rural areas to 
accept re-education from poor peasants during 
the Cultural Revolution 
Xiaojiao  小脚 Kunshan’s lower administrative ranking 
Xinhong jiedao 
weiyuanhui 
新虹街道委员会 New Hongqiao Street Committee 
Yicheng jiuzhen 一城九镇 One City, Nine Towns 
Yinfeng zhuchao 引凤筑巢 Attract the phoenix, then fix the nest 
Zijianfang   自建房 Self-built houses 
Zhaijidi     宅基地         The homestead 
Zhuchao yinfeng 筑巢引凤 Fix the nest, then attract the phoenix 
Zhihui chengshi 
shifanqu 
智慧城市示范区 Smart City Demonstration Zone 
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Appendix A- List of Interviews 
 Categories  Theme Code  Date 
Government officials  
(Nine cases) 
The positioning and aims of Hongqiao Business District G2012062101 21/06/2012 
What measures have been taken by Minhang District 
facing opportunities and competition from Hongqiao? 
 
G2012062102 21/06/2012 
What roles of Hongqiao Business District are on the 
project. 
 
G2012072603 26/07/2012 
The function of Xinhong Street Committee 
 
G2012072904 29/07/2012 
Planning process and construction of Hongqiao project G2012080305 03/08/2012 
The industrial layout in Hongqiao Business District 
 
G2012081106 11/08/2012 
What is difference in Hongqiao pre- and post-relocation? 
 
G2012080807 08/08/2012 
What are the roles of Hongqiao Business District 
Management Committee and Shenhong Company in the 
construction of the Business District? 
 
G2012081308 13/08/2012 
The issues of investment and land lease G2012081309 13/08/2012 
Group discussion 
(Three cases) 
Relocation compensation mechanism D2012072801 28/07/2012 
Categories Theme Code Date 
Group discussion 
(Three cases) 
Governance mechanism of Hongqiao project D2011120602 06/12/2011 
What they got and lost in relocation D2011122303 23/12/2012 
Planners  
(Three cases) 
The aims of the construction of Hongqiao transport hub 
and business district, and Shanghai’s urban 
transformation 
P2012072101 21/07/2012 
Different opinions of the planner and officials about the  
relocation of Aibo Community 
P2011010402 04/01/2012 
Planning of Hongqiao business district  P2011011003 10/01/2012 
Professors and scholars 
(Four cases) 
The role of Hongqiao hub on regional development, and 
critics’ views about the Hongqiao hub and business 
district 
S2012070101 01/07/2012 
The role of the hub on the regionalism S2012071002 10/07/2012 
The industrial layout in Hongqiao business district S2012080103 01/08/2012 
Development of Suzhou S2012063004 30/06/2012 
Administrators and leaders 
from state-owned company 
(Four cases) 
Function, role and operation of Shenhong Company A2012080201 02/08/2012 
What is the role of Shenhong Company in land 
expropriation and the construction of the transportation 
hub? 
A2011113002 30/11/2011 
Governance mechanism of Hongqiao project A2011120803 08/12/2011 
04/06/2009 
Relocation issues by Hongqiao project A2011122804 28/12/2011 
Village committee staff 
(Two cases) 
What are the attitudes of relocated villagers towards the 
project after relocation? 
C2012012201 22/01/2012 
What are the expectations of relocated villagers towards 
the project before relocation? 
C2012072902 29/07/2012 
Categories Theme Code Date 
Real estate developers (Two 
cases) 
Are there some incentives or preferential policies for 
settled enterprises? 
R20120724 24/07/2012 
Why invest in Hongqiao? R20120726 26/07/2012 
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Local residents 
(Four cases) 
The impact of the project on their lives R2012071501 15/07/2012 
The impact of the project on their lives R2012071502 15/07/2012 
The impact of the project on their lives R2012071603 16/07/2012 
The impact of the project on their lives R2012071604 16/07/2012 
Villagers resettled in Aibo 
Community 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation  V20120712 12/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120712 12/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120712 12/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation  V20120713 13/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120713 13/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120713 13/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation  V20120714 14/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120714 14/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120714 14/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation  V20120715 15/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120720 20/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V2120720 20/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation  V2120720 20/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120721 21/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120721 21/07/2012 
Villagers resettled in Aibo 
Community 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation  V20120721 21/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120722 22/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120722 22/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation  V20120722 22/07/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120126 26/01/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120126 26/01/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation  V20120126 26/01/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120127 27/01/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation V20120127 27/01/2012 
Villager’s attitude toward relocation  V20120127 27/01/2012 
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Appendix B-Parts of the transcript of interview  
This interview was conducted with officials responsible for the construction of the 
Hongqiao project and relocation task. 
Why was the Hongqiao project proposed by the municipal government? 
“Hongqiao project was an expanded project due to construction high speed railway 
station in Shanghai, high speed railway line was expected to promote economic 
and urban growth in Minhang district, based on comprehensive thought of Shanghai 
municipal government, project of High speed railway station and Hongqiao airport 
expansion were combined and site selected in Hongqiao. In this background, 
proposal of Hongqiao transport hub was promoted. along with construction 
transport hub, Shanghai municipal government attempt to build Shanghai as global 
city through construction four centres of shipment, trade, economic and financial. 
Hongqiao business district was expected to be trade centre to develop service 
sector in Shanghai, and promoted development of western shanghai.” 
 
What is the administrative mechanism in the process of the construction of 
Hongqiao transport and commercial hub? Who governs? 
“Hongqiao project is governed and proposed by Shanghai municipal government. 
Construction of Hongqiao project divided into two phases of construction Hongqiao 
transport hub and Hongqiao business zone. On order to coordinating progress of 
Hongqiao project, Shanghai municipal government established leading group of 
Hongqiao project, deputy mayor was nominated as head of this leading group, then 
related departments of municipal government and surrounding district aer part of 
this leading group. Then, under umbrella of this leading group, a series of 
organization bodies of Shenhong Company, Hongqiao business district 
management committee and Xinhong street committee were established by 
municipal governmen , among this governance bodies, Shenhong Company and 
Hongqiao business district management committee have played leading role in 
construction Hongqiao transport hub and Hongqiao business zone. Among 
construction Hongqiao transport hub, Minhang district and Huacao township 
government have also played crucial role in task of relocation and compensation of 
local villagers” 
What is the background of establishing Shenhong Company? 
“China has issued the open door policy since1978, in particular,  when Shanghai 
started project of developing Pudong new area in 1993, Shanghai has achieved 
stunning success which led shanghai to be re-emerged and on the course to global 
city. Along with almost finished projects of its inner urban regeneration and Pudong 
new area, Inner district has gradually become place of consumption from productive 
district; Pudong has also gradually on way to be become financial centre of 
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Shanghai. Construction of financial centre has fostered financial and its related 
industries gathering in Lujiazui of Pudong new area with policies support from 
central government (Such as the second operating headquarters of The People's 
Bank of China moved to Pudong from Beijing to support construction of financial 
centre in Shanghai). Even there is long way to go in terms of construction of 
financial centre, the prototype of the financial centre has gradually appeared to 
some extent in Pudong, overall, Shanghai municipal government has reached its 
goal and original aim in terms of developing Pudong new area and construction 
financial centre. But when it comes to issue of construction trade centre in 
Shanghai, there is no outstanding overall specific strategic plan to develop trade 
and commercial industry in entire Shanghai in the past decades. The existing 
planning only caters to part district of Shanghai not for whole Shanghai. 
Development of trade and commercial industry largely depend upon a few of roads, 
such as Nanjing Road, which could not form agglomeration effect, not to mention 
building commercial centre in Shanghai. Therefore, Shanghai municipal 
government has formed the strategy to build trade centre in Hongqiao, the reasons 
of Hongqiao was chosen as location is its location advantage, such as fast traffic 
advantage of Hongqiao airport and Hongqiao high speed train which promoting 
economic connection between Shanghai and Yangtze River Delta, which was 
expected to form the effect of city integration (同城化) and agglomeration. 
With an attempt to implement Shanghai municipal government‟s goal of building 
Hongqiao as one commercial centre of four centres, therefore Shanghai municipal 
government established Hongqiao business district to carry out its planning. 
The municipal government set up the state-owned enterprises to responsible for the 
preliminary work of building the business district: Shenhong Company (the State-
owned enterprise: Shen means Shanghai, Hong means Hongqiao airport), full 
name of Shanghai Shen Hong Investment and Development Co., Ltd., (referred to 
as Shenhong Company) which was jointly invested 5 billion yuan by three units of 
Shanghai Airport Group, Shanghai Jiushi Company and Shanghai Land Reserve 
Centre was set up in 2006. In order to achieve smooth development, Shanghai 
municipal government has paid much attention on the issue of share of Shenhong 
Company, Shanghai Airport (Group) Co., Ltd., accounted for 40%, both Shanghai 
Jiushi Company and Shanghai Land Reserve Centre accounted for 30% 
respectively. The shares arrangement of Shenhong can form perfect combination 
land reserve and transportation construction.” 
What is the role of Shenhong Company in the process of constructing Hongqiao 
transport hub and business zone? 
“Shenhong Company as a state-owned enterprise was authorized by Shanghai 
Municipal government to implement special land reserve and to lead preparation of 
the detailed planning within Hongqiao business district. So Shenhong Company 
replacing part of government‟s function and role has played a pivotal role in land 
expropriation and infrastruction construction in the project of Hongqiao transport 
and business zone. 
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In terms of land expropriation, Shanghai municipal government allocated 2 billion 
yuan as start-up funding for Shenhong Company, then, Shenhong Company 
borrowed money from bank to purchase land under guarantee of Shanghai 
municipal government. Shenhong Company delineated scope of demolition and the 
number of land should be purchased from Minhang district based on the planning of 
Hongqiao transport hub and business district. Minhang district government was in 
charge of project of demolition and farmer replacement, Shenhong Company 
bought land from Minhang district at price of 1.40 million yuan per mu (1,000 mu is 
about 66.7 hectares or 166.7 acres), Minhang district government is fully 
responsible for everything after demolition. After project of demolition, vacant land 
was prepared by Minhang district government, the rural land was converted to 
urban land which was under supervision of Hongqiao Company. Hongqiao transport 
hub has taken up some part land for infrastructure construction such as the second 
runway of airport and high speed railway station which was paid by Hongqiao 
airport group and Shanghai Railway Bureau. The rest of land has transformed into 
commercial land which under supervision of Shenhong company as landlord. The 
main feature of Shenhong Company is to explore land, provide supporting 
construction for construction Hongqiao business zone and to implement land 
reserve. Before land leasing auction, Shenhong Company need provide basic 
infrastructure such as pipeline of energy and network, road to link the various plots, 
elevated road and downlink channel which is prerequisite to land before the auction. 
Shenhong Company has established subsidiary companies to be responsible for 
the construction of these projects. 
Shenhong Company also provided relocation cost. Shenhong Company has bought 
rural land from Minhang district at price of 1.40 million Yuan per mu, the total 
amount of land is 12.8 square kilometres ( about 1500* 12.8 mu) costing 27.072 
billion yuan, which is bank loan by Shenhong Company using land as collateral. 
During period of providing basic infrastructure, Shenhong Company also gets bank 
loan which was guaranteed by Shanghai municipal government. The entire bank 
loan used in terms of land purchasing and providing basic construction will be paid 
by the money from land leasing auction. Also because of needs a lot of money 
during the construction period, Shenhong Company is ranked the seventh largest 
loan customers of Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, the loan amount up to 
14.6 billion yuan in 2008.” 
 
Does financial crisis affect the development progress? 
“It brought some negative influence to development progress. Its impact has 
revealed on two aspects: on the one hand, private real estate could not access to 
credit from bank which was controlled by government causing slow down progress 
of the construction project; on the other hand, due to financial crisis, the growth rate 
of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and government revenue is slower than those of 
pre-crisis, so government has been facing fiscal constraint.  In particular, the speed 
of land sales is slower meanwhile land income is also reducing which is big problem 
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for government, because government expenditure is largely dependent on revenue 
from land sales” 
Interviews with relocated villagers. 
How much land and how many houses did you have before relocation? 
“I have four stories building, which cost me a lot money to build and decorate it. It is 
a pity we need displace from my house, in addition, I family had 3.2 mu lands for 
production and rent, my life standard dropped compare to pre –relocation”. 
What did you get from the construction of the Hongqiao transport and commercial 
hub? 
“My family got three new flats; I admitted that design, quality and environment of 
community are good which looks like new urban community. The new community 
provided basic facility as the urban community have such as underground parking, 
public green land, sport facilities, outdoor walking and leisure venues for elderly. 
But except this, I have lost my source of income, land divided, housing rental, 
agricultural production all lost after relocation, most important, we could not find job 
here, particularly for young generation, my son have not been finding a job, 
compensation payment was run out after decoration of flats.” 
What did you expect from the Hongqiao transport and commercial hub? 
“Now, we have been settled here, I expected Hongqiao project can bring job 
opportunities for us, and bring more renters to rent my new flats which will increase 
my income.” 
What is difference in your life pre- and post-demolishment? 
“I do like to resettle Aibo community, my family‟s income has dropped so much, the 
difference between pre and post relocation is drop of income. I almost have nothing 
income, before relocation, I have large amount of income from housing rental, I 
could not live now, money was run out, I hope government gen more compensation 
for us and get job for me.” 
What issues are your most concerned about? 
“Income, job opportunity, get more compensation for our future life, fair issues are 
our most concerned issues.” 
“There are not enough job opportunities in Hongqiao area, there is only some low-
end job opportunity in there such as security staff with low salary which has less 
attractive to ex-farmers. The situation get worse, younger generation could not find 
job in Hongqiao area when Hongqiao business zone is being built, which has 
caused many social problems in there, for instance, many farmers addicted to 
gambling, I do not like this.” 
“I requested Minhang and Hongqiao government to get more compensation for us. 
Because pension subsidy is the only source of their livelihood, as for the old villager 
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in particular reply heavy on the pension subsidy. But the level of pension subsidy of 
ex-farmers is sub-district level which is lower than those of retired old workers have 
in urban area. We were protesting for high level and got more compensation. 
We complained unfair economic compensation. Because there were some phases 
to relocate villagers, the earlier to be relocated, the less compensation to get, we 
were relocated earlier we get big lost compared to those who relocated later, this is 
unfair. In addition, local village leaders got many more flats in the process of 
relocation, they benefited so much form relocation. Income and job opportunity are 
most concerned issues for us, we need job and more income for our life” 
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Appendix C-Questionnaire 
Dear Citizens:  
We are students from the East China Normal University, conducting questionnaire 
surveys for the research of Yanpeng Jiang who is a PhD candidate from the 
University of Leeds. His thesis title is New Wave Urban Development in Shanghai: 
Planning and Building the Hongqiao Transport Hub and Business Zone. I hope that 
you can take ten minutes to support our research.  
This questionnaire is anonymous. All replies will be kept strictly confidential and 
used only for the purpose of the study. There is no right or wrong answer. We 
simply would like to understand your views on some issues [relating to your 
experience of relocation]. Our investigators will introduce to you some background 
information regarding this research to facilitate your process of answering your 
questionnaire. Your help is important to us! Please OFFER more support, very 
grateful! If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Jiang 
Yanpeng, School of Geography, University of Leeds, UK.  
School of Geography, University of Leeds, UK 
Email：gyypj@leeds.ac.uk 
Phone number: 07809770689 
School of Geography 
University of Leeds 
Leeds, UK. LS2, 9JT 
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Time and place                                                       Questionnaire No and Interviewer 
                                                                                                         
 
 
  
  Please tell me the category of your household registration. 
A.  Rural Hukou                                 B. Urban Hukou 
 
When did you sign the contract and move out of your home?                              
                                                                                            Date---2006-2007----------
--------- 
When did you move to Aibo Community?                           Date----2009-2011---------
------------                                         
1.1 How many mu of land did your household have? 
 A. Cultivated land                                       B. Paddy fields                           
C. Mountain forest                                       D. Other                   
 
1.2 How many labour forces did your family have? --------------------------   
 
1.3 What was the main income source of your household prior to relocation please?  
A. Farm production                                          B. Factory work                                  
C. Professional activities                                  D. Land dividends                        
E. Business                                            F. Self-employed business 
G. Housing rental                                            H. Other 
1.4 How much was the total annual income of your whole household prior to 
relocation (Yuan RMB)? 
A. 0-10,000                                     B.   10,000-20,000     
C. 20,000-40,000                            D.    40,000-50,000 
E. ≥50,000                                
 
1.5 How much is the annual income of your whole household after relocation (Yuan 
RMB)? 
 
                                                        
Village  Age   Educational 
level 
 Occupation  Number of household 
members 
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A. 0-10,000                                     B.   10,000-20,000     
C. 20,000-40,000                            D.    40,000-50,000 
E. ≥50,000                                
 
1.6 What is the main income source of your household after relocation? 
A. Factory work                                B. Professional activities                                      
C. Business                                      D. Self-employed 
E. Housing rental                              F. Other                  --------------------------   
 
1.7 What kind of structure was your house prior to relocation?  
A. Bungalow                               
B. Two-storey western-style building 
C. Three-storey western-style building                                 
D. Four-storey western-style building 
E. Commercial housing 
 
1.8 How many square metres of floor space do you have in your house? 
A. ＜100 M2                                                          B. 100-150 M2   
C. 150-200M2                                    D. ＞200  M2                         
 
1.9 How much money did your house cost to build?   
 
2.0 Were you invited to give any suggestions (e.g., received information, 
participated in meetings and was visited by officials and researchers) for your 
relocation before you moved? 
A. Meeting                                    B. Paper materials                        
C. Visit                                          D. Propaganda                           
 
2.1 Is relocation an opportunity to become prosperous from your experience? 
A. Yes                                             B. No                      
 
2.2 What kind of compensation methods did you choose? 
A.  Monetary compensation                                   B. Off-site housing compensation 
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2.3 How many sets of your apartment do you have now?            
            set                      M2                                            
 
2.2 How much monetary compensation did you get?                                                                
Unit: thousand Yuan 
 
2.5 Did you wish to be relocated?  
A. Yes                                                            B. No                         
 
2.6 What has been your biggest problem in the process of relocation?  
A. Too low compensation                    B. Excessive losses   
C. Sadness at leave                            D. Uncertain future     
 
2.7 How satisfied are you with the compensation standard?  
A. Very satisfied                                      B. Satisfied               
C. A little dissatisfied                               D. Very dissatisfied   
E.  More satisfied than dissatisfied  
 
2.8. Is the compensation standard the same in the process of relocation? 
A. Yes                                            B. No    
 
2.9 On which of the following have you principally invested with your compensation? 
A. Apartment decoration                 B. Establishing business 
C. Saving for future                         D. Marriage ceremony for your children                      
E. Buying car and consumption                  
          
3.0. How satisfied are you with job of relocation?  
A. Very satisfied                                       B. Satisfied    
C. More satisfied than dissatisfied           D. A little dissatisfied            
E.  Very dissatisfied   
 
3.1 What factors will affect your evaluation of the work by officials in the process of 
relocation? 
A.  Attitude of government officials working on the project                              
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B. Fairness of compensation   
C. Level of relocation compensation standard                   
D. The distance between resettlement housing and original house  
E. The reasonableness of assessment of house value  
 
3.2 How satisfied are you with the infrastructure and facilities in the new 
resettlement area after relocation? 
A. Very satisfied                                                B. Satisfied         
C. More satisfied than dissatisfied                    D. Very dissatisfied              
E. A little dissatisfied                                             
                           
3.3 What is the greatest difficulty for your household? 
A. No land                                      B. Hard to become employed 
C. No funding to invest                   D. No way to get rich 
 
3.4 What is the biggest problem in your present life? 
A. Less income                                   B. Worse standard of living 
C. Inconvenient to live                        D. Fewer job opportunities 
 
3.5 What problem are you most concerned about?  
A. Job opportunity                                        B. Health care 
C. Pension insurance                                    D. Child education 
E. Standard of living                                          F. Other                           
 
3.6 What is the biggest change for you brought by relocation? 
A. Convenient transportation              B. Improved living environment 
C. More job opportunities                   D. Increased income  
E. Reduced income                            F. Other   
 
3.7 How did you deal with problems arising from your relocation? 
A. Put up with them                                               B. Complained                       
C. Reported them to government                            D. Accused local leaders      
E. Deviate actions                      
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3.8 Do you wish to get further support from the government after your resettlement
（e.g., funding, policies, job opportunity and technology)? 
A. Very much                                                 B. Wish   
C. Do not wish                                               D. No  
 
 
3.9 Please make a comparison between your pre- and post-relocation experience  
by ticking the most appropriate box. 
 
 A: Much 
better 
B: Better 
off 
C: The 
same 
D: Worse 
off 
E: Much 
worse 
 
1：Compensation       
2：Job opportunities      
3：Income       
4：Housing      
5：Living environment       
6：Level of 
consumption 
     
7：Infrastructure      
8: Relations with 
neighbours 
     
9：Healthcare      
10：Children‟s 
education 
     
11：Welfare for the 
elderly 
     
12：Other      
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.0 Please indicate how important each factor will be for your family in the process 
of relocation by ticking the most appropriate box. 
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 A：Of pre-
eminent 
importance 
B：Of great 
importance 
C：Of some 
importance 
D： Of no 
importance 
1：
Compensation  
    
2：Job 
opportunities 
    
3：Income      
4：Housing      
5：Living 
environment 
    
6：Consumption 
level 
    
7：Infrastructure     
8: Relations with 
neighbours 
    
9：Healthcare      
10：Education      
11：Welfare for 
the elderly 
    
12：Other     
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尊敬的市民： 
 
 
我们是华东师范大学学生，正在研究课题-大型城市交通枢纽工程对区域空间结构的
影响和国家自然科学基金项目-城市建成区扩张的最低成本驱动与周期响应机理研所
持观点的问卷调查，希望您能抽出十分钟支持我们的研究。 
 
这份问卷不会记录您的姓名，您所提供的所有答案和信息我们都会严格保密并且仅仅
用于本项研究。您的回答没有对错之分，我们只是想了解您对一些问题的真实看法。
在答卷过程中，我们的调查员还会为您介绍一些背景信息以方便您回答相关问题。您
的热心帮助对我们至关重要！请多加支持，万分感谢！ 
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时间地点                                                                                        问卷编号采访人 
                                                                                                         
 
 
  
  撤迁前您的户口分类 
A 农业户口                                   B城市户口 
您什么时候签撤迁合同并迁出您的住房？                               日期------------------------- 
您什么时候搬到爱博家园？                                                     日期-------------------------
-                                         
1.1 请问您家里原来有多少亩土地？ 
 A.耕地                                           B. 田                             
C.山地                                            D.其他 
1.2请问撤迁前您家里有多少劳动力？                                --------------------------   
 
1.3 撤迁前您家里的主要收入来源是什么？ 
A. 种地                                           B.工厂工作                                    
C做手艺                                        D.土地分红                           
E.做生意                                        F.搞副业 
G 房屋出租                                    H 其他 
1.4搬迁前您家的年收入是多少： 
A 0-10,000                                     B   10,000-20,000     
C 20,000-40,000                            D    40,000-50,000 
E ≥50,000                                
1.5 搬迁后您家的年收入是多少： 
A 0-10,000                                     B   10,000-20,000     
C 20,000-40,000                            D    40,000-50,000 
E ≥50,000                                
 
 
                                                        
村  年龄  文化 
程度 
 职业  家庭 
人口 
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1.6 搬迁后您家的收入来源是什么？ 
A. 工厂工作                                   B   手艺工作                                     
C.做生意                                        D.搞副业 
E房屋出租                                     F 其他                  --------------------------   
 
1.7 您家房子是什么样的结构? 
A 一层楼的平房                              B 两层的洋楼 
C三层的洋楼                                  D四层及四层以上的洋楼 
E 商品房 
1.8 你家的原来的房子有多少平米？ 
A ＜100 M2                                                        B 100-150 M2   
C 150-200M2                                    D＞200 M2                         
1.9 你家的这栋房子共花了多少钱？  
 
2.0 搬迁前，有没有向您征求过意见（比如开会，发材料和访问等） 
A 开会                                         B 发材料                      
C 访问                                         D 宣传                          
2.1 从您的经历看，撤迁能否成为脱贫致富的机遇？ 
A 是                                             B 不是                      
2.2 您选择的撤迁补偿方式为：  
A 货币补偿                                    B  异地产权房屋安置 
2.3 你家的新分的房子有多少套？                                       套                  M2                                            
2.4你家共得到多少补偿金？                                                                    万 
2.5您愿不愿意被撤迁？ 
A 愿意                                                               B 不愿意                
2.6 您认为撤迁中你的最大的困难是什么？ 
A 搬迁费太少                                  B 搬家损失太大 
C 不舍得家园                                  D前途不定 
2.7您对确定的农民撤迁补偿标准是否满意？ 
A 非常满意                                       B 满意 
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C 不满意                                          D非常不满意 
2.8虹桥撤迁过程中，撤迁补偿的标准是否一致？ 
A 一致                                              B 不一致  
2.9 您把补偿金都用在哪些方面？ 
A. 房屋装修                                     B.生意买卖 
C.储蓄存款                                      D.操办婚事                      
E 买车或者消费                          
3.0您对撤迁工作满意吗 
A 很满意                                          B 基本满意 
C一般                                              D 不满意 
E 很不满意 
3.1 那些因素影响您对撤迁工作的评价？ 
A 政府工作人员的工作，                            B 补偿的公平性 
C 撤迁补偿标准的高低                                D 撤迁后的房屋安置远近 
E 房屋价值评估的合理性 
3.2 您对现在的基础设施（供电供水，道路，通讯和市场）满意吗？ 
A 非常满意                                       B 满意          
C说不上来                                       D 非常不满意                    
E 不满意                                          
3.3您认为现在最大的困难是什么？ 
A没有土地                                        B就业困难 
C无钱投资                                       D致富无门 
3.4您认为生活中最大的问题是什么？ 
A收入减少                                        B生活水平下降 
C生活不方便                                    D 工作机会少 
3.5你现在最关注的问题是什么？ 
A就业机会                                         B 医疗保障 
C养老保险                                         D小孩教育 
E 生活水平                                         F 其他                            
3.6 您觉得动迁给你带来了最大的变化是什么？ 
A交通便利                                         B 居住条件改善 
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C就业机会增多                                  D 收入增加 
E收入减少                                          F 其他    
3.7在搬迁过程中您的要求不能满足，利益受损时，您是怎么处理的？ 
A. 忍耐                                                B 发发牢骚                       
C反映情况                                          D 上诉告状                  
E极端行为                      
3.8 在搬迁后，您希不希望政府给予后期扶持（资金，政策，就业和技术等）？ 
A 非常希望                                                  B 希望 
C 可有可无                                                  D 没必要 
3.9请您对撤迁前后的情况进行一下对比（在合适的地方打勾） 
 A:好多了 B：好一些 C：差不多 D：差一些 E：差多了 
 
1：补偿      
2：工作机会      
3：收入      
4：房子      
5：生活环境      
6：消费水平      
7：基础设施      
8：邻里关系      
9：医疗保健      
10：孩子教育      
11：老人福利      
12：其他      
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4.0 您认为在搬迁过程中，以下方面重要与否（在合适的地方打钩） 
 A：非常重要 B：很重要 C：一般 D： 不重要 
1：补偿     
2：工作机会     
3：收入     
4：房子     
5：生活环境     
6：消费水平     
7：基础设施     
8：邻里关系     
9：医疗保险     
10：孩子教育     
11：老人福利     
12：其他     
 
